Philippines (2012 onwards, inc OEF)
This little encounter...
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/re...rovince-ambush
Happened a few days ago a few miles from home, in an area where I often ride the bike and hike.
Certainly not notable in any way, and isn't going to change any games, just one more sporadic flare in a sporadic fight that's been going on for decades.
What I never quite understand is the predictability of it all. The NPA appear in a moderately remote village. The Philippine Army dispatches troops, invariably by land and by the most predictable route. The troops are ambushed. The NPA leave the area immediately, and long after they're gone military reinforcements descend on the place, accusing the locals of complicity and generally pissing everyone off. Right now, 3 days after it happened, I can hear a couple of UH1s clattering around over the ambush site... I can't imagine what they expect to see, you can hear them coming miles away and the guys who staged the ambush are far far away on the other side of the mountains by now.
So it goes. I'll have to ride a different trail for a while!
OEF Philippines (2012 onwards)
Moderator at work
I have merged a number of threads in this arena, so have locked several up: Catch All OEF Phillipines (till 2012), The US role in the Phillipines (catch all) and leaving a couple open for updates: Small War on Basilan (catch all), The Islamic Insurgents (catch all) and Communist Insurgency in the Philippines (catch all).
This thread is for updates in 2012 onwards, prompted by the next post.
Joint action three terrorist leaders dead
The BBC News report:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16867193
Washington Post:http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...djQ_story.html
Quote:
The Philippine military said it killed three of Southeast Asia’s most-wanted terrorist leaders in a U.S.-backed airstrike that significantly weakens an al-Qaida-linked network that had used islands in the southern Philippines as a hideout and training base....Malaysian Zulkifli bin Hir, also known as Marwan, a top leader of the regional Jemaah Islamiyah terror network...the leader of the Philippine-based Abu Sayyaf militants, Umbra Jumdail, and a Singaporean leader in Jemaah Islamiyah, Abdullah Ali, who used the guerrilla name Muawiyah...
I note the air strike was 0300hrs by two OV10s dropping 4 x500lb bombs and no-one is being specific what the US help was.
The more things change, the more they remain the same...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
carl
Once upon a time, we knew how to fight small wars.
Mmmmm. Don't disagree, I agree with you and so does the author of "Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902" (LINK) from Leavenworth. He ends:
Quote:
"As the most successful counterinsurgency campaign in US history, it is the logical starting point for the systematic examination of military intervention, civic action, and pacification operations."
However, before he gets there he also notes:
Quote:
"When the guerrilla or ladrone problem persisted, the American Army sought to do what it was trained to do—destroy the armed insurrectos."
Notably, as shown below and unlike today, with few restrictions. Also:
Quote:
"As a Philippine veteran noted, “The American soldier in officially sanctioned wrath is a thing so ugly and dangerous that it would take a Kipling to describe him.”
Comment similar to that were often made by other opponents -- until the mid 1970s. We used to be not noted for good behavior. Today, we're the good guys (By Order Of...). :rolleyes:
From the Wiki (LINK):
Quote:
"The use of concentration camps or "zones of protection" theoretically prevented an undue loss of civilian life that would have occurred had the US Army engaged in total war on the Filipino population. However, due to unsanitary conditions, many of the interned died from dysentery."
Why were we there?
Quote:
"Support for American actions in the Philippines was justified by those in the U.S. government and media who supported the conflict through the use of moralistic oration. Stuart Creighton Miller writes "Americans altruistically went to war with Spain to liberate the Cubans, Puerto Ricans, and Filipinos from their tyrannical yoke. If they lingered on too long in the Philippines, it was to protect the Filipinos from European predators waiting in the wings for an American withdrawal and to tutor them in American-style democracy." (emphasis added / kw)
My, my. We're still quite moral -- in that respect... :D
On Armies as servants:
Quote:
"General Otis gained a significant amount of notoriety for his actions in the Philippines. Although multiple orders were given to Otis from Washington to avoid military conflict, he did very little to circumvent the breakout of war. Notably, shortly after fighting began he turned down a proposal from Emilio Aguinaldo to end the fighting, stating “fighting, having begun, must go on to the grim end.” Otis refused to accept anything but unconditional surrender from the Philippine Army. He often made major military decisions on his own, without first consulting leadership in Washington at all."
