Soldiers and NGOs (merged thread)
I was wondering if anyone with knowledge could tell me about relations between the military and aid and development agencies and NGOs on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Here, btw. is a link to the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations lessons learned website, interesting stuff on disarmament, working with NGOs and rule-of-law. Worth a look:
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/lessons/
Guidelines for Relations Between US Armed Forces and NGOs
USIP, 23 Jul 07:
Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments (Pamphlet)
Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments (Handout)
Quote:
The following guidelines should facilitate interaction between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Organizations (see Key Terms) belonging to InterAction that are engaged in humanitarian relief efforts in hostile or potentially hostile environments. (For the purposes of these guidelines, such organizations will henceforth be referred to as Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations, or NGHOs.) While the guidelines were developed between the Department of Defense (DOD) and InterAction, DOD intends to observe these guidelines in its dealings with the broader humanitarian assistance community. These guidelines are not intended to constitute advance endorsement or approval by either party of particular missions of the other but are premised on a de facto recognition that U.S. Armed Forces and NGHOs have often occupied the same operational space in the past and will undoubtedly do so in the future. When this does occur, both sides will make best efforts to observe these guidelines, recognizing that operational necessity may require deviation from them. When breaks with the guidelines occur, every effort should be made to explain what prompted the deviation in order to promote transparency and avoid distraction from the critical task of providing essential relief to a population in need....
Not so sure the UN is my one stop shopping for CALL
I've been around USAID employees and contractors for more than a decade, and while their system has administrative hurdles like most USG institutions, they do have some professional folks on the ground trying like hell. During 3 civil wars and their offices reduced to 2 from 50, those folks performed well under pressure. I give them high marks for putting the right folks in the most inhospitable places on earth and expecting nothing less than 110%.
The UN has been a thorn in my side for years. The link Charlie provides with a spotlight on Africa is but a joke.
Peacekeeping, Peace building and best of all, child protection advisers in Africa is abysmal. Collating miles of paper in three languages and then sum up a detailed financial report to back future events (that nobody signed up for) is hardly a lesson learned.
Back to topic, we (the US Military) got along with USAID employees far better than most State players with far less to do.
don't get me started on Peace Corps volunteers in the bush :D
What Stan said. I'd even add
Peace Corps volunteers in town, anywhere...
USAid, OTOH, everywhere I worked with them did great even if their State 'colleagues' did reject them like ugly stepchildren. Quite wrongly, IMO, the Aid folks got along far better with their HN counterparts than the diplomats did.
Been a while but I doubt either of those things has changed much...
Understanding the role of humanitarian organizations in war zones
I've just returned home from Baghdad and would like to recommend the following online course that will explain what it's all about regarding soldiers working with NGOs in Iraq, or anywhere else.
http://ocha.unog.ch/uncmcoord/
The course is not easy if you have never worked with the UN or for an NGO so leave yourself at least a good long afternoon so that you don't get frustrated.
Wherever the US Military is sent these days two non-indigenous groups will always be there, the media and NGOs.
Some of you may disagree with much that is included in the course but try to understand that the world of war is a complex place with folks that think we are what's wrong and the root cause of much of the current problems. Of course I don't agree, but we are not always as good as we would like to be all the time.
The world of humanitarian intervention is changing as the world changes from post-cold war to GWOT. The humanitarian efforts of the UN and the big NGOs are being “reformed” so that they can continue to provide assistance when needed. No organization is perfect and no groups of people are all good, or even competent. The UN and NGOs are no exception.
Creon
Cdn mil paper: How soldiers can get along better with civilian NGO types, others
This just out from Defence Research and Development Canada....
"Collaboration between the Canadian Forces and the Public in Operations" (86 page PDF) by Michael H. Thomson, Barbara D. Adams, Courtney D. Hall, Andrea L. Brown, and Craig Flear
Abstract
Quote:
In current operations (e.g., Afghanistan and Haiti), the Canadian Forces (CF) are expected to work more closely than in the past with a number of diverse civilian (“public”) organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (IOs), Other Governmental Departments (OGDs), local populations, and the media. However, the CF’s history of working with, for example, NGOs, has been limited and may pose challenges to collaboration (Leslie, Gizewski, & Rostek, 2008).
The purpose of this study was to 1) further understand the core issues that help or hinder civil-military collaboration, specifically involving the CF, NGOs, IOs, Afghan nationals, and the media, and 2) highlight recommendations for potential training and education for effective civil-military collaboration in the public domain. A number of subject matter experts (SMEs), representing diverse organizations and entities, both military (CF) and civilian (NGOs, IOs, Afghan nationals, the media), were consulted to elicit first-hand accounts of collaboration efforts in theatre.
Results indicated that the CF did not effectively acknowledge their counterpart’s expertise and experience and that the CF should refrain from “taking charge” and telling others how to do their job. Civilian participants said that the CF had open dialogue and that CF leaders were good at engaging, but that the CF could engage more with civilians and civil organizations given the challenges faced by civilians in navigating the military system and CF ommunication channels. Military and civilian participants said that one strategy to facilitate collaboration was to build positive relationships. However, civilian SMEs thought that the military overstepped its jurisdiction and that roles and responsibilities needed to be clearly established.
NGO or IO adherence to the principle of neutrality varied across organizations and this had potential negative ramifications for the ability of some organizations to operate safely in non-permissive environments. Participants included both negative and positive perceptions about one another. Stereotype reduction occurred following contact with one another and after learning about another organization’s values, intentions, and operational objectives and goals.
Afghan nationals provided examples of CF trust violations that may turn the local population against them. Overall, participants argued that there was a general lack of knowledge regarding the contemporary operating theatre and the multiple players involved. Gaining knowledge of potential collaboration counterparts was the core recommendation for future training and education to support civil-military collaboration in a comprehensive operating context, including the public domain, and this training and education needs to be fully integrated.