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I've always enjoyed Sarah's interviews and pieces on Afghanistan. I don't always agree with her, but she provides valuable insight from someone that isn't military who walks the walk. She was interviewed on NPR yesterday. Her thoughts reminded me a lot of Dave Kilcullen's comments in the New Yorker as well as CNN (part 1 video and part 2 video). All are worth reading/listening/watching.
"The United States should redefine its objectives in favor of the Afghan
people, not the Afghan government. In a counter-insurgency, the people
are the proverbial prize. It is only by supporting the Afghan people – not
abusive powerbrokers – in their effort to reconstitute their social,
economic, institutional, and cultural fabric, that stability in Afghanistan can
be achieved, and the country be durably denied as a sanctuary for
terrorists."
This a very interesting paper. Tom Ricks spoke very highly of it on his blog and I was most impressed with it.
One small thing mentioned in the piece that I didn't know is that Afghan farmers can make more growing fruit than they can from opium.
Here is the address:
http://www.sarahchayes.net/images/Af..._plan_0109.pdf
I am very interested to see what others think.
Yes, there was a smattering of articles late last year about pomegranates:
From The Economist:
Voice of America:Quote:
Afghan poppy-watchers are cynical about the chances of alternative crops producing quick results. Mint, saffron and cotton are just three of the crops that have been promoted, yet all have so far failed to make a dent in Afghanistan’s only significant export. Some agricultural experts also argue that the outside world’s relentless focus on developing agricultural exports is perverse in a country that has long been a net food importer and whose people suffer from widespread nutrition deficiencies. Pomegranates are, at best, only part of the solution. One Afghan development expert says the country needs a synergy between a variety of alternative crops, infrastructural development, better governance, security and time—perhaps up to 20 years.
Quote:
More than two-and-a-half million trees have been planted in the last two years. The trees take up to five years to mature. But once they start producing fruit, USAID official Loren Stoddard says farmers are much less likely replace a productive orchard with poppies.
"Vegetable crops are great - the reason we like pomegranates long term is because vegetables you plant and replant and maybe replace with poppy," Stoddard stated. Pomegranates you never replace, so it really is the longer term solution."
Stoddard says farmers who export high-quality fruit can earn as much as $5,000 per hectare - about 15 percent more than poppies.
What I really liked about her piece is she is very plain spoken. She says the Pakistanis have orchestrated the resurgence of the Taliban and each civilian killed by our errant fire = 3 to 5 Taliban created. Period. No beating around the bush.
An overriding theme of Ms. Chayes' article is her focus on the "Afghan People"; and some disparagement of those approaching Astan as a multi-tribal culture - albeit, my impression of what she wrote.
I just finished reading a study of the Taliban, which also studies the Pashtuns, and which was posted by Cavguy some months ago in another thread in this forum. I was struck by the tribal and sub-tribal nature of the Pashtuns (see Fig. 3, p.6 in the CAC article) - which is only one of the many large groups in Astan.
I wonder how many of Ms. Chayes' "Afghan People" think of themselves primarily as that - or, e.g., as Popalzai (one of the sub-tribes near her residence).
Ms. Chayes is clearly committed to a centralized government approach in Astan to solve its problems - thus, the need to emphasize the "Afghan People" concept, as opposed to a small community approach, which would look more to the local tribes and sub-tribes.
This all reminds me of the Hillary Rodham (before she became Clinton) argument against the traditional Saul Alinsky approach (organize small communities of people from the grassroots up).
Ms Rodham (in her senior undergrad thesis) argued that approach was too slow - and that large central government programs were the better way to reach the same end. Where a strong central government exists (as in the US), Ms Rodham's approach is feasible - whether desirable is another question.
Note that the dichotomy is not population-centric vs non-population centric. Both Ms Rodham's approach (much like Ms Chayes') and the traditional Alinsky approach look very much to the population as the key to success. The Rodham-Chayes approach is top down; the Alinsky approach is bottom up. These are two very different ways of looking at practical political action.
I've been listening to her book on CD this past week (a long commute and a library full of interesting books on CD is contributing significantly to my continuing education).