Pesky servants just won't behave. Difference between then and now is that public attitudes have changed. A combination of Otis, some WW II incidents and MacArthur changed the rules.
The Army in the Philippines in 1900 (and up until the mid 1960s...) believed in doing something even if it was wrong. Since Viet Nam the attitude is to do nothing; particularly if it even might possibly consider going wrong. That's not the Army, that's the society from which it springs. Picture trying to do this today:
Quote:
"The shift to guerrilla warfare drove the US Army to a "total-war" doctrine. Civilians were given identification and forced into concentration camps with a publicly announced deadline after which all persons found outside of camps without identification would be shot on sight. Thousands of civilians died in these camps due to poor conditions."
Hundred if not thousands more were shot for being where they would have been better off not being. We followed much the same rules in Korea and early on in Viet Nam. Different times, different rules. Can't do that or anything approaching it today.
Then there's this:
Quote:
"On July 2. the U.S. Secretary of War telegraphed that since the insurrection against the U.S. had ended and provincial civil governments had been established, the office of military governor was terminated. On July 4, Theodore Roosevelt, who had succeeded to the U.S. Presidency after the assassination of President McKinley on September 5, 1901, proclaimed a full and complete pardon and amnesty to all people in the Philippine archipelago who had participated in the conflict."
Oops...
Quote:
Beginning with the Taraca, which occurred on April 4, 1904, American forces battled Datu Ampuanagus, who surrendered after losing 200 members of his people.[1][78] Numerous battles would occur after that up until the end of the conflict on June 15, 1913..."
Took a while...:wry:
Back to the original link:
Quote:
"In his 1902 annual report, Chaffee wrote of the need for language skills:
'An important duty as yet not taken seriously by the officers of the Army serving in the Division, but which ought not be longer neglected if they would meet to the full the demands which the situation requires and may be reasonably expected of them as enhancing the efficiency when serving here, is the acquirement of a workable knowledge, both oral and written, of the native dialect where stationed. . . . I believe that the interests of the government are deeply involved in this matter. . . . I recommend . . . a bonus of two hundred dollars to each officer and intelligent enlisted man who shall attain a state of proficiency in a native dialect, and one hundred dollars additional for proficiency in Spanish.' "
Lot of things changed, some did not... ;)
We still know how to fight small wars -- we just aren't allowed to.
Part one (it's a subject I get verbose on)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ray
Not having seen the Moro rebellion first hand, as you might have experienced being there, I would like to believe that you are right.
I've spent some time in the affected areas. I've been interested in the conflict since living in Mindanao (79-83, more or less) and have been following it closely and digging into the history ever since, aside from going back occasionally. I've written about it now and then. It's difficult to get a handle on that conflict through Google: there's a great deal of nonsense that's been published, and without a good understanding of the context it's hard to sort out what actually fits in the picture and what's being pushed in to support somebody's agenda.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ray
However, from a purely academic standpoint, it is said that Modern Muslim rebels of the southern Philippines see the Moro Rebellion as a continuing struggle against foreign rule.
Yes, but the "foreign rule" in question is that of Manila.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ray
The indicators in the open forums suggests that while the Moro Independence Movement was basically that and nothing more in earlier times, it is believed that it has been touched by the Pan Islamic fervour that has swept the world. It has also transmogrified an Independence Movement into a religious one in addition!
Touched, yes, but only peripherally. it remains primarily a nationalist movement thoroughly rooted in local issues. "pan-Islamic" issues have limited traction with the leadership and virtually none with the masses; connection to the movement is seen primarily as a way of gaining support for the local cause. The connection to "pan-Islamic" movements is IMO consistently overstated by many sources, and not by accident.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ray
It is well known that Islamist groups such as the Abu Sayyaf and Rajah Sulaiman movement, have been supported by groups outside the Philippines such as Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda.
Again, the extent of this support is widely overstated.
ASG is best understood as a failed attempt to develop an AQ "franchise". AQ, through Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, was directly involved in the group's founding. Almost from the start, though, there was conflict within the group between jihadi and purely criminal elements. Funding from Khalifa largely ceased after the killing of key link man Abdul Asmad in 2004, and when Abdurajak Janjalani was killed i '98 the AQ connection was severed. Janjalani's brother took over nominal control of the organization but was completely eclipsed by men like Aldam Tilao and Galib Andang. From this point on the ASG was effectively a purely criminal enterprise, receiving protection from and sharing proceeds with local government, police, and military. The group achieved its greatest notoriety during this period, and was inevitably described as "AQ-linked", despite the minimal to nonexistent connections at that time.
