United Nations Peacekeeping (catch all)
Forward: This is a piece that is composed for a class on insurgency and counter insurgency and as such is limited in its scope to materials specifically related to that class
The business of peace keeping is one of the most complex and exhausting processes which modern military forces find themselves involved in. Classical logic tells them they have won the war, but in these cases the war may just be a battle in the process of a greater war for the stabilization and development of the country.
The two perspectives on nation building that are commonly discussed in the western world are the US model of heavy forces, large money and extended deployment versus the United Nation blue helmets minimalist approach.
The Comparison of the US versus UN Peace Keeping operations is fundamentally flawed. The reason that this is so is extremely simple. The situations into which the UN is willing to intervene are on a whole a lot less unstable and dangerous than there American comparisons.
To counter balance the UN Peace keepers preference for more stable situations it is common to sque the American data by including Japan and Germany as successful operations. While these may have been successful reconstruction operations, there was no internal conflict in these countries, not to mention the fact that they had been extremely successful economic players on the world scale prior to the war. They where then brought to the table of unconditional surrender, the conflict had ended and been resolved, it was not stalled in flux. The countries they are being compared to are fundamentally divided be it by a civil war, an internal power vacuum, or a tyrannical leader oppressing his people.
The other interesting point when considering the literature is that there seems to be a constant statement that just a little more money and a few more soldiers could have gotten so much more done, which is likely inaccurate. I can understand the reasoning from a systemic perspective for a constant lobby for expanded capabilities but this constant if only statement doesn't delve into the actual situation. It instead glosses over the subject and defers discussion. If there was a finite need for more soldiers or more money it would be amazing for there to be a reason listed.
All in all I found the literature to be plauged by these and other problems, including an extreme lack of bipartisan ship, making dispariging comments about early war on terror tactics while celebrating the same tactics when carried out by the UN.
Dobbins, James. America's Role in Nation-Building; From German to Iraq. RAND. 2009.
Dobbins, James. United Nations's Role in Nation-Building; From Congo to Iraq. RAND. 2009.
Credibility Remains a Serious Issue With the UN
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,518345,00.html
"Report: Unlicensed U.N. Doctors Administer and Take Controlled Narcotics
A group of largely unlicensed doctors and nurses at the United Nations are distributing controlled narcotics including Valium, Diazepam and Demerol, and in some cases they are self-medicating themselves with the drugs, according to a published report.
Serguei Oleinikov, deputy director of the U.N. Medical Service, recently approved the "disposal" of dozens of unexpired Valium tablets from the fifth-floor department within the United Nation's headquarters in midtown Manhattan, Inner City Press reports.
Ruth Martin Agwai, one of the unlicensed nurses reportedly connected to the scheme, is married to Martin Luther Agwai, a Nigerian general who is the commander of the United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force in Darfur. According to Inner City Press, Agwai has used the diplomatic pouch and privileges granted to her by the Nigerian Mission to the U.N. to take medical equipment overseas."
Dallaire: The Blurring Line Between Peacekeeping and COIN
FP.com had an interesting interview with Gen. Romeo Dallaire, who I'm sure you all know better than I was commander of UNAMIR in 1994. Some interesting stuff - or so I thought - on, for example, ". . . a need for a new doctrinal basis and new structures for the protection of civilians."
Check it out here.
Quote:
FP: It sounds like what you're talking about is almost a fundamental retooling of the world's militaries. What would that look like?
RD: The big players are still basing a lot of their security on the classic use of force. And in the last two decades, except for twice in Iraq or in Kuwait, we haven't been using the classic use of force. We're still learning how to handle Afghanistan -- we haven't got that thing solved. We're still trying to work out how humanitarians, the diplomats, the nation-builders, the security people, police, and military -- how are all of them working at the same time to bring about [peace] instead of blowing the place up and then throwing in a bunch to rebuild it.
There is a need for a new doctrinal basis and new structures for the protection of civilians. [It's about] using that force as part of your prevention tools. We're not going in guns blazing. There's a whole bunch of stuff that you can do before you use that force. But it's important to make sure that people know that as you're going through these stages, if it doesn't work, ultimately, we'll use the hammer. That makes [the use of force] much more powerful.
Matt
Haven't read Tom's book . . .
But I did read Dallaire's.
I would agree with the need for a political basis, as well. But I guess my question off the top of my head would be "have things really changed that much since 1994?"
We're doing some "peacekeeping"-like work in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. But I would argue we're doing it as a necessary tactic, I suppose, for the accomplishment of the missions which began as definitely something other than civilian-protection.
Would western militaries be anymore willing or able to take on such a task today than they were in 1994?
Matt
Interventions post-Rwanda 1994
MattC,
I am sure there have been some, but too late tonight to Google to get confirmation. So how about the UK in Sierra Leone in 1999 (partly to rescue a UN expedition), Australia & allies in East Timor in 1999, the French in 2002 then others in the Ivory Coast and mmmm.
On my limited knowledge each has threatened to be "hot" and each has used a level of that lovely military term 'force projection'.
Incidentally do read Tom Odom's book, I recommend it; grim in places.
davidbfpo