Gen Jones on Face the Nation, 4 Oct
The transcripts aren't out yet so I'm paraphrasing here, but:
Did anyone catch when Bob Schieffer questioned the general about the conventional wisdom regarding our assumption that if we pull out and the Taliban again take power in Afghanistan and that, by default, would mean al-Qaeda would follow and set up shop again?
And the general's reply?? He said that was 'hypothetical' and he'd rather not answer or address that.
Huh? "Hypothetical?!?" That's the fundamental assumption that our entire follow-on U.S. strategy is based on! The National Security Adviser can't even seem to back up the "conventional wisdom" that tells us that we can't separate the "threat" of the Taliban from al-Qaeda. If he can't tell us on national TV that by allowing the Taliban to regenerate and assume power in AFG will again allow the 'safe-haven' to form inviting al-Qaeda back in, then why are we taking any action? Nation-building, COIN+, or anything else?
The "defined" linkage between the threat to our vital national interests al-Qaeda poses and the nonsense in the strategic 'threat' of the Taliban is the foundation for everything we are doing right now and everything McChrystal is calling for. If Gen Jones won't publicly stay on that bandwagon or even comment on that assumption beyond saying it's only 'hypothetical,' it just reinforces why we need a strategic reassessment, not the rearranging of COIN or CT deckchairs that's currently underway.
Hypothetically speaking...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
kotkinjs1
He said that was 'hypothetical' and he'd rather not answer or address that.
From that one could infer there are those who would have it one way and those who would have it another, and that this argument is one fault line separating two sides of an internal administration debate, and the General (ret) isn't going to publicly air his view.
Or that somehow hypotheticals aren't part of the discussion, and they're only addressing realities. Like choosing strategy without discussing cost (say, number of troops needed to execute, for example) I'm not sure exactly how that would work.
As to whether AQ returns to Afghanistan or not I'm not sure it matters either way. Regardless of where al Qaeda's hypothetical next "base of operations" is I think it would be nice to be able to make a convincing case to that hypothetical nation's government that we're a reliable long-term partner.
Safe havens needed by AQ to be effective?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Zack
They (AQ) already have a safe-haven in FATA anyhow (as safe as AQ can be anyhow). It is good to note that Afghanistan controlled by the Afghan Taliban probably will not allow AQ to set up shop again, but the bigger question to ask is about the validity of the whole safe haven argument in the first place. How did we come to the conclusion that AQ needs camps to be effective? A safe haven ala FATA or Afghanistan is neither needed for planning, funding, or executing a plot.
Zack,
I suspect domestic politics in the USA primarily dictate the use of preventing AQ current or future use of a safe haven in Afghanistan; it is an easy argument to use and quite emotional. Plus difficult to argue against without being labelled "appeaser" or defeatist.
If you were to tell the public a safe haven is not required for AQ inspired or directed acts of terror, that would lead to far wider and effective challenges to the choices made. Preserving the long term future of Pakistan / India / South Asia is not an argument that resonates on the "high street'.
Politically and bureaucratically when there are so many demands for attention and resources labelling AQ terrorism as a foreign based threat enables it to become an over the horizon issue.
Just a few moments pondering.
davidbfpo