HASC Announces Roles and Missions Panel

HASC Announces Roles and Missions Panel

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House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton (D-MO) and Ranking Member Duncan Hunter (R-CA) announced the creation of a committee panel to examine the roles and missions of the military services. The following members have been named to serve on the Roles and Missions Panel:

Congressman Jim Cooper (D-TN), Chairman
Congressman Rick Larsen (D-WA)
Congresswoman Kristen Gillibrand (D-NY)
Congressman Joe Sestak (D-PA)

Congressman Phil Gingrey (R-GA), Ranking Member
Congressman Geoff Davis (R-KY)
Congressman Michael Conaway (R-TX)

“The basic structure of the Department of Defense and the division of labor between the military services has not dramatically changed since the late 1940s. Ensuring that the military services are working on the appropriate roles and missions is key to our national security and Congress has an important role to play in this effort. Under the able leadership of Chairman Jim Cooper and Ranking Member Phil Gingrey, we will evaluate and identify options in order to maintain the fighting force our nation needs to protect the American people,” said Chairman Skelton.

“We look forward to working with our colleagues on this important issue. The assignment of roles and missions to the Armed Services has always been a critical element to America’s security. I’d like to thank Rep. Gingrey, Rep. Conaway, Rep. Davis and all of the other members of the panel for agreeing to undertake this important endeavor,” said Ranking Member Hunter.

“The military finds itself facing unpredictable threats in a dangerous new world. Our military services have responded bravely to these challenges and are completing missions they never anticipated. This panel will explore the changing missions of the military services, identify gaps in our capabilities, and propose options that ensure the United States can defend itself against every threat to national security. I look forward to beginning this important work with my colleagues,” said Congressman Cooper.

“This panel will allow us the opportunity to study an issue vital to our nation’s Armed Forces. I am honored to serve as Ranking Member of the panel, and look forward to working together with Chairman Cooper and other panel Members on this important undertaking,” said Congressman Gingrey.

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Isn't that an example of Congressional micro-managing of DOD? It seems to me that if the services need to be transformed (which they do, but not along Rumsfeld's lines) it ought to come from the services, not be dictated to them.

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Originally Posted by kit

Isn't that an example of Congressional micro-managing of DOD? It seems to me that if the services need to be transformed (which they do, but not along Rumsfeld's lines) it ought to come from the services, not be dictated to them.

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DoD and the Services have proven incapable of deep change without outside intervention. It took the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reform Act of 1986 to get jointness taken seriously. I think this is well within Congress' obligation to exercise oversight.

I'd also add that this type of oversight helps civilian leadership understand how to employ the military toward policy ends. I hope this will facilitate some very honest and frank discussions toward that.

As Steve points out and recent public arguments reinforce, service culture can be parochial and myopic. Publicly defining roles and missions is a good step in helping us posture for our new security challenges.

Best regards, Rob

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Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

I'd also add that this type of oversight helps civilian leadership understand how to employ the military toward policy ends. I hope this will facilitate some very honest and frank discussions toward that.

As Steve points out and recent public arguments reinforce, service culture can be parochial and myopic. Publicly defining roles and missions is a good step in helping us posture for our new security challenges.

Best regards, Rob

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You're right, but just changing the structure without changing the military culture would only result in "old" officers leading the "new" military. Not exactly an idea which offers comfort, is it?

However, I suppose we have to start somewhere.

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Originally Posted by kit

You're right, but just changing the structure without changing the military culture would only result in "old" officers leading the "new" military. Not exactly an idea which offers comfort, is it?

However, I suppose we have to start somewhere.

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Such structure changes, however, often prompt the "old" officers to retire. It also creates openings for the "new" officers to move up. Frankly, I think an overhaul of the personnel system (as Vandegriff and others have proposed) should accompany any major roles and missions overhaul.

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Originally Posted by kit

You're right, but just changing the structure without changing the military culture would only result in "old" officers leading the "new" military. Not exactly an idea which offers comfort, is it?

However, I suppose we have to start somewhere.

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There are ways to change the culture through legislation. The most effective elements of Goldwater Nichols were the requirements that the Services promote officers who had had joint assignments at least as the same rate as those who had not, and requiring a joint assignment for promotion to flag rank. Immediately, the Services started sending their stars to joint assignments instead of their bottom feeders.

