The Civilian Shoe Dropping
OK. Now we know how many troops, and when the next decision comes.
Now, what about the civilian side which everyone says is the whole point.
Barry McCaffrey has an assessment in circulation which he prepared for Gen. Petreaus, says the civilian thing just ain't happening. Even if they send them, it is too dangerous to leave the base and do anything effective.
FP has a different take from Dov Zakheim in the Shadow Government section:
"In much of our government, however, the war is nowhere to be seen. Civil servants go about their business as if it were peacetime. There is still a serious shortage of U.S. government civilians here in Afghanistan, although their numbers are increasing. Many of those who do indeed serve here do not venture out of Kabul. This is so not because they are less dedicated to their mission. The sorry fact is that all too often they have little to offer in the field. Their expertise tends to be bureaucratic -- they are only equipped to manage and document projects and activities -- rather than technical. "
That has been one of my on-going criticisms--- lots of program administrators, etc., but few with actual technical training in relevant subject areas. Wholeof Government is a great concept, but few federal agencies actually do things--- program and grant administration are the core skills.
Lots of big noise at AEI on an expended civilian surge, pending a new Obama funding request.
I attended a seminar today at USIP with Ashraf Ghani & Steven Hadley. Lots of criticism, and good recommendations on ways forward, but.... (Trying to get a web cast link)
Dec 8, McCrystal and Eikenberry both hit the Armed Services Committees. Hopefully some tough questions...
Steve
We declare Victory and leave...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
concur with it being on autopilot, but I don't know how it turns out.
Big drawdown by mid 2012, full probably about late 2015 - early 2016.
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...but probably better than filling a USG capability gap we've known has existed for about 5 years with people off the street who may/may not have anything approaching the right technical skills and experience.
I'd say that capability gap has been known since 1918, was relearned in 1942 and we've had it branded on our foreheads about for about 50 years. The gap has really existed for about 34 or so years , has been reborn for about 7 -- it's not like we haven't done this before...
I also suggest that if the USG cannot put the right people with the right skills in place, that is the sole fault of the USG and specifically the
legislative and executive branches -- to include State, DoD and the US Army. The people are out there.
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Even then, I suspect the majority of any tasks (time to name that tune) we'd expect a civilian surge to fill will be done (if done) by the uniformed folks once we realize we laid place settings for dinner guests that never even existed (or were intended to exist):(
If so, that is the fault of the uniformed folks for not sticking to what they should be doing and allowing others to do what they should be doing. Indeed, insisting on others doing what they should be doing...
But that might mean a budget shift...:rolleyes:
We've done this before. We do not do it well and Congressional, military and bureaucratic failings are a big part of why we do not. The attitude that "...it won't get done unless we do it." is a big part of the problem. People think they need credit for a big Attaboy on their watch. "I see it, I own it" is a poor philosophy...
Civilian Issues in Semi-Permissive Environments are Complicated
The issue with civilian participation as being due to security problems is usually overstated, and often done in a manner to give the incorrect impression that the military personnel are "braver" and more willing to work in dangerous areas.
A more pertinent issue is the lack of a civilian reserve capability to provide people with the right skills. Only about 25% of the US military is currently deployed on operations. The vast majority of the force is available and "waiting" (to include training, re-setting, and preparing) to be sent on missions. Conversely, almost everyone in a civilian agency is currently doing their primary job. There is no vast pool of civilians available to be sent to Afghanistan without taking them away from other critical functions.
The military is more like the fire department. Only a small percentage is out fighting fires at any one time, with the majority waiting to be sent out. The civilian agencies are more like the police department. Almost all of them are already out "on the beat" with very few in reserve. The US is trying to build such a capacity with the Civilian Response Corps, but this Bush-era initiative was only recently given adequate funding and still has a ways to go.
Additionally, aside from the problems already mentioned regarding program managers and bureaucrats versus subject matter experts, we don't really have a good handle on how to integrate the military and civilian planning and execution functions. It's not just a matter of adding another column or two to the synch matrix. For more on this topic, see "Complex Operations and Interagency Operational Art" at:
http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/prism/...Schnaubelt.pdf
and "Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-Permissive Environments" at:
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=79
Oh, I've got plenty of faith that it'll work out, more than most.
I just subcribe to realism and accept that it will not be pretty, they way most would like, or the best we could do. I wish it could be different but accept that it likely will not be and I can very grudgingly accept that...
And that's okay, it will be adequate. Mediocrity is our touchstone. :rolleyes:
Bob's World: There always are... :D
Rob:
Quote:
"...I don't expect a budget shift and part of the reason is based on what I have seen I don't think any potential beneficiary would be willing to risk having the marker called in - they only seem to want the sure thing and I don't see many of those in the near future."
Exactly -- that's why it will not get fixed. :(
A big part of the problem is that we -- military and civilian -- have become so bureaucratic and so very risk averse in all aspects that we are becoming a true danger to ourselves. We aren't there yet but the prognosis is not good unless those trends are reversed...
CMS and Steve the Planner:
We can integrate military and civilian planning and execution functions, we did it in WW II and it worked well -- we just do not want to do that today for mostly bureaucratic and turf protection reasons.
As long as the solution is to just throw money at problems without fixing the underlying turf and bureaucracy issues, there will be no improvement.
Congress likes the dysfunctional milieu as it aids their reelections and ability to move OUR money where they wish. The good of the Nation is not an issue for too many of that august body... :wry:
Thoughts for the Field Manual
The FM should be in three parts:
1. The Ways and Means of a Punitive Raid, where there is no intent to occupy a country legally.
2. Your Immediate Post-Conflict Reconstruction in situations where a short-term legal occupation follows from an intervention.
3. Clear doctrine when we should use 1 vs 2 - there is a difference.
Cheers
Mike