Understanding Indian Insurgencies
SSI Letort Paper, 20 Feb 07:
Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications for COIN Ops in the Third World
Quote:
...The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical perspective for analyzing the Indian experience with insurgency, and to discuss its implications for counterinsurgency in Third World countries. Understanding the affected population is essential for understanding an insurgency or planning for counterinsurgency. The contested population is not only the end; it is also an important means for the insurgent. The insurgents and government of the day compete with one another to control the population, as well as to gain the populace’s loyalty....
Democracy, Bad Indian Agents and Halliburton
I think any number of books could be written on the comparative analysis of 3rd world conflicts and insurgency and our own Indian fighting experience. We are looking at roughly a 260 year time frame of active Native resistance, roughly from King Phillip's War to Wounded Knee of 1890. Indian activists and militants in a non-hostile mode of today say it is a 500 year resistance, the point being that from such longevity of combat and cross cultural experience, there appears to be little draw-down on the lessons learned. Take General Crook for instance, that despite his brilliance against the Apaches, he was almost killed at the Battle of the Rosebud against the Lakota and Cheyene and his force was routed. Had Crook not been literally surrounded by a contingent of his Native scouts with lever action Winchesters, he may well have been killed himself. His brilliance and mistakes and many others like him appear to be overlooked and ignored. Why did Crook fail at the Rosebud? He had the logistics, firepower and manpower and he had native scouts and a wealth of personal command and combat experience. God knows he had the popular support of the American people too. Did he underestimate the charisma of Crazy Horse and leadership of Gall? He couldn't have been aware of Sitting Bull's vision quest and sundance that foretold victories against the hated Pony Soldiers. Contrary to our written history books, Sitting Bull was psychologically and spiritually prepping for the summer of 1876 for quite some time. Did Crook mistakenly regard Sitting Bull as a commander and not the Medicine Man he really was, thus having some corrupted Intel from the get-go? Were his interpretors telling him what they thought he wanted to hear and not what they were really hearing and seeing? Who knows. Is al-sadr really an Imam or a field commander?
As stated, there are a multitude of variables and approaches that can be taken in the relationships of our Indian wars and current 3rd world insurgencies. The hodge-podge title of my post reflects I think the current situation in Iraq and Afghanistan where neither rhyme nor reason seems to account for the fact that we are not achieving what we know we can attain in those two theatres of operation.
Is there a parallel with the notion of trying to implement Democracy in 3rd world Muslim countries and trying to aculturate the Indians to our way of life in the 1800s? The best minds of the time thought the Indians would readily adopt and adapt to our way of life. Make farmers of them buffalo hunters was a popular idea at the time. Once they see the light, they'll switch over fast. To help them along, there was an attempt to suppress their spirituality. The Sundance was outlawed well into the 1900s. Peyote was outlawed until recently. Kids were literally taken to reservation schools, their hair cut short and they were punished for speaking their own language. This system continued on well into the 1950s. Make Christians of them heathens was the general idea of the time. What we fail to collectively comprehend is that Indians did adjust, adopt and adapt but on their terms. The underlying fact behind the high enlistment rate and the high decoration rate among Native Americans in time of war is they still regard America as their land. The rest of us are and always will remain boat people, immigrants and to some Natives, squatters with better weapons. Bear in mind the last time Federal forces were in the process of being mustered against an Indian insurrection was in 1973 at Wounded Knee II. If anything, the passive resistance by Indians via litigation and protest over what they perceive as cultural encroachment and domination is increasing. The most recent 'hit' our side took was the demise of Chief Illiniwek, the mascot of Illinois, whom the NCAA has deemed "hostile and abusive" to Native Americans. He has danced his last dance at games, folks. Now isn't that a kick to the dominant culture? Morality and ethics aside, it is demonstrative of ongoing cultural friction after the last official conflict ended 117 years ago at Wounded Knee I.
During the Indian wars of the 1800s, any number of field Officers had serious issues with a number of Indian Agents. Corruption was rampant and some Agents were allowing whiskey peddlers free access. The classic example of this is the Santee uprising otherwise known as the Minnesota Massacre. The Santee were experiencing real hunger and the corrupt Indian Agent made the statement, "let them eat grass". His body was later found with grass stuffed in his mouth and many innocent civilians died during the uprising on both sides. Some of the Santee fighters fled to the plains and joined forces with their Lakota cousins as well. I know there have been issues with our Military and private security contractors. Are Officers seeing corruption and other issues with private contractors that is detrimental to the Iraqi and Afghani people and ultimately our troops? If so, why aren't we hearing about it? What mechanisms are in place to deal with this? Where does the buck stop? Are Officer and enlisted men at all encouraged or expected to report corruption?
Naxalites’ Urban Push: Will They Succeed?
IPCS, 18 Feb 10: Naxlites' Urban Push: Will They Succeed?
Quote:
Undoubtedly, the Naxalites pose a serious threat to India’s progress. Their influence has spread across a few important states in the eastern part of the country, among which the worst affected by the threat include Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Orissa, West Bengal and Maharashtra. Though the entire area of these states are not entirely in the grip of the Naxalites, certain districts within each state are under their serious influence. Among these, the districts in Bastar region of Chhattisgarh can be ranked the most affected....
....While there are several dimensions of the Naxalite threat; the objective of this essay is to discuss in particular the Naxalite strategy in urban areas.What are the implications of their urban penetration? What are likely to be the security implications of this new strategy of the Naxalites? More importantly, will the Naxalites be successful in carrying out their will in urban areas? How can this new push be arrested?
Death threats leave Jharkand politicians in fear
The headline for a BBC News report:
Quote:
Senior politicians in the Indian state of Jharkand say they are living in fear and hardly dare venture from their own homes.In recent weeks Maoist rebels have begun issuing death threats against local Congress Party leaders - demanding they oppose the government's latest military offensive against the guerrillas. These are not empty threats. Earlier this month the Maoists gunned down Congress leader Govardhan Mahli in the East Singhbhum district of the state.
Beyond the headlines and some strange phrases - governance and governors under threat.
Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8639621.stm and this link to a map of where this province is:http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/jhar...ndlocation.htm
An earlier BBC report on the Maoist motivation:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8659501.stm
India's Maoist challenge: analysis
In summary:
Quote:
India's long-running Maoist insurgency has increased in intensity in recent months. In April, 76 government troops were killed by Naxalite guerrillas in a brutal hit-and-run ambush near Chintalnar in Dantewada district in the central state of Chhattisgarh – the largest Naxalite strike in the group's 43-year history. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has described the rebellion as 'India's gravest security threat.
An IISS Strategic Comment:http://www.iiss.org/publications/str...ist-challenge/
Which ends with:
Quote:
In the longer term, India's growing prosperity offers a window to tackle the structural roots of the conflict – but there must be doubt about whether the government has either the will or the political capital to use this opportunity.