Law Enforcement Advisory Capability as a Major Shortcoming
I've just returned from the second part of a major irregular warfare wargame. Interestingly, the most pressing finding in this game (and others I've participated in) is that the most significant shortfall when the United States provides counterinsurgency support or undertakes SSTR is our inability to provide advice and support to the national police in a partner state. Everyone agrees that the key to stabilization and counterinsurgency are some kind of constabulary or gendarmeries that are more robust than local police, but something less than the military. But because we ourselves don't have such an organization (particularly a deployable one), we are ill-equipped to provide advice and support to partners who might want to develop one.
Several solutions are normally discussed for this problem. All have shortcomings:
1. Use existing military resources, particularly military police, to provide such advice and support. The problem is that American MPs are not trained, educated, and organized to be a national police.
2. Task the State Department to develop such a capability. The problem with this is that they have nothing like the requisite expertise or institutional interest.
3. Create a new organization within the Department of Defense to do this. I kind of like this one, but it would be expensive.
4. "Outsource" it, either to contractors or other nations that do have such a national police capability (France, Italy, Canada, etc). The problem with this, of course, is that contracting it out does not have a very good track record, and other states may not have the capability or the will to undertake the job at a necessary level.
5. Task the Department of Homeland Security to develop an expeditionary law enforcement capability. The problem here is that, say, pulling American border guards out of Arizona to go help stabilize another state and train its national police would be politically difficult, maybe impossible.
Ultimately, it's a big problem for which all solutions are flawed.
The AFP as a possible model
What chance that the FBI could evolve into having some roles like those of the Australian Federal Police? Our AFP has evolved a hell of a long way in a hurry to get where it is today - given the resources that the US can muster , surely you could do something similar? (unless there are some domestic political reasons that as an Aussie I am unaware of).
Given our Federal structure and the way our
police are structured plus the deployability problem, the only viable solution is to develop a 'Constabulary Assistance' Battalion /Group or whatever using the MP Corps. The fact that they are not now trained to do that is irrelevant; what is needed is the relevant factor. We're looking at the future, not at today.
It is an ongoing problem and as one poster here has said -- and as was said at your game -- the Air Force trains their folks to be primarily law enforcement types as opposed to tactical elements. There is no reason in the world that a select number of Army and Marine MPs cannot be similarly trained.
As a national police element, even the RCMP and the AFP are not as applicable as are the models of the Gendarmerie Nationale and the Koninklijke Marechaussee. I have little doubt either would be glad to offer spaces for such training and for the worker bees, there are Police Academies all over this country that can offer civilian LE training, some of it exceptionally good.
Oh, and if we go that route, the lower grade MPs selected need to be second hitch guys; that is NOT a job for 19 year olds with guns... :)
Shortcomings can be rectified...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
SteveMetz
. . .
Several solutions are normally discussed for this problem. All have shortcomings:
1. Use existing military resources, particularly military police, to provide such advice and support. The problem is that American MPs are not trained, educated, and organized to be a national police.
2. Task the State Department to develop such a capability. The problem with this is that they have nothing like the requisite expertise or institutional interest.
3. Create a new organization within the Department of Defense to do this. I kind of like this one, but it would be expensive.
4. "Outsource" it, either to contractors or other nations that do have such a national police capability (France, Italy, Canada, etc). The problem with this, of course, is that contracting it out does not have a very good track record, and other states may not have the capability or the will to undertake the job at a necessary level.
5. Task the Department of Homeland Security to develop an expeditionary law enforcement capability. The problem here is that, say, pulling American border guards out of Arizona to go help stabilize another state and train its national police would be politically difficult, maybe impossible.
Ultimately, it's a big problem for which all solutions are flawed.
Fatal flaws cannot...
1. MPs, see my previous comment.
2. State is the last place to do this for many reasons including those you cite. As an aside, the USAID and contract elements have worked several places and USAID should be resurrected and removed from the pernicious influence of State. Problem with the AID contractor model is that while it is proven to work in benign or not ovely hostile environments (see dozens of examples in the 50-today period), it does not do nearly as well in the event of hostilities (see Afghanistan and Iraq). Part of the problem there being attracting quality contract personnel. Having that model available where appropriate is a good idea, a more robust capability is required for really hot spots.