Ironically, the intense pressure that came on the criminal factions as the US got involved was partially responsible for an attempt to bring the group back to its jihadi roots. Military pressure effectively ended the KFR revenue stream, Tialo was killed and Andang captured and their followers largely scattered. Janjalani left the area and took refuge in MILF territory, where he made contact with RSM (more on them below) and initiated a campaign of terror attacks in the Manila area. That phase was effectively ended with the killing of Janjalani and the capture of Ahmed Santos.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ray
The fact that Islam is slowly digging in and expanding in Philippines is borne out by the fact that hard core Catholics have converted to Islam, giving rise to such movement as the Rajah Sulaiman Movement. Islamic expansion should not be taken lightly because the founder of the Rajah Sulaiman movement was converted while working in Saudi Arabia and could return to convert a whole lot of other hardcore Catholics to join the folds of Islam and fight their own (before conversion)!
That's exaggerated. There have been conversions among Filipinos working in the Middle East, and some have recruited other converts after coming home. The number is small and there's no evidence of significant growth. Most of the conversions are opportunistic, aimed at getting or continuing employment in the Middle East. A very small number of these did emerge as radicals, and the RSM core was drawn from this group. The group was very much centered around the person of Ahmed Santos and never recovered from his capture; it's been dormant for years. There are small groups of converts in a number of locations in Luzon, but little evidence that jihadi organizers are exploiting them; it's widely (and I think accurately) believed that Philippine security forces have informers in place throughout the network.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ray
While the Philippines Forces maybe ruthless in their handling of the Moro rebels, if one observes that history of this area, they are not well disposed to the Americans either. In fact, history indicates how the Spanish having lost to the Americans, through a sleight of hand, handed over the area to the US, when in actuality the Spanish had a tacit understanding wherein control of the Sulu archipelago outside of the Spanish garrisons was that of the Sultan. In fact, the Bates Treaty signed by the US assigned to the US greater power than that what the Spanish exercised. The rest is history.
That's a small part of the history. It is of course true that much of the territory Spain sold to the US was not under Spanish control when it was sold. (Mark Twain, among others, made the point that the sale and purchase of people was a poor basis for claimed sovereignty, but that's another issue.) It's also true that there was considerable conflict in the early years of the US occupation. By the 1930s the US had, however, achieved a quite amenable working relationship with Muslim leaders, many of whom actually asked the US not to include them in the grant of independence, which they referred to as "turning them over to the Filipinos". Even at that time rule by Manila was widely (though of courser not universally) seen as a greater danger than rule by the US.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ray
In so far as the US and MNLF/MILF is concerned, suffice it to say that from January 2002 until July 31, 2002, the United States committed nearly 1,300 troops to the Philippines and $93 million in military aid to assist Philippine armed forces (AFP) in operations against the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in the southern Philippines, on the island of Basilan southwest of Mindanao. The U.S. action was Operation Balikatan. The CRS Report to the US Congress corroborates the same.
Is the US now merely a spectator?
As you say, US assistance has been focused on efforts against the ASG, not the MILF or the (now largely dormant) MNLF. The MILF has not made a major issue of this and would just as soon see the ASG dismantled, which would open the way for them to achieve a dominant position in the west... if they can overcome the legacy of internal conflict between the Maguindanao/Maranao and Tausug/Sama factions, again another story.
In actual practice, US forces have been generally well received even in the ASG areas, largely because of the perception (IMO accurate) that Philippine forces behave better when he Americans are around. That may seem contrary to some interpretations of regional history, but the observed reaction remains.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ray
No Muslim group would ever think of the US being a mediator, more so in the Philippines, they having had an unfortunate history with the US in Philippines.
Consider this:
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquire...in-peace-talks
The US government, through USIP, played a significant role in drafting the Arroyo government's "peace agreement" with the MILF, which would have granted the MILF official recognition and a degree of control that many Filipinos saw as effectively establishing a Moro substate. The agreement was torpedoed by the Philippione Supreme Court and the US role in it widely criticized. The entire episode could be considered a failed attempt at mediation, failed not because the Muslim group rejected it, but because the government rejected it.