Is Globalization the Answer or Culprit?
This could go in the Tunisia thread, but is a little broader than that, so I've placed it here.
An interesting piece on the implications of Tunisia in the struggle over the identity of Islam by Thomas P.M. Barnett over at World Politics Review.
For those not familiar with his books, Dr. Barnett's theory is that globalization's connectivity reduces conflict. Conflict tends to originate in the periphery where states are not connected or do not have adequate rules.
In this case, he posits that adherence to religion and making a buck don't have to conflict, and that folks in the Middle East and Africa want to be connected to the global economy more than they want to be a part of Al-Qaeda's world. The gist is that capitalism can beat fundamentalism just like it beat communism- economically, with democracy (politics) coming later. Once people are worried about buying a nicer TV/car/cell phone, they tend to worry less about hating their neighbors... you could argue that Iraq shows a positive correlation here as well.
While I'm inclined to agree with him, I think this line of reasoning also opens up another question- is it possible that a systemic shock (like the Great Depression or another state vs. state war) could discredit globalization so thoroughly that the majority of people would actually reject it? Could the current Chinese bubble popping lead to that large of consequences?
Unlikely I know, although there are precedents... Several earlier periods of globalization fell by the wayside for similar reasons, although the fact that we're back where we are seems to indicate that there's something to the phenomenon.
Looking forward to hearing your thoughts.
V/R,
Cliff
Good to see you again Cliff
On the subject of insurgency and its causes: Ted Robert Gurr, back in 1970, published what is still the best explanation in Why Men Revolt. In its essence, Gurr's argument was that revolutions take place when after a period of economic growth there is a sudden and sharp decline and the perception of the populace (or significant members thereof) that this is the fault of the venal and unjust government. He calls this "perceived relative deprivation." As a political scientist, I agree that this is politics, but economics is both relavant and the trigger mechanism expolited for political purposes.
Cheers
JohnT
You are dead wrong on this one Wilf. Dangerously so.
Wilf, you confuse "official" with "legitimate."
A strongman can deem himself to be "official;"
A puppet can be deemed "official" by some strong external power;
But only a governed populace can bestow "legitimacy" upon their government.
Vast sweeps of the populace of Saddam's Iraq did not recognize his legitimacy, they only feared his offical power. Same is true in Saudi Arabia today, and that number is growing as the gulf between the people and the Royals continues to expand and pleas of the people for change are not merely ignored, but attacked.
Do indeed look at Egypt as Slap suggests, but if one cannot see past the poverty to the factors of governance that I lay out, then all one is going to see is the surface issues. The people have always been poor in Egypt, even when the kingdom was rich. But as I recall, Pharaohs placed and sustained in power by Greek and Roman armies were far more susceptible to popular uprisings. They were inherently illegitimate in the eyes of the populace.
When Egypt explodes it will not be because the people are poor or because many are Muslim. It will be because they do not recognize the right of Mubarak to govern. By his own selfish actions he has robbed his office of legitimacy. It will be because many feel that they are excluded from full participation in economic and governmental opportunity as a matter of status. It will be because many feel that the rule of law as applied to them is unjust. It will be because hope has been removed from the political process there.
It will not be because they are poor.