Big step for Rwanda: Abolish Capital Punishment
For those who have sometime questioned the Rwandans' ability to see beyond the immediate I would offer this:
Many outsiders expected the Rwandans (meaning the RPF) to be unmerciful after the genocide; indeed, they surprised me by their moves toward reconciliation when such steps seemed impossible. If this step away from capital punishment becomes official, it is further evidence of such thinking.
Best
Tom
Francophone Africa Forever at Whatever Costs
Quote:
Operation Turquoise was aimed only at protecting genocide perpetrators, because the genocide continued even within the Turquoise zone," Mr Bihozagara said.
Very close to the truth, Op Turquoise was ORIGINALLY intended to restore the former government and when that proved impossible in the glare of international attention, it shifted to preserving the former government under the shield of the "humanitarian" zone. Meanwhile, genocide did continue inside that zone.
Let's just say that France is less than popular in Kigali (at least in the GOR and military). French actions (under and over the table) before, during, and after the genocide served France's overarching concern to retain Rwanda as a member of the Francophone Africa bloc.
Frankly some of the French doings harken back to what the French were willing to do in Indochina (the use of former SS troops) and Algeria (torture and general mayhem), only they were doing it through the client former government and its associates and looking the other way. Meanwhile France (and the US let this happen) forestalled and then delayed reaction to the genocide.
Best
Tom
Genocide Plans and Start Dates
Adam,
Taking a longer view of the "genocide" as a Rwandan government policy is useful in understanding the flow of events as they culminated in early 2004.
From independence with the flip flop of the Belgians in using the Tutsis as a control element for their colony to supporting the Hutus as the majority in the newly emergent independent Rwanda, sanctioned organized and supported violence against the Tutsis was very much a stated and unstated GOR policy. The results were periodic massacres that in manner if not numbers (though in the thousands) served as precursor models for 94. The Tutsi expatriate rebel factions--directed largely toward restoration of the royal family--incursions into Rwanda in the 60s (not many and not well done) did serve as sparks (or excuses by the GOR who exaggerated the threat) for massacres of the Tutsis. These massacres stimulated the Tusti diaspora into surrounding African countries and abroad into Europe, the US, and Canada.
Habyarimana seized control in in 74 as I recall promising to end this cycle of violence. In may ways he did but his use of the single party state with the MRND as its core included a 99% exclusion of Tutsi participation in any political process. This--the so called golden era of Rwanda--lasted until the late 80s when 2 events started to unhinge the equation. First of all African regimes could no longer count on the Cold War to keep the flow of donor assistance coming without political reform. Second the collapse of the world coffee market--the long pole in the Rwandan economic tent--was a disaster for Habyarimana's single party state. Commencing in the early 90s pressures from donors forced the President to start opening up the political process. And the internal poltical process amoung Hutus was explosive and often violent.
Parallel to these events, the RPF structured itself as a rebel/insurgent force that woulld force the GOR to accept the Tutsi expatriates (a million if not more) back into Rwanda. Initial efforts with the Oct 90 invasion were a disaster and Kagame as the new leader had to restructure and rebuild the RPA even as he held on to Rwandan territory against the GOR and the French. Habyarimana used the RPF threat against his opponents inside the country. Massacres of Tutsis took place on a scale of the early 60s; political violence against Hutu opponents of the regime was also common. But even within the regime, hardliners coalesced among the President's wife's family. That is where the gencoide plans really started to form up. French roles in all of this were both open in training the old army and advising/training/supplying hardline elements like the Interhamwe--the militia of the MRND.
Arusha was signed in 93 and by its terms the RPF won its fight; Implementation of Arussha sputtered along until April 94 when Habyarimana caved and agreed. That was his death warrant among the hardliners including his wife. France supported the GOR and the hardliners even after the UN embargo was placed against arms shipments. France gave shelter to hardliners as they fled; I saw a used Mercedes parking lot in Goma where GOR and hardliners parked their vehicles only to whisked away to safety--largely courtesy of the French.
The French charges against Rwanda are a smoke screen to cover Paris's role after Rwanda recently opened an investgation into all of this. Gerard Prunier's analysis of who shot the plane down still applies; he like me on the ground saw no logic in an RPF decision to shoot Habyarimana down. In contrast, the hardliners stood to gain and they used the event as a trigger for the genocide. Dallaire's recounting of events lays out how immediately killer squads started to fan out as well as the role of Radio Television des Milles Collines in orchestrating events over the air waves.
Long answer I know
Best
Tom
Link is Down But See USIP for Same Issue
the link is down but I will keep trying
But in the meantime, I particpated in an On the Spot Forum Panel in April 2004 at USIP on this very subject:
Quote:
On the Spot in Rwanda: The Challenge to Diplomats and Journalists in Reporting the Genocide. It has been ten years since the genocide in Rwanda, which saw its most intensive slaughter in the spring of 1994. In light of the 10-year anniversary of the tragic events in Rwanda, on April 14 the Institute hosted a special roundtable discussion with three journalists and three diplomats who were on the ground in Kigali and in the region at the time. Moderated by Michael Southwick, former Institute Africa specialist and then deputy chief of mission to the U.S. Embassy in Kenya, the session featured discussion of the multiple challenges faced by journalists in their efforts to obtain and report the story as it unfolded and the role of American diplomats in the region to shape the response of policymakers. The panel discussion was followed by a general question and answer session moderated by Southwick.
Speakers
(Note: 1994 Affiliations listed for all speakers)
Panel I
Alex Belida
Voice of America
Donatella Lorch
New York Times
Jennifer Parmalee
Washington Post
Panel II
Thomas Odom
U.S. Military Attaché to Rwanda and Zaire
David Rawson
U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda
Michael Southwick, Moderator
Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Kenya
Of Related Interest
The USIP site still has the audios for our presentations.
Best Tom
"Join our unique, Participant Observation Summer program. All expenses included!!!"
Hi Marc,
You know, that's not a bad slogan. We've gone through so many, I don't which one to use anymore. That and the Army Chief of Staff is sending all retirees new pins, cause he didn't like the last set. Hmmm, what did that set the Army back for ?
Will give the link another shot now.
Thanks, Stan
Invite Thompson to "Talk" Here, Hey?
Marc,
I emailed Thompson. You should invite him to join the SWJ to blog or start a discussion thread on his book. Maybe we need an author's forum?
Best
Tom