The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)
Moderator's Note
Prompted by the SWJ Blog article 'Meet An Urban Planner For Cities That Don't Yet Exist' and link:http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/mee...dont-yet-exist I found that two hundred threads contain Kilcullen and nine threads specifically contain his name in the title, so before I merge them to this 'Collection' thread they were:
1. In 2008 'Killcullen Briefing' a link to another website
2. In 2008 after his book was published 'Kilcullen article' on defeating the Taliban
3. In 2009 announcing a speaking slot 'David Kilcullen at the Pritzker Military Library'
4. In 2009 a link to an Australian TV debate 'Kilcullen debates the ethics and tactics of contemporary warfare'
5. In 2009 a thread after 'Accidental insurgent' was published 'Recovering David Kilcullen'
6. In 2006 'Kilcullen -- New Theories for a New Way of War'
7. In 2010 'Deconstructing Kilcullen's Counterinsurgency'
8. In 2010 seeking questions for a meeting 'Questions for Dr. David Kilcullen'
9. In 2011 'Kilcullen on Libya: U.S. Should be ‘Air Referee’
In January 2015 four other threads were merged into this one.(ends)
Kilcullen's work has been discussed elsewhere on SWC, including the thread on his "28 articles". But given the high-level attention it has received, a dedicated thread seems appropriate.
Lt. Col in the Australian Army, Ph.D. in anthropology, Chief Strategist in the Office of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, recently awarded the Medal for Exceptional Public Service, and subject of a glowing review in the New Yorker article quoted above.
Here are his major works:
Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency
Complex Warfighting, April 7, 2004
Counterinsurgency Redux, Survival -- IISS, Winter, 2006
Three Pillars of Counterinsurgency, Dr David J. Kilcullen*, Remarks delivered at the U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Conference, Washington D.C., 28 September 2006
Start at the beginning...
"28 articles" was written for a Coalition Company Commander just warned for deployment in Iraq or Afghanistan. With admirable clarity, at the opening he defines his subject.
Quote:
(Counterinsurgency) is a competition with the insurgent for the right and the ability to win the hearts, minds and acquiescence of the population.
Right from the start … guaranteed failure. This definition is true when fighting a domestic insurgency, or if we are seeking to create or maintain a colony. Neither is true – yet – for America. Certainly not in Iraq.
The Iraq government must win the hearts and minds of its people for the Iraq State. A US company commander can only help, as a secondary player in this game.
Apologies, I forgot our ace in the hole!
As usual with the US military, deus ex machina saves the day!
Quote:
Originally Posted by "Knowing the Enemy", George Packer, The New Yorker (Dec 18, 2006)
... a “ruggedized” laptop computer, loaded with data from social-science research conducted in Iraq — such as, McFate said, “an analysis of the eighty-eight tribes and subtribes in a particular province.” Now the project is recruiting social scientists around the country to join five-person “human terrain” teams that would go to Iraq and Afghanistan with combat brigades and serve as cultural advisers on six-to-nine-month tours.
Since there are so few Arabic-speaking, Iraq-expert social scientists in the US (even fewer for Afghanistan), the data for these laptops’ will mostly come from the locals. That is, our maps of the social terrain will be that of various partisans in the Iraq civil war. (there are no neutrals in a civil war)
It's a high-tech way of making their enemies, our enemies.
Good idea, just the wrong time and place.
Also this illustrates our confusion between "data" and "knowledge." Even if the data is correct, most of our company commanders will lack the contextual understanding -- the wider view of Iraq/Afghanistan society -- needed to successfully apply it.
Who should we be listening to?
The usual suspects ... Lind, Richards, van Creveld ... and the other folks you see published on www.d-n-i.net
Unfortunately we are in the early stages of developing strategies effective in the age of 4GW. Early days yet. Yet the wealth of writing of the subject, from both in and outside the services, suggests that we'll have results eventually.
Implementing them might be a more difficult problem. I consider this the critical step, about which I've seen nothing of interest. Perhaps we must learn to wage 4GW on our own military institutions.
The sage who I believe has produced the first keys to winning 4GW is MAJ Don Vandergriff (The Path to Victory). In the end, our people are our greatest strength. Nothing is more important than getting the right system to attract, retain, and promote in the armed services.
Among my articles, the most operational is, I believe:
"Militia: the dominant defensive force in 21st Century 4GW?"
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/pdf/fabius_..._militia-1.pdf
Another view of Kilcullen's work, by T. X. Hammes
The below link goes to a favorable mention of "Counterinsurgency Redux" by T. X. Hammes. Hammes is on the A-team of 4GW experts. His opinion deserves attention.
http://www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-i...-guerrilla-war
Carl is right, from one perspective...
(a quickly written note, apologize for typos)
From the perspective of company commanders, this is just another set of advice, to be skimmed for a few insights. "#1 Know your turf ... tell me something I don't already know."
It's banal in the sense of commonplace, almost trivial.
(side note: For every members of Al Qaeda there must be hundred+ manuals on how to fight him, many of which are hundreds of pages long ... Perhaps we should conduct counterinsurgency by smothering our enemies with manuals.)
From a larger perspective this -- boiling his work down to commonplaces -- misses the key to Kilcullen's views. He's a brilliant PhD anthropologist - Lt Col in the Aussie Army.
I'll bet that he means this stuff, in its full glory as I described above. As do the senior DoD and State folks -- uniformed and not -- who promote his work.
The "excesses" (my word, not yours) that you throw away ("be the world expert on your district") are his key insights. Delusional as they might be.
This illustrates some key larger points as to why we lose these wars. Hence deserves attention!
Going out on a limb here, but...
FB,
I try to live by the adage that arguing over the Internet is like competing in the Special Olympics because even if you win, you're still retarded.
That said, I offer that you have misread the 28 Articles:
Quote:
Kilcullen then gives 28 steps to victory. Let's start at the top.
As a former company commander who actually served in Iraq, my read of the work tells me it was not intended to be a presciption for victory, but rather a memory jogger so that the mobilized company commander could frame his thoughts, work, and shape his staff. He wants the guy on the ground to contribute to victory, not be the end all.
Kilcullen also wants the commander to avoid being part of the problem, like the hammer in search of a nail. If you think his work is only good for the insurgents, then I believe that you have misread and missed his point.
a minor point about the discussion...
Folks, we're all stumbling around here. If you want good answers, call Martin van Creveld. It's long distance, but worth it.
Meanwhile, back in the weeds, it does not help me when you say that I'm wrong (btw, you're pussycats compared to the DNI editorial cabal).
Or that I've mis-read Kilcullen (ditto).
I've given a close analysis of his text. Please give specifics as to my errors.
Zenpundit, Merv, and others have raised some great and specific points, which I will attempt to grapple with later. Now on to the central question ...