Afghanistan: Sealing the deal in the "build" phase?
This is going to be a lot of questions, but here goes...
1. What is the approach that we are using in Afghanistan right now?
a) Shape-Clear-Hold-Build
b) Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer
c) Shape-Clear-Hold-Build-Transfer
d) Something else (please specify)
I've read or heard (a), (b), and (c) from fairly knowledgeable sources.
2. My impression is that we are dropping the ball in the "build" phase. If so, do you think this is due to (one or more of the following)?
a) Inability to establish local governance
b) Inability to establish a relationship between community and provincial/central government
c) Inability to provide basic services (security, water)
d) Something else
Finally, if you think we are dropping the ball in the "build" phase for one of the reasons above (or in a different phase) or for some other reasons, why do you think that is the case? And do you see any indication that we have figured out a better way?
Okay, that was a lot of questions, so to clarify more or less what I was hoping to get for feedback, I'll give my impression.
A: I see no indication that we have any short-term prospects to "transfer" any community because this requires that the host nation be able to at least provide security. One step back from that, it seems that, given our past tendency to "mow the grass", we're not able to seal the deal on the "build" phase either. The obstacles to that, as I see it, include one or more of the following:
a) locals lack the means to provide their own security
b) locals lack the incentive to not collude with the Taliban (either through poppy cultivation or fighting) once it returns because they have no other viable means of earning an income
c) locals distrust the central government and do not want to associate with it
d) locals do not want state legal codes imposed upon them at the expense of customary law
e) locals, even if they were acquiescent to state legal codes, are not yet ready to accept central gov't law due to the perception of corruption and lack of responsiveness.
As for indications that we are addressing/correcting any of these issues, I suppose we are attempting to stand up ANSF forces. One would hope they are local ANP to police their own locales, so that we have fewer incidents of ANP from outside the district coming in and partaking in boy-love Thursday festivities. Item (b) seems fairly difficult to overcome, given the lack of infrastructure, education, and security outside of the community (intra-community trade only goes so far). Item (c), one would think, is fairly hopeless given that bribes = 1/4 of GDP and Karzai's election was about as legitimate as Saddam's 2002 approval vote. Item (d) seems like it could be addressed, but I wonder if we're trying or have any plans to try. And item (e) seems a combination of (c) and (d).
Hopefully that's somewhat clearer than mud.
T'was the Brits this time
The first answer I found why Mohammed Akhundzada was removed as Governor is from Wikipedia:
Quote:
Sher Mohammed was accused of links to drug smuggling. In 2005, nine tons of opium and heroin were discovered in his basement. He said the drugs had been planted by the British, whose army was providing security in Helmand Province as part of ISAF.[1] He was sacked by President Karzai under pressure from the United Kingdom [2].
Link:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sher_Mohammad_Akhundzada
He came to notice again, in November 2009, with this story: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...o-Taliban.html
Looks like the UK is the villain - in some people's eyes this time.
Curiously his surname does not appear in this late 2009 report on Kandahar, which I usually rely on and have posted before: http://www.understandingwar.org/file...r_Kandahar.pdfhttp://www.understandingwar.org/file...r_Kandahar.pdf