This sounds suprisingly similar to
Kaplan's Department of Everything Else. I agree in principle of the need for an "Office of Reconstruction" (don't like the name but that's just a quibble) IF (and that's a very big if) we as a nation see the need for these activities going forward. The expertise should be drawn from the civil governance and planning expertise that exists around the country (an example being the APA). Where I diverge from Mr. Bowen's narrative is that I believe this organization can and should be stood up under the State Department.
Not the American way unless we're fired up by
an existential war and Iraq is not that. Be happy Iraq is getting greater realtive priority than did Viet Nam -- things could be worse...
Still it is annoying that a little bit off focused effort could be easily achieved and pay good dividends. Not likely to happen, Congress likes to play silly games about (1) party superiority and (2) reelection -- the needs of the nation come in a distant fourth after their State or District. .
The public -- the majority of it -- is not the problem; a few in the public, the media and Congress can be problematical but I suspect the new Prez has got at least two years free credit.
Wall Street Journal: Hard Lessons from Talibanistan
Spent Friday night at Clyde's in Tysons Corner with my Iraq Braintrust.
Between drinks, we discussed the recent WSJ article: Learning a Hard History Lesson in 'Talibanistan' (May 14, 2009) , a sad tale about the external impacts of constructing a new base in Karezgay (Zabul Province), but, in the process, destroying the underground canals (karez) on which area farming depends.
"The karez "are the linchpin of their entire civilization here," says Capt. Paul Tanghe, who advises the Afghan National Army battalion in Karezgay."
In the recent USIP Conference on Hard Lessons, they talked about the billions in mis-directed reconstruction spending---on schools, infrastructure, etc..., but there was not a one of these folks who had solutions. Nor, because their focus is on higher-level programs rather than field-based process, did they really get it.
All it took was what planners & public admin folks routinely do: a scoping process. Followed by a simple site-specific planning/engineering process.
I'm very familiar with the capabilities of a D9 Dozer, and what happens when somebody says "build me a base, fast." But there must be a way to malke small improvements that can make a big difference. (I hope?)
Without some kind of mid-level planning structure, we are always just "doing stuff" like a school here and a school there---pretty soon you built 2800 of them (and spent billions of US taxpayer money doing it), but you don't have a school system, or a well-understood process of how these schools are supposed to be financed, staffed, and maintained into the future.
Lessons to learn.
Steve
Systems Perspective Article
SWJ Blog's new article: Perspective on the Systems Perspective
How Army Special Forces Can Use Existing Systems within the Operational Environment
by Major Michael Longacre, Small Wars Journal
Major Longacre makes a great pitch for systems approaches to planning and basic infrastructure (road, electrical systems). Couldn't have said it better.
Civilian planners are trained in looking at systems, linkages, and connections. Leg bone's connected to the tail bone, etc...
Unfortunately, no one is focusing on this stuff, as evidenced by DoD, DoS, and US AID hiring postures. No planning advisers advertised for Afghanistan. Instead, planning is just a sub-heading within overall advisory positions.
In Iraq, State reconstruction strategy was focused on province-by-province, and the military was focused on battlespace-by-battlespace. There was no big picture. No planning.
Sounds like the same thing will happen in Afghanistan. Oh, well! So much for small changes that could create big improvements.
Steve