3. A new organization in DoD would be flat bad. Another bureaucracy, another 'DoD Field Agency' competing for dollars, another DHS...
4. Your objections say it all. Relying upon weak reeds and all that, plus the recurring problem of national agendas...
5. Either someone is a master of satire or they're trying to scare us. The USBP themselves will tell you that they are the most problem plagued Fedral LE agency; DHS is an unmitigated disaster on all levels other than as a brilliant example of why creating new bureaucracies is not smart and should be avoided if at all possible. Giving them another mission and organization would be marginally worse tha a new DoD aggregation.
The only flaw in a mix of AID operated, contractor supported operations where appropriate and a dedicated and trained MP Constabulary training and advisory organization (which should NOT work for the PMG) for those places where hostilities are present or likely is the training of the MPs. That is so easily remedied as to be inconsequential, it could be done in a year or two.
As an aside, there were two Pams floating about in the early 1960s, green covers so MP School as opposed to DA I think, that discussed (a) training of MPs to support counterinsurgency and (b) structuring a model police force for a developing nation. IIRC, both made sense. They're bound to be in someones Library, perhaps even at Carlisle.
I have always dearly enjoyed the ability of the US Armed forces to reinvent wheels and further have gotten giggles from the fact that in recent years, many of those wheels tend to be triangular or square.
It is absolutely a big problem but there is, for once an easy solution (well, easy if you can get the bureaucracy and the competing interests aligned...).
The Air Force Security Force could do the
job; whether it's the AF, the Army, Marines is IMO not important -- though the various Chiefs of Staff / CNO (I left out the Masters At Arms, different kettle of Squid. Er, Fish... :) ) and their personnel folks might not agree.
The current training regimen in the USAFSF is heavily law enforcement oriented and less combat skill oriented; the Army and Marine MP forces reverse the priorities. Any one of the three could do the job, all would need a modified syllabus, extra and special training for the advisory mission. A national policing mission in most other nations in the world is far different from the milieu in US LE circles in all respects other than base human nature characteristics.
The key point is that whoever does the mission in a potentially hostile environment should be military for a number of reasons, not least due to relations with the host nation who understand the military - police or paramilitary regimen and prefer it to the amorphous US model. A minor exception can be made for British Commonwealth nations who are more attuned to the Anglo model but also tend toward the paramilitary school of thought.
While I don't care which service does it, in your paper, you may wish to consider these:
LINK
LINK
LINK
another problem rides again
In Panama during Opns Just Cause/Promote Liberty we used most of the above organizations to field and train the new National Police (PNP). We had combined patrols with PNP and US Army MPs. The FBI, in the form of ICITAP ran several training programs with the help of its regular contractor, Miranda Associates (mostly retired FBI guys - although the best of them was a former USAID public safety program guy). They did pretty well in fielding the investigative police arm called the PTJ and a Police Academy, not so well in everything else.
The primary basic police training and advisory program was run out of the US Forces Liaison Group and later the Military Support Group - Panama. We had SF teams augmented by Reserve SOF (mostly SF) wh were cops in civilian life at each Panama City precinct and each rural police district HQ. The 7th Group SF guys who did not rotate got to be very good cops in short order:D
Bottom line: we need an interagency approach which is hard to achieve at best. SF and RC cop teams work but there are hardly enough of them. MPs, SPs, and AF SP need lots of additional training. FBI not the right guys - too invsetigatively oriented and ICITAP is a bigger mess today than it was as the new kid in 1990. Contractors have all the problems that contractors have anywhere.
Revive the USAID Public Safety program and build a military advisor RC cop cadre might be the best approach to the start of a long term solution. Integrate into PRTs? Out in the field....
BTW, if interested see my article with Rich Downie in Military Review in about 91 called "Taking Responsibility for our Actions" and my SSI mongraph of April 1992, The Fog of Peace (the first of 3 by that title with differen authors and subject that SSI published:mad:).
