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Op-Ed in the International Herald Times,
By SWC Member Gian P Gentile
andQuote:
After spending 2006 in command of an armor reconnaissance squadron in some of West Baghdad's toughest neighborhoods, I learned to be very humble when linking causes to the effects I thought my unit produced.
Quote:
The American Army's new counterinsurgency doctrine told me to attack the root problems that allowed the insurgency to exist in my area. But some roots were impossible to get at.
I mean no disrespect to anyone, and I even feel uncomfortable posting this, but something concerns me:
Is there a "civil war" within our military?Quote:
By the end of 2006 I had became wary of some cocksure commanders who exuded the sense that they had mastered their area of responsibility. It seemed to me that these commanders had in their own minds become smarter than the war that they were fighting.
This piece has some interesting wrinkles to it, both positive and negative.
Positive:
A. Recognizes the inherent difficulty of developing situational awareness and is honest in saying so. There is an ingerent tension between the "Can Do" culture of the military, especially the manuever leaders, and the need to be candid. This tension is often most apparent between maneuver and intelligence to the point that I had two of the most senior intelligence generals in the Army in 1990 tell us "never brief negativity" meaning never say we did not know, a rule I refused to adhere to.
B. Recognizes that a civil war has been ongoing and that apparent effects are not necessarily the real effects on the ground. Again this goes back to the issue of candid appraisal.
Negative
A. Still focuses somehow on COIN doctrine as if it is the cause of the difficulties inherent in the Iraq war--a civil war with a multilayered insurgency embedded in it. In this regard, it is almost a backtrack from the honesty in the rest of the article. Current COIN doctrine is not responsible for the stituation in Iraq and neither is the author.
B. The author jabs at fellow commanders in a way less honest than the criticism LTC Yingling directed at the general officer corps, which of course this author openly denounced.
C. Finally I am usually left with the feeling that in offering such insights and critcism, the author never offers any way ahead beyond pointing out it is difficult to see.
Tom
Interesting snapshot. It is of course and 'Op-Ed' piece but opinions matter. And differ. :wry:
I used to point out to a long series of bosses that the use of the word 'my' in reference to units was a really bad idea, pointing out that for the USA, A. Lincoln had made that category of persons illegal on New Years Day in 1863. Excessive use of personal possessive pronouns as opposed to a simple 'we' tells the troops much about the speaker.
I do think, however, that this is a fundamentally important point:
It shouldn't be used as an excuse to "do nothing." However, much of the moral and socio-economic terrain of Iraq is shaped by factors well beyond the capacity of the US military (and USG) to deal with. Many of them relate to general issues of policy--not only Iraq policy, but also historical legacies, longer term and larger issues of US policy in the region.Quote:
The American Army's new counterinsurgency doctrine told me to attack the root problems that allowed the insurgency to exist in my area. But some roots were impossible to get at.
FM 3-24 doesn't really address this directly, I assume, since the purpose really isn't to state "sometimes you're dealt a near-impossible situation where you can't win," but rather "here's how you can have the most positive effect." In the broader debate over Iraq policy, and insurgency in general, I do think its important to remind ourselves of this, and have a little humility about capabilities and limitations.
I do realize the "winnable" vs "unwinnable" insurgency issue has popped up on several SWJ threads, but I thought it was useful to flag it here too. For the record, I don't think there is enough clarity in current US policy goals in Iraq to determine how "winnable" it is. As I understand those (somewhat contradictory) goals, however, I think that the most that can be hoped for is a "less bad" rather than "more bad" outcome, coupled with "not losing" in the eyes of foes. This isn't to belittle achieving "less bad" outcomes--far from it, less bad means less forced displacement, sectarian killing, and regional instability. I think its vitally important, actually.
Rex,Quote:
FM 3-24 doesn't really address this directly, I assume, since the purpose really isn't to state "sometimes you're dealt a near-impossible situation where you can't win," but rather "here's how you can have the most positive effect." In the broader debate over Iraq policy, and insurgency in general, I do think its important to remind ourselves of this, and have a little humility about capabilities and limitations.
It does address it directly and in complex fashion--the very basis of parallel lines of operations is the complexity of COIN. To say the doctrine says to "attack the root problems" is in itself a very simple spin of the complexity.
I agree fully on the issue of winnable versus winnable. The clarity that is needed is actually addressed in this article to a certain degree. By that I mean the defacto separation of Iraq, which has been and still is ongoing. You are correct that the military cannot provide neither solution nor clarity in that regard. And I doubt that for the interim the USG will be willing to either.
Best
Tom
IMO, the words 'win,' 'victory' and so forth should never be used in the context of an counterinsurgency.
Generally, what occurs in such an operation is an acceptable outcome, no more (lacking the G. Khan solution...). Words like winning set the stage for public relations -- and political -- problems of some magnitude. Not to mention the affect that you both mention on the mindset of the troops involved...
Words are important.
No argument there, Ken. That's is where clarity in purpose has got to emerge rather than us backing into something else. Sticking my neck out a bit, I believe Rex was putting "winnable" in quotes because it is a poor measure, especially given the lack of clarity.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
And words are important :D
Best
Tom
To add on to what Tom said, I've always thought that using the expression, "victory for the American people" doomed us from the start, regardless of whether Iraq is an insurgency or not.Quote:
Originally Posted by Ken White
IMO, defining victory in political terms, when the military's ability to influence politics is limited, was a mistake. Someone will tell me if I'm wrong, but I believe that the objective in Kosovo was stopping the ethnic cleansing and we let the people work out the political details.Quote:
Originally Posted by jcustis
If the administration really believed that nothing could be worse than Saddam, then we should've left when he was captured, confident that whatever emerged would be better. And if we believed that things could get worse, then we shouldn't have rolled the dice.
Yep, indeed I was.Quote:
Originally Posted by Tom Odom
eight years later and they're still trying to work out the political details...
In Iraq, I think we planned to leave in the July-August 2003 time period but something happened in early May that changed the plan. I have no idea what but there was a lot of shuffling going on. In any event, it's only a little over five years, Saddam is gone -- and they're still trying to work out the political details.
Thus there's a lot of similarity.
Small Wars, No Small Debate via SWJ Blog.