China’s View of South Asia and the Indian Ocean
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Originally Posted by
Backwards Observer
Ray, thanks for replying. Do you think a military alliance between the US and India would be a potent enough deterrent to China? What are your feelings on the likelihood of such an alliance/pact from the Indian side?
India is said to be having a 'strategic relationship' with the US.
It has meant buying US equipment and some naval exercises and some visits of military personnel.
Earlier the US troops were trained at the Indian Jungle Warfare and Counter Insurgency School, had exercises in Ladakh (High Altitude), some HAHO exercises with the Indian Paratroopers, and some naval and air force exercises.
I presume it was more for interoperability and little in the way of strategic alliance.
There is no doubt that a US - India military alliance would be a deterrent to China and maybe that is why there is closer cooperation between India and the US in many fields, beyond defence, to include economically making India a challenge to China.
However, India has to tread carefully since abandoning Russia would make it closer to Pakistan and a Russia - China - Pakistan axis will not be in the interest of either India or the US.
While most Indians root for the US, yet even amongst them, quite a few are sceptical about US' reliability as an 'ally', in the military and strategic sense, since US is not taken to be quite in the mould of a 'friend in need, is a friend indeed'.
India is not an Anglo Saxon country and uncomfortable a truth that it maybe, Carl's statement is valid to understand the equation
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Obviously this is a hypothetical discussion but it is still remarkable that we are having it. Would we be even having the same discussion if the country in question were Australia?
Even a 'natural' ally Israel is finding going difficult since US interests override!
Therefore, if Israel is having problems, India has no hope in hell!
Hence, India is satisfied with the US as a 'friend'.
China’s View of South Asia and the Indian Ocean
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China’s View of South Asia and the Indian Ocean
Published on August 31, 2010 by Dean Cheng
The Indian Ocean is becoming increasingly important to China’s economic and security interests. China appears to be pursuing what has been widely characterized as a “string of pearls” strategy of cultivating India’s neighbors as friendly states, both to protect its economic and security interests and to balance a “rising India.” With Chinese influence in the region growing, it is essential that the U.S. not fall behind in the Indian Ocean, but maintain a steady presence in the region, both to signal its resolve to stay engaged and to avoid the difficulties of reentering a region.
http://www.heritage.org/research/lec...e-indian-ocean
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As the People’s Republic of China (PRC) expands its global economic and security interests, one region of growing importance to Beijing will be the Indian Ocean area. Not only must a significant portion of China’s oil imports transit this region, but one of China’s enduring friends (Pakistan) and one of its long-time rivals (India) border this region, as well as China’s sensitive Tibetan flank.
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European colonialism ended Chinese and Indian isolation, both from each other and from the rest of the world, yet it affected the two major Asian powers very differently. India was conquered by the British and directly colonized. In the period of decolonization, the Indian Subcontinent was partitioned into Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority East and West Pakistan (now Bangladesh and Pakistan, respectively).[1]
By contrast, although China retained nominal sovereignty, the Chinese view this period as the “Century of Humiliation.” From 1840 to 1945, China lost control of its destiny. During this period, foreigners collected China’s tariffs and taxes, were immune from Chinese law and prosecution, and ultimately were able to dictate China’s fate. When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won the Chinese civil war, Mao Zedong made a point to say that China would now “stand up.” For Mao and the rest of the CCP leadership, their victory marked the return of the ability of the Chinese to dictate their own future. This had two implications for Chinese views of South Asia.
The first implication is that Chinese territory is a unitary whole and inviolable. The “Century of Humiliation” saw foreign intrusions into China, the creation of concessions, and even the forcible removal of territory from Chinese control (e.g., Hong Kong and Taiwan). This would no longer be tolerated. In the South Asian context, from the perspective of the CCP leadership, Tibet, like Taiwan