Slapout9, this is slapout
anything bigger than .40. :D
Yep, makes no sense to reinvent that particular bear; the current one is capable of being trained and doing well.
The International Police Academy was run by USAID in the early '60s. IIRC, from about 62 until at least 65 (I got busy about then and lost track :wry: ). It was a plus-up and add on to the one that had for some time been run in Panama (I think, somewhere down South primarily for Latin American students) and was (I also think) in Suitland MD right outside DC.
As I recollect, it had a good rep and attracted students from many nations. We learned how to fight insurgencies in the early sixties with the entire strength of the Guvmint, all agencies cooperated, mostly willingly and effectively; then we got diverted by the social upheaval, political class disaffection due to the Army's mishandling of Viet Nam, dumb Bosses who were "Big War" fans and most dangerously and pervasive and still with us, 'sensitivity' and political correctness...
So now we get to learn all over again; it's the American way. :confused:
Wander through Montgomery enroute to visit kids and grandkids four or five times a year -- sometimes straight north and sometimes veering off on 85 to visit the east coast Cop and crew and the Army Guy and crew. I drink about four of five beers a year, Dos Equis or Michelob (NOT light or, UGHUltra) preferably. I have to restrict my beer intake to insure no conflict with my far, far, far more copious Bourbon intake... :cool:
War Game Small world / two degrees of separation
Quote:
Originally Posted by
SteveMetz
I've just returned from the second part of a major irregular warfare wargame. . .
My son was also a participant and said he was introduced to you briefly. Given that he is less rowdy than am I and was in the other group working on your piece of the problem, you may not recall. He obviously couldn't tell me much but did discuss the Police training aspect peripherally.
Sounds like a solution looking for a problem. We've done this before and it worked; then in the post Viet Nam effort to bury our heads in the sand and say "we only do the nations big wars" we buried the result of years of relevant experience. Viet Nam does not have too much relevance today on a number of points but the pre-Viet Nam doctrinal development, training, experience and operational efforts elsewhere at the time aimed worldwide are still pertinent. Minor tweaks to todays conditions are simple (if encumbered with a few easily blown aside turf protection issues :wry:).
Best regards,
Ken
Unfortunately, you're right.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Tom Odom
Ken,
Correct but we went farther than burying it; we made it semi-illegal in many respects. USAID in particular did a major shift away from cooperation with DoD and especially the CIA. In the realm of police training, USAID stepped back and declared "no mas". I was not involved in the central America operations in the 1980s but friends who were said these chainges--especially the self-declared ban on police training--played a large role. In our efforts in Rwanda, we had benefit of an activist Ambassador and an activist chief of staff of USAID, Dick McCall. Dick came out and stayed with us for months at a time. His presence as the number three man did much to motivate the players back in DC in the Nat Sec Council to at least get out of the way if they were not going to get on board.
Best
Tom
Therein lies the problem. The government of the US is a reflection of the society from which it comes -- just as are the Armed forces. There has been a massive societal change in this nation in the last 30 years and the personnel and personal solutions of 1970 are now totally inapplicable. Some of the processes and techniques are, with minor tweaks, still useful but anything involving people and what they are willing to do is an entirely different affair.
The probability of getting USAID or State involved in a conflict in any meaningful way short of total war is unlikely; their support will be tepid at best due to personal preference and a desire to avoid risk.
There will be exceptions like the two you mention (and good for them!) but that's what they'll be, exceptions.
As Steve points out below, as a result of Warren and Maddy, AID is a different animal now then it was then, the US Info Agency is gone and any significant resurrection is unlikely. The culture is the problem.
DoD is going to have to suck up a lot and the coterie of senior folks who still want nothing to do with IW are going to continue fighting that surreptitiously as they have been for years until they're finally retired. It's likely going to take five to ten years to get the Army to adapt to fighting a type of war they don't want to fight. The nay sayers are right, we need heavy capability; full spectrum capability -- but you can't drop off the bottom rung of the capability ladder because it's tedious, difficult, expensive and lacking in the ability to provide victories and a win.
In the interim, fortunately, the kids will make it work well enough to hold the line.
