Unless that enemy is one's own insurgent populace
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
Breaking the enemy's will to fight is the real objective. Killing the enemy and the proper application of violence is a big part of that. Ultimately, you want to bring the enemy to the negotiating table at a weakened position. However, it's not a panacea. If the negotiations do not lead to peace, then you have failed. The war to end all wars is a good example of how the accumulation of body counts without formal arbitration instead of retribution can lead to more war.
If the American Civil War would have been over an issue was that equally difused across the land it would have manifested as an insurgency if at all. In which case Grant's strategy of crushing the will of the enemy populace would have likely failed. As it was a geographic issue, and a separate nation was formed, it worked.
Body counts? Certainly gained a bad rap in Vietnam. I see this as a measure of performance though, not effectiveness. Many factors go into what it takes to break the will of an opponent, so merely counting bodies only tells you that you are killing people.
In COIN operations, where one is trying to regain the support of their populace WHO, WHERE, WHEN, WHY, and HOW one kills is probably far more important than how many. Again, I still see it as a measure of performance that will often lead to an assumption that more is better, when if fact, the opposite may be true.
While I hate to agree with Wilf
about anything ;) he is on to something here. Mike, there are times when you can't bring the enemy to the negotiating table - Hitler and his henchment committed suicide rather than surrender. It was the thierd or fourth echelon that came to the table and certainly did not represent the NAZI regime. I suspect that Bob's World has put the body count issue in the right context - that it can be an useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.
Cheers
JohnT
I don't mind agrreing with Wilf, particularly when he's right.
And he is in this case. :cool:
The key item from his post is this:
Quote:
"Historically best practice body counts were based on recorded kills, verified by physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation. (emphasis added / kw)
I would add that those figures should not be publicized in any way or released to the media because they will either misunderstand or misuse them -- more likely both -- and that will skew the military application (as it did in Viet Nam after mid 1966).
P.S.
Don't give them to the Departmental bureaucracy or Congress either -- because they will then be 'leaked' and really misconstrued.
P.P.S
John and Bob's world are correct also in that it can be a useful measure of performance but not of effectiveness/outcome.
Intel guys always want more data
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rex Brynen
This is true, however, of almost all data in intelligence assessment--the data rarely has a single unambiguous interpretation. Assessing the validity and reliability of indicators, contextualizing them, and making collective sense of them (and their broader significance) is what analysts ought to be doing for a living.
As a general rule, I would rather have more information than less, even if the information might be inflated or indicative of multiple possible trends.
and are typically oblivious to how collecting and counting it might be affecting the very operations they are working to support.
Or just as often, will fight tooth and nail to keep a data source on line when the ops guys want to go turn it off for the negative effects its day to day operational presence has on the mission as a whole.
BL, I would discount the intel community's perspective on this by the "factor of 2 described by Fuchs," I would proably do the same for commanders at any level higher than that which the casualites were actually produced at, say company level.
A body count is pointless.
However, knowing that you killed 'X' AND got his weapon AND will or even may be able to exploit that is not pointless.
The key is to know your enemy and really understand who you're fighting. Bill Moore makes the valid point that our overly competitive system encourages misuse of such data (and I repeat that public release exacerbates that factor) but that same system with it's forced short rotations (and repetitive deployments deliberately tasked to different AOs) does not allow Commanders or units to get to know their enemy. A body count is then sort of pointless.
However, as Wilf said when he started this thread:
Quote:
"Historically best practice body counts were based on recorded kills, verified by physical control and recovery of the body AND Weapons - usually for some form of exploitation."(emphasis added /kw)
However, Wilf cited that usage in some Commonwealth campaigns where a three year tour (or longer, particularly in Rhodesia) was the norm. We don't do that (unfortunately) so many do not see the value for us. It was not and is not pointless.
If you know your AO and your enemy. If you do not, then it probably is pointless...
As for Bob's World's comment on the Intel community and their shortfalls, I've seen that. He's right. I've also seen commanders that would not tolerate that attitude as they wanted to do what was right as opposed to doing what they thought their Boss might want...:wry:
He also says:
Quote:
I would discount the intel community's perspective on this by the "factor of 2 described by Fuchs," I would proably do the same for commanders at any level higher than that which the casualites were actually produced at, say company level.
Hmm. That sounds like an indictment of a lot of Field Grade and Flag Officers...:wry: