Retooling the Artilleryman
Fires Bulletin, Sep-Dec 07: Retooling the Artilleryman
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The 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery (2-17 FA), Steel, had returned from Ramadi, Iraq, in 2005 for only a few months when chatter started within the ranks about another deployment. For the Artillerymen of Steel, the talk about when Steel would return to Iraq seemed less important as to how it would return. Training is vital to every battalion, but 2-17 FA had not completed its transformation from a 155-mm Paladin unit into a 105-mm howitzer unit yet. The question was obvious: Train as infantry, train as Artillery or train as both?
The battalion commander attacked the problem by preparing the Redlegs for both missions—and not with 50 percent effort into each—ensuring Steel would be a multifunctional battalion able to accomplish FA as well as infantry missions. The battalion received essential support from the brigade commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), 2nd Infantry Division, to ensure the Soldiers were “kitted out” like infantry.....
"She ain't always as pretty as the other girls...
but she can cook.", is a euphemism that comes to mind. Artillery units, and other specialties have proven up to the task of doing both - as have many other specialized units and MOSs. There are consequences, and they may not be optimized in education, MTO&E, etc. - but they are doing it. The enabler has been leadership at all levels, it has proven the lever by which FA units (and others) have reorganized for stability related tasks.
Keep in mind that many FSOs and FECs are working non traditional roles within HQs and staffs to good measure. FSOs are often being called on to be Intel officers at the company level (I don't mean as in graduates from the MI ADV Course - but as analysts asking the "so what is the enemy trying to do questions based on new and existing information). FSNCOs are also being tasked to put their gray matter to other tasks as well such as IO or Intel (we re-rolled ours to good effect).
The GPF of today are capable of reorganizing to meet the tasks that grow out of METT-TC - they are both bright and adaptable. Will other tasks atrophy some - yes. That is the risk - and resources will have to be applied on the back end to really address them, however units are also mitigating this some by conducting training in theater - mortar and FA shoots for example, or in some cases they are asked t perform more traditional tasks in support of larger stability type missions - firing illum over large graveyards to prevent insurgents from caching IED materials and arms/equipment in those "sacred" type places during LIMVIS.
My personal observation is that FA units have provided a source of manpower and leadership in an existing, homogeneous organization to successfully complete a number of missions in a variety of conditions. They have met the challenge and shown what soldiers and leaders are capable of. We will probably never be resourced to be fully optimized for the range of military operations across the full spectrum of war, but we do have the human capitol required to adapt relatively quickly to meet them, and we are capable of resourcing and delivering the material and equipment they require to do so.
Best regards, Rob
Great thread. Couple of thoughts...
The recent terminology shift from GPF to Multipurpose Forces (MPF) is a good harbinger, I think.
The Marines could be ahead of the power curve and effectively leverage the old MRU(SOC) into an MEU(COIN); I submit the Army can do the same thing.
The key is the doctrine. We did not train on COIN or ID for over 30 years because the doctrine lay dormant and we didn't want to play. We have no choice in whether we play or not; we have got to be prepared to play and play the total spectrum of warfare whenever the civilian heirarchy says "Go out and play in the traffic..."
We will not get to choose whether that traffic is comprised of fleets of 18 wheelers or a dozen baby buggies or whatever in between; we've got to be prepared to f do it all. We owe that much to the Nation, to the troops and even to the institutions themselves. Competence is justification to the max...
If the Doctrine says that FA Bns should be prepared to function as MPs in the post attack phase (Great idea, BTW) and the Spt Bn has to guard its own compounds and convoys, then we will resource, train for and be able to do that. If it says that Light Infantry will do the foot mobile missions, that the Stryker BCTs will do the Mech AND foot mobile missions and that Armor Bns will be able to provide Armor elements OR wheel vehicle mounted patrols OnO or any of dozens of potential variations on that theme -- then we'll do that.
If the Doctrine says that Cat I units are authorized 10% overstrength, stabilized, fully resourced and trained and equipped for both primary and alternate (and even supplemental) missions, then we will do that. If that Doctrine says that CAT II units will be at strength, train and be resourced for their primary mission and be capable of receiving an equipment set and training for an alternate (or even also a supplementary) mission in 60 days, then we will do that. Cat II units get 80% fill and 90 days...
We have the capability to do these things; the troops have the capability to absorb the training and do the tasks. If we spend wisely (not our strong point :rolleyes: ) then we can provide an adequate number of Alt and Suppl Msn sets. If the Doctrine says do it, Congress will support it.
The capability is there, all that's needed is the will in high places...
Oh. Rob, the answer to your question is one word. We have to relearn things because of -- egos.
The very sad thing is that our very excessive branch parochiality, our tendency to adopt fads, our rejection of anything our predecessors did, our rejection of any good ideas until they become our ideas causes the effect that as new brooms move in and sweep out the old, they always do the baby - bathwater bit... :mad:
P.S.
That competence? It also goes a long way toward making bad guys think twice before they mess with you in any venue...
Lot of advantages to that...
Not lurking, napping. I'm old...
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
Hey Ken - wondering where you'd been lurking at - thought I'd see if we could get you out:D
Do you really think its egos like we normally think of them? Could it be egos and lack of contextual understanding that prevents us from looking deeper and asking things like: - "wonder why they did things like that?" - until like/similiar conditions roll around and then we say - "hey that sort of makes sense."
I think egos are the principal driver but your contextual understanding and a strong (and sad) disregard for history contribute. There are other minor contributors as well. The personnel system is itself a major contributor to both the context and ego elements. I've had more than one GO tell me that just as they finally learned the job, they moved.
That same personnel system -- which needs to be destroyed -- is also responsible for insisting that the new brooms hit the road running and achieve rapid results; it forces the egos into overdrive and does not allow time for contextual scanning.
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I'd not heard about the switch from GPF to MPF....
I have friends in low places... :D
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If I took something else like machine guns - and went from GPMG to MPMG would that change the nature and capabilities of that thing, or just the term we used to describe it? Maybe I can answer it myself - at least take a stab - using the MEU analogy:
General -would mean - good for everything equally, not so good for any thing in particular (goes with the defend everywhere/not strong anywhere) whereas
Multi-Purpose might mean on a particular training cycle the unit was tailored for a specific range - multiple purposes/multi-missions, but not all - like when a MEU SOC does its train up.
Works for me. The big plus I see is that at least someone in the Pentazoo is thinking -- that's always a plus.
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This would allow units to be resourced beyond their base MTO&E & train on a range of METL tasks for that cycle - you could have several in the hopper with a different ranges based on the close in Strategic Intel assessment (which is going to be closer to getting it right then one that attempts to go beyond say 6 months to a year) - kind of like standing JTFs.
True -- and we already have the DMETL today. We also have humungous stocks of predeployed equipment much of which is ancient and will need to be replaced soon. Or does it? A little jiggle of the POM and... ;)
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I'd qualify this by saying we'll have to acknowledge that when conditions call for a large commitment there will be some risk in that not all might have had recent training in all requisite areas - but there are no perfect answers.
Also true, always a possibility and 'no perfects' is correct. The key IMO, is the Intel -- I'm not nearly as confident about that piece as I am about the capability of units to do multiple missions.
One thing that I think would help with the Intel on a global basis is to form a MilAssistAdvisoryCmd with a BG / MG Cdr as a counterpart to the SOCom at each Combatant Commander. Staff it with regional FAOs and interface it with the DAO, MEDTs and SOC elms...
Provided, of course, that we start to realize the value of the FAOs.
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I like the idea - it sounds feasible and mitigates strategic risk.
Best, Rob
We'll see what they come up with. At least it's being looked at. I just hope we don't go too far down the "COIN is God" route. We're bad about over correcting...