The Demise of Secretary Wynne
The Demise of Secretary Wynne
By J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton, Small Wars Journal Blog
Quote:
Recently I was privileged to witness a small piece of history. While visiting a friend at the Pentagon, I stood next to the office door of Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne as he left the building for the last time. After he left, and while all the rooms were still empty, I was given a quick tour of the offices. Surrounded by giant paintings of airpower, it was difficult not to reflect upon the current situation and how he got there.
My friend is Special Assistant to Secretary Wynne, Dr. Richard Andres, and once the Secretary had left, we sat down and had a long discussion on current topics. Rick and I have discussed our opinions on air power and the military many times before, and while I consider myself to be service agnostic, Rick is very much biased toward the Air Force, and I think with good reason.
Something I’ve often heard Rick say, and I believe he is correct, is that the Army does not understand air power. Often their plans minimize its use, and their after action reports under report its effectiveness. Case in point, the surge in Iraq. While sitting in Ricks E ring office, he asked me point blank whether or not I believed a 20% increase (or “surge”) in troop strength could really make much difference to the situation. It was obviously a baited question, but it wasn’t one I had to think about much. To my mind, the increase could not have been that effective; there had to have been some fundamental doctrinal change in order for that small an increase to have had the dramatic effect that it’s had. Prior to this discussion, I’d already been pondering the issue for some time...
I read that earlier on the Blog.
Couldn't get enough sense out of it to comment. Does the Army not understand the AF -- or does it downplay the AF due to political game required by our dysfunctional Congress? A 1,000% increase in munitions released???
Then all those things Tom correctly illustrates. Plus this comment:
Quote:
"...Although I felt privileged to be present at the Pentagon as Secretary Wynne departed the building for the last time."
Odd...
Author shoots foot then puts it in his mouth
Well as one of the few resident zoomies here let me say that Dr. Andres and Mr. Compton do not represent a lot of us in their views - they're more akin to that embarrassing uncle you wish was related to someone else.
This is just another example of the kind of counterproductive "criticism" some air power advocates will stoop to. There is plenty to justify the role of air power in all its forms without denigrating the other services while overemphasizing the role of your own. The irony is that is exactly what the author accuses the Army of doing.
I'm always wary of vague and sweeping generalizations and this essay is chock full of them. The "Army does not understand airpower" is the worst such generalization. Then there is the portrayal of Gen. Petraeus, the (former) JOINT force commander, as essentially a parochial stooge. How can the author here argue on one hand that airpower was the crucial element in the "surge" while arguing on the other that the Army doesn't understand airpower when it's primarily Army officers that are runnning the show in Iraq? Add cognitive dissonance to the many problems with this essay.
classic COIN from the air ...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
4) What is "classic COIN from the air?" My bookshelf is light on any works or demonstrated successes of "COIN" from the air.
He may be referring to the way the British Mandate of Mesopotamia chose to respond to unrest during the 1920s. The approach seems to have been pretty much what the AF advocates today: bomb them into submission. :(
There was a recent article on this campaign in one of the military history magazines. If I can find it, I'll post the reference.
AF as a supporting component
I've been considering this post for some time IOT word it correctly.
I have no disagreements with any of the above dissent IRT the AF's future.
However, it must be addressed that they are a combat multiplier. I would submit that we should credit them with their role as a supporting component in the surge.
I can comment on four of the more kinetic operations of the surge(specifically November2006-June2007): Turki Village/Diyala River Valley (my unit, 5-73 Recon) and Najaf/Baqubah (Strykers out of Fort Lewis).
Furthermore, it must be understood that these situations were esentially counter-state denied areas (i.e. areas that the enemy controlled and CF/GOI did not regularly patrol). These situations were unique to the time period.
The AF brought to bear the combined weight of the American military power in certain almost linear conflicts (e.g. in Turki Village (JAN 2007), 38 x 2000 lbs JDAMs in under two hours on an entrechment of Wahabi fortiments. In a prior conflict, we were throwing hand grenades back and forth. This time, the AF reigned supreme.)
However (again), it must be addressed that these were supportive roles. Enemy fortifications were not identified solely by Predator drones; in 90% of the PID, enemy activity was identified by covert reconnaissance, movement to contact, OR specific intelligence gathered from the populace.
Regardless, I love the AF as long as they don't make any assumptions on their superiority over the boys on the ground.