Recruting MBX Staff Advisors
Distinguished Gentlemen,
I have been a long time lurker on this forum and finally joined in January 08 as I foresaw I would need some help in a mail based CPX (MBX) that deals with COIN ops in SadrCity.
I dont know whether this is the right forum for such a request, so, Moderators please feel free to move to a more appropriate place if neccessary.
I am taking part in an experimental MBX where I as BLUFOR commander am in command of 3-15IN with AOR SADR CITY. REDFOR commander runs the insurgency, umpire team runs the staff and line officers.
As I am fairly out of the loop as far as modern army organisation goes (came out myself in 1974) I decided with the umpires that it might be a good idea to recruit advisors to my staff officers that can help developing strategies and give administrative hints especially where dealing with 2HBCT and the Iraqui Forces, INTEL gathering etc.
As I am not sure that REDFOR commander isnt on this forum also I cannot disclose more details here, just some organisational basics (I will append excerpts from the MBX guide as published by umpires below this message):
The CPX is run on mailing list basis in conjunction with a website for each force (a bit like ouor famous GlobalThunder MBX, see: http://www.tacopshq.com/MBX/Globalthunder/archive.html), i.e. reports, OPORDs, FRAGOs etc are exchanged via mail, the time scope of the MBX is variable (overall duration approx 4 weeks game time). SITREPs are distributed via Google Earth .kmz files, currently I am working on the first OPORD and have a meeting scheduled with my staff officers in about 2 hours game time.
Following slots are availiable:
- S1
- S3
- S5
- PAO
The MBX will not be very time consuming, if you can spare an hour distributed over the week thats fine (probably to read up initially might require some time, though)
The umpires are first timers and the MBX is experimental, so there might turn up some quirks during execution, this is to be anticipated especially as far as OPSEC is concerned.
Any help and out-of-the-box thinking is much appreciated, we will try and make life as hard as possible for REDFOR while having fun, if you are interested in filling any of the mentioned above or just want to lurk send me a PM and I will fill you in with more details on background and situation.
Thanks in advance,
Silento
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APPENDIX: mini-MBX: Sadr City Confrontation v.1.3, November 18, 2007
Abstract:
This mini MBX is a test MOUT operation in Sadr City, Iraq, taking place at some point after the end of OIF phase III. The fog of war will be fully implemented such that a commander will have limited situational awareness even of his own troops. This MBX is intended to be short and of limited size.
1 Object of the game
The victory will be determined according to side objectives and rules of engagements. The actual winner will be determined by all players and the umpires once the after-action report has been drafted. Media and victory points have no real meaning other than relative metric to help discuss the outcome of the scenario.
1.1 Disclaimer
Wargaming an ongoing conflict is a tricky subject. This MBX is meant to highlight the tactical command problems encountered by both sides within a 4 th generation war. RED represents a local faction of insurgents which is opposed to the occupation but otherwise is not engaged in secular or ethnically motivated terrorist activities. Civil and Public affairs are considered key elements within the MBX. Because of the urban environment and the political context of counter-insurgency, the rules presented below are meant to promote operational concepts other than firepower to achieve the scenario’s objective.
-snip-
2.5 Other considerations
Beyond immediate tactical objectives, all players should keep in mind that this MBX is modeling one engagement of a 4 th generation war. Beyond the explicit tactical objectives, other factors must be considered:
1. US domestic support is sensitive to US service person casualties. The strategic cost of a pyrrhic victory far outweigh a tactical victory.
2. MEDEVACs and SAR will be modeled for BLUE as these can have a mojor impact on operations (e.g. Mogadishu, 1993).
3. Passive support for the insurrection within Sadr City may transition to active support if military operations are using heavy fire missions against elements entrenched in high-density neighborhood. The spread and intensity of the combat within the AO will be recorded and considered in the AAR.
4. HUMINT and ELINT will be handled separately from the engine.
5. World press witnessing intense combat always find a way to spin it as an abuse of force on the part of the Blue side. Both BLUE and RED should include Public Affairs as part of their plan.
6. Any RED unit surviving an engagement will be considered to become more proficient. This result is inconsistent with the strategic aims of a counterinsurgency.
3 OPFOR
OPFOR represent a resource-strapped, yet highly organized and motivated insurgent group from Sadr City. Their mode of operations and C3 will be handled similarly to a regular force, although their technological means are different (Cellphones, messengers). This organization has a political bureau which acts as the higher echelon, a fraction of its fighters are indigenous to Baghdad while an important fraction is made of highly motivated and expendable foreign fighters. OPFOR gets to shape the battlefield with the maximum possible flexibility. OPFOR gets to setup first for three reasons:
1. OPFOR’s setup involved long term battlefield preparation which is the most critical element of RED’s command challenge.
2. OPFOR’s battlefield preparation must be made in anticipation of BLUE’s reaction to a possible situation.
3. BLUE is expected to have access to reasonable intelligence assembled from OPFOR’s setup.
-snip-
End APPENDIX