Announcements such as this may or may not have underlying substance. There are no heavyweights on the subcommitte that I can identify. The next thing to watch is whether the Senate follows suit and which staffers join the team. G-N86 was the result of a coupla "A" squad staffers, led by Jim Locher, and the alignment of political power in both houses.

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Originally Posted by Steve Blair

Such structure changes, however, often prompt the "old" officers to retire. It also creates openings for the "new" officers to move up. Frankly, I think an overhaul of the personnel system (as Vandegriff and others have proposed) should accompany any major roles and missions overhaul.

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I agree with that statement. And not only the personnel system, but the education and training tracks too. The military of the future can't afford to continue the parochialism inherent in MOS specific training for officers and the coupling of that with assignments outside their MOS or to joint operations commands. We can't expect, for instance, an officer who came up the 11B track to suddenly know enough about fleet operations, SpecOps or the employment of air power to efficiently manage, and lead, a joint operations command.

Yes, a smart officer surrounds himself with competent, qualified staff officers who are strong where he is weak, but how much cross-service experience does any one officer have? Is it enough for him to meet and evaluate enough people from the other services to fill those jobs when the time comes? I think the answer is probably not. That means he'll be dependent upon the personnel systems of the other services, and the "good ol' boy" network, to fill those staff slots. That seems rather hit or miss to me.

Actually, I'm a fan of the old German staff officer career track system and think it's something which should be examined here.

JCS did a big "Roles & Missions" study in the mid-80s. Conclusion -- more of the same.

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Originally Posted by Old Eagle

JCS did a big "Roles & Missions" study in the mid-80s. Conclusion -- more of the same.

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The most influential one was the Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) of the 1990s. You're right, though, that they didn't recommend any earth shattering changes.

I'm interested in the Army/Marine division of labor. Below is an op ed on it that will be in the September Strategic Studies Institute newsletter.

Grunts and Jarheads: Rethinking the Army-Marine Division of Labor

Debate rages today about the future of America’s ground forces. Gone are the days when serious strategists could suggest that that utility of landpower was receding. Now no one questions its importance. But there is disagreement on the type and number of ground forces that the nation needs.

Among the most contentious points are the size of the force (by how much should the Army and Marines be enlarged?), specialized formations for irregular warfare and stabilization operations, and the role of the reserve components. All of these are vitally important. There is, though, another issue which receives less attention: the relationship between the Army and the Marine Corps—the two primary components of America’s ground forces. Does the United States need two ground forces with virtually similar capabilities? I once heard a perplexed foreign officer say, “I’ll never understand your military—not only does your navy have an army, but your navy’s army has an air force!” Is there a strategic reason for this beyond simple tradition? If not, what should the division of labor within the ground forces be? These are not new questions, but are ones that should be asked anew, given the evolving national security environment.

To answer these questions we must first be clear on what we want ground forces to do. While nearly all strategists agree that irregular warfare and stabilization operations will be the most common tasks for the U.S. military in coming decades, there is also a broad consensus that it must retain the capability for conventional warfighting. This means the ground forces must be capable of multi-division stabilization or combat operations of relatively short duration, and smaller scale counterinsurgency support or stabilization operations lasting many years. In most cases, major operations would take place within the context of a multinational coalition, but the United States must also be able to undertake unilateral or near-unilateral action.

How, then, should the Army and Marines divide or share responsibility for these actions? Over the past century, there have been two methods. One was a functional division of labor. The Marine specialized in securing littoral regions, fighting small wars, and, later, amphibious and expeditionary operations. During the height of the Cold War, the basic idea was that the Marines would handle limited contingencies such as noncombatant evacuations. For warfighting, they would be among the first ground forces deployed (at least for operations within a few hundred miles of the coast) later to be bolstered or replaced by Army divisions with more “staying power.” This gave the United States both a rapid response capability and the ability to undertake sustained, intense conventional combat. The second method was to treat the Marines and the Army as interchangeable. During the world wars, Korea, and Vietnam, for instance, there were few capability differences between Marine and Army divisions. The differences seem to be receding today as the Army continues to make itself more expeditionary and the Marines become more sustainable.

Either of the responsibility arrangements could be used today. The Department of Defense might continue to use the Marines as rapidly deployable, initial entry forces and the Army as a follow-on. If so, it might make sense to reconfigure the Army's lighter units—the 82d Airborne Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 10th Mountain Division-- particularly if the Marines augment their capability to project and sustain power inland by deploying the Osprey or some other new helicopter. The second option would be to simply allow the Marines and the Army to be interchangeable. The Marines could continue to develop special operations capability and the ability to project and sustain force inland, and the Army would retain its capabilities for initial entry operations and its organic air units while developing sea basing and other expeditionary capabilities. As in the world wars, there would be little distinction between a Marine and Army unit. Conceivably, mixed divisions or combat teams could become the norm. But there is also a third option: a geographic division of labor. The Marines, for instance, might be the primary ground force provider for the Pacific Rim and, perhaps, Latin America, the Army for Africa, Europe, and Central, Southwest, and South Asia. This would allow the services some degree of focus concerning cultural expertise, language, and relationships with partner militaries.

Each of these options has advantages, risks, and costs. Ultimately, the decision is strategic. Maximizing flexibility and minimizing risk by preserving redundant capabilities comes at a high cost. Can we really afford two interchangeable ground forces? A division of labor between the two, though, decreases flexibility and increases the risk that we might not have the forces we need in adequate numbers during a time of crisis. But it also diminishes redundancy. In the coming decade, broader trends may force American policymakers and strategists to take the more frugal path. If, as many defense experts predict, the United States faces a budget crunch as the population ages, infrastructure decays, and the costs of rebuilding the military after the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts mount, a division of labor between the Army and Marines, however much risk it entails, may prove necessary.

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Originally Posted by SteveMetz

Ultimately, the decision is strategic.

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I would disagree with that statement. Ulitmately, the decision is political and has nothing to do with strategy. And the Marines have a lot of friends in Congress, plus the best PR in the business.

Don't forget...this isn't the first time we've debated this. In the early to mid-twentieth century, when it became obvious that the Navy no longer needed troops to repel boarders, the future of the Marine Corps was being questioned, seriously, and the Corps decided to re-define their role from that job to being the pre-imminent authorities on amphibious operations, in spite of the fact that the Army had plenty of experience at it. And, they successfully sold that idea.

What the author of the piece quoted seems to be doing is finding a reason to keep the Marines, rather than just assessing the probabilities, and I suspect that's how the whole debate will progress. In the end, political realities will prevail and the Marines will be given some job to do.

I wonder is it better to let existing traditions, size and capabilities determine missions and roles, or would we better served using roles and missions to determine size and capabilities?

Is the HASC going to use this as an opportunity to re-evaluate what roles and missions are relevant given our current and emerging policies and the threats we face, or is this really just redrawing the interior lines for the purpose of allocation?

If its the latter, its really just opens the door for politics (the "where you sit is where you stand", and "all politics is local" apply). If it is the former, where the military and the legislators have a real discussion about strategic direction to achieve policy goals, I think it could be a new ball game.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not so ignorant as to believe the "office callers" are not in full court press on the Hill - but I think those are the two ends of the spectrum. If Congress wants to help establish the conditions which will serve us over the coming decades, this is a great opportunity (Sorry Ken, I had to say it:D).

Steve's question about defining who does what is a better place to start then the question of who gets authority over UAS/UAVs. I think by defining what primary roles and missions our services must be able to do in order to carry out our policies will answer the mail on the secondary and tertiary roles and missions which support them.

I also believe if you can answer the big question then you can better define size (people) and capabilities (acquisition, sustaining, training, etc).

We really need to get this right. To do so requires we reasonably identify the nature of the Long War, and the opportunities/challenges our commitment to it presents to more traditional minded opponents.

We must also consider ways to mitigate those risks using other elements of national power and consider what, if any benefits we gain by departing from our traditional & costly "Golden Mean" where maintaining duplicate capabilities and not getting it too far right or too far wrong was not only acceptable, but embraced.

Best Regards, Rob

Though they're unlikely to get much from me. ;)

Good points all -- and it is an opportunity. I hope they do a blank sheet of paper exercise (I know, I know...) but they could do it in any fashion and have fun breaking some rice bowls... :D

We'll see what happens. I'm an optimist.

But...:wry: