A para-military police leader adds
From a "lurker" with a long time serving in a para-military police service and only the summary is cited below:
Quote:
Summary:
a) Instructions, standing orders, SOPs, shared maps, call signs and structure.
b) Command and Control which puts (a) into practice.
c) Training.
d) Exercises and wash ups.
e) Working together whenever possible and operate as joint units e.g. dogs, EOD, catering etc.
Much can be gained from:
Checking Orders etc (in Arabic so difficult)
Interviewing people on and off the record – they will know the problems! Do people follow the instruction and orders? Remember talk to the "Indians" not the bosses. They will make suggestions. I used to start with the boss and work downwards, increasing the number at each rank that you speak with.
Look at Command and Control structure, you could find improvements. TEWTs, training?
Deployment of resources – because it is simple most people go for fixed deployment – I would always push for about 50% flexible.
Surveillance, a vital element in most aspects. Technology, cameras etc. We used everything we could get hold of, the simpler the better.
Training, both tactical at unit and on an individual basis.
Discipline?
Inspection Assessment Note
From a "lurker" who has experience in inspecting police forces:
Quote:
Assessment Note
In assessing any unit the following should be considered;
Readiness - in terms of kit, training (including awareness of role) and numbers
Operational Delivery
Leadership
Community response
Readiness
This is well covered by David’s suggestion regarding exercises and inspections of facilities and equipment.
Operational Delivery
It is easy to fall into the trap of counting activities but that should be avoided as many such measures are directionally ambivalent, in that is more or less better? Think of rape reported any increase is always presented as a positive, as more victims are willing to come forward. However, the increase may be real!
It will be better to assess outcomes the approach to this is to start at the briefing;
Is it merely informative or does it include structured tasks?
Does the tasking regime reflect the strategic priorities? If not why not?
Is there an appropriate review and debrief in place?
Next consider operational deployment;
Are the areas deployed to routine or are the selected by reference to the mission objectives?
Are the assets deployed appropriate in terms of capability and capacity?
Is there flexibility in terms of real time decisions by the leadership?
Results
Out comes not activities should be counted, the number of vehicles stopped at a VCP is irrelevant the percentage of such stops that results in either an action or intelligence is the measure that should be employed.
The number of allocated tasks resulting from the briefing that are successfully completed should be monitored not just in terms of “jobs done” but also in terms of further actions generated.
Leadership
This can be assessed by monitoring on going improvements in the results.
It can be further assessed in terms of self generated taks and actions. Are they in line with mission objectives and are they developmental in terms of the individuals and the team.
Community Response
This is best assessed in possibly hostile environments by a mechanism for discreet and anonymous feedback. (similar to the systems used in Northern Ireland)
Learning from our history
Thanks to a pointer I have found a couple of historical papers on the Uk's earlier commitment to assisting the Iraqi police:
1) An academic / practitioner's article (behind a pay wall) 'The Lessons of Policing in Iraq—a Personal Perspective': http://policing.oxfordjournals.org/c.../1/102.extract
This refers to a published paper by 'HMG's Strategic Task Force into international police assistance', I wonder if the net paper is part of that. It certainly is not readily found on the web.
2) From 2010 a former diplomat's papers:http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/...-statement.pdf
3) A former Chief Constable's 2010 paper: http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/...ment-final.pdf