All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)
Looking for any books, articles, or even websites on Greys Scouts, the horse-mounted infantry used in Rhodesia in the Sixties and Seventies. Any other information on the use of horsed cavalry in post-WWI small wars would also be welcome. Contrasting cavalry with early mechanization in small wars and trying to determine if there was much of a place for cavalry in small wars once tank and automobile technology became pretty dependable in the Thirties.
Rhodesia vs US: Training and Tactics in COIN
Howdy,
I'm doing a masters thesis on the idea of comparing Rhodesia's Training and Tactics to the current US. How did a little country with no resources manage to fight a COIN and train for a HIC fight so well, while the US appears to be only trying to train for one or the other.
From what I've gathered so far, the Rhodesians trained 70% of the time on force on force threats, fearing one of their many neighbors were going to eventually attack in force. So they trained for HIC, but practiced COIN, fairly successfully. (with almost every contact resulting in enemy killed).
Is my thesis wrong? Any ideas or suggestions for readings would be greatly appreciated.
Once more Rhodesia can teach the USA?
Apart from scouring the various threads on SWC, their links and recommendations I would recommend a PM to those who have studied Rhodesian training, or undergone it.
Then I'd look at the literature written after 1980, by those who did serve; I say after 1980 as it will cut out the Soldier of Fortune material and the PR.
Have a look at some of the well known texts: Reid-Daly on the Selous Scouts, the two tomes on the RLI and RAR. Then 'No Mean Soldier' by Peter McAleese, a British professional NCO who served there.
I expect Rhodesian training was far more than a local variant on UK training, for example what was the impact before 1974 of the Portuguese? Plus South Africa, where after 1965 I expect much of the higher training took place.
Quite a few here would be interested in seeing the end product.
for research on small nations fighting COIN wars...
... see 'Counterinsurgency in Africa: the Portuguese way of war, 1961-1974' by John P. Cann.
Ian Smith's regime was supported primarily by Portugal and Portugal had to fight in three different theatres in Africa.
I second that. Or third it...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Cavguy
Yes, their tactical performance with little resources was brilliant, but it also didn't matter. What Steve and I are saying is that we get obsessed as a military with tactical innovation while ignoring our deficit in strategic thinking.
Totally true on all counts.The Rhodesians showed great tactical competence in an existential war, a really rather common occurrence.
In our last existential war, 1942-45, the US showed tactical competence. I have little doubt we will again when needed -- right now for most people, it simply is not needed, adequate will suffice. That's unfair to the guys and gals on the ground now but that's the way it has always been and is likely to stay. Democracies will not invest in really good and hard training short of existential wars -- the Mothers get too upset at the 2-5% casualty rate caused by rigorous training. So does Congress, it's expensive to pay those folks for the damage to their little bods thus incurred and in a tight recruiting market, unnecessary (in the eyes of the budgeteers and politicians) losses are frowned upon.
All the lessons from Rhodesia are readily available and have been studied, some are applicable, some are not. Those that have applicability have already been adopted. Ever notice how the US Troopie carries a weapon now versus say 15 years ago? That may be why some of us cannot understand what you're trying to do.
In any event, the tactical side isn't a problem, the politics of restraint, risk avoidance and getting out of Dodge are the problem. Regrettably, the Rhodesian tactical lessons don't cover that. Their strategic error let down all those great tactical moves. Ours looks about to repeat the flaw...
If you do not get the strategy right, you are not going to succeed tactically even though there will be (and are, in Afghanistan; were in Iraq...) a number of great tactical ploys, moves and operations. The TTPs aren't the problem, the politics are.