Keys to a Successful Surge
Keys to a Successful Surge - Max Boot, LA Times.
Quote:
While politicians debate whether more U.S. troops should be sent to Iraq, just as important is how those troops will be utilized. In the Boer War, a "surge" of soldiers helped. In the Vietnam War, it didn't. The difference is that the British had a sounder strategy. I
n formulating the right strategy, there is no better guide than a slim 1964 volume, "Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice." Its author was a French officer named David Galula, who saw service not only in World War II but in postwar China, Greece, Hong Kong and Algeria. If there is a Clausewitz of counterinsurgency, Galula is it.
Although much has changed in recent decades, most of his admonitions still apply, which is why so many are echoed in the new Army-Marine counterinsurgency field manual. U.S. forces have gotten better at this demanding type of warfare in Iraq, but even now they're still falling short, often through no fault of their own, in carrying out many of Galula's key precepts...
Much more at the link...
- 1 Good Shot of PR Anyway
I was quite surprised to hear on NPR yesterday a report on the PM's visit to Ramadi and how he was met by some sheiks. The drift of the report was quite positive and I was pleased to hear NPR saying something favorable. The report said the Sheiks seemed relaxed and smiled on occasion and presented the PM with petitions for more services and security. General P. was there with the PM too and some of what he said was broadcast. In one take, he was discussing the situation with a Ramadi citizen and in essence told the man that "with his help" things would get better. As a civilian who pays alot of taxes, I can live with an 'armed peace corps' concept of reconstruction and stabalization. It makes sense as long as the *$%^(#* politicians stay the he** out of it and let the military do their thing. I still advocate a Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) model as part of the solution, where unemployed young men are put to work cleaning up rubble doing heavy manual labor for good pay. If they can provide for their families and be tired from doing heavy work at the end of the day, they will be less inclined to set off IEDs. I fail to see why some company commander somewhere can't be given some cash and be told to put some Iraqis to work simply to see how things pan out. Officers and NCOs supervise work details all the time but I realize big ideas and implimenting them are two different things.