She has really dedicated herself personally to Afghanistan and spent a great deal of time living among the people since the invasion, so whether you agree with her or not, it is definitely an informed perspective. The book is well worth a read/listen.
http://www.amazon.com/Punishment-Vir.../dp/1594200963
since I read through her webpage, etc. However, as Ms Rodham and Mr Alinsky illustrate, two informed perspectives can result in very different approaches, even though in that duo's example their end goals were much the same - my first point.Quote:
from BW
She has really dedicated herself personally to Afghanistan and spent a great deal of time living among the people since the invasion, so whether you agree with her or not, it is definitely an informed perspective.
The problem for those dummies (e.g., JMM) without an informed perspective, is which approach to select - assuming the dummy is in a policy-making position - my second point.
Sarah Chaves deserves credit for her work and risk taking in Afghanistan.
But, a foreign affairs expert she is not.
Historically Afghanistan is a pile of conflicting tribal goals and purposes, all micro-focused and very self serving.
It is the private view of some on this site, which I publicly endorse and agree with without giving away their identities, that Afghanistan will in due course again be a benevolent kingdom as to style of governance and government...and I endorse that future outcome.
Two questions come to mind vis-a-vis this piece. First is her fixation with solar power. Who manufactures these solar power plants, but most of all, who maintains them? What if they're not financially viable? I would guess like all the other "alternative energy" crap, they operate at a huge energy deficit, i.e, they are much less efficient than other, more conventional means of energy production.
Second, how does the poppy farmer switch crops, when the warlord/druglord makes him and his family dead?
http://ebird.osd.mil/ebfiles/e20090320664559.html
Not sure if this link to the early bird from today will work here.
"Wall Street Journal
March 20, 2009
Pg. 1
U.S. Courts Former Warlords In Its Bid For Afghan Stability
By Matthew Rosenberg
JALALABAD, Afghanistan -- Gov. Gul Agha Shirzai, a semiliterate former warlord, has an autocratic style, a reputation for doling out government contracts to family and friends, and a personal fortune allegedly amassed via corruption and the opium trade.
Many in Afghanistan think he might also be the country's best hope for stability.
As the head of one of the country's most peaceful provinces, Mr. Shirzai has ensured that roads get built, opium poppies are plowed under, and the Taliban are held at bay...."
Shirzai was the central villian in Sarah's book from his time as first post-invasion Governor of Kandahar. Certainly a man who knows how to make things happen in Afghanistan, I just hope the US backers of him today are gaining a broader perspective before backing him once again. I don't have any insights to form an opinion, but if the postion taken by Sarah in her book is accurate, then this would not likely be a course we would want to pursue. Given a broader context he may in fact be exactly the guy.
Downside of our constant rotations is that it's damn hard to gain that broader context.
Quote:
Originally Posted by 120mm
Solar power is very economical and avoids power lines, grids, and hydro plants that are in inadequate suppy throughout Afghanistan.
You can power a car, a cell phone, a lap top computer, whatever, with a small directly hooked up solar powered batter pack/system, as but one example.
http://www.solarhome.org/
...of the Wall Street Journal piece, click here for access to the version on the paper's web page.
It sounds a lot better than it actually is. If you have solar as a "trick pony" or a curiousity, it really is simple. But when it comes to actually producing economical and reliable power at anything but a micro-micro scale, there are all sorts of complexities involving storage and inverters and such.Quote:
Originally Posted by George L. Singleton
I know folks who live "off the grid", and even for a regular home, it is expensive as hell, unreliable and requires all sorts of maintenance. And, obtw, most storage technologies are ecologically nightmarish as well. And do we want to talk about safety? The Afghans I work with still haven't mastered the art of wiring in series v. parallel or even something simple as running to ground. Do you want this same Afghan servicing a bank of batteries? Big enough to power a factory? Bhopal, India, anyone???
Just like all the other alternative energy: It's really seductive sounding, especially to those who don't really think it through.
I read through most of Chayes website and some of her blog, and think she's very well informed when it comes to the political situation, though I think she's a bit naive about the technical solutions.
Ah yes, there's some pretty good background on his governorship of Kandahar in Guistozzi's "Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop" Suffice it to say he ran things on a patronage system, had a significant personal fighting force that served to both check the Taliban and harrass his tribal opponents, and was loved by some and hated by others.Quote:
JALALABAD, Afghanistan -- Gov. Gul Agha Shirzai, a semiliterate former warlord, has an autocratic style, a reputation for doling out government contracts to family and friends, and a personal fortune allegedly amassed via corruption and the opium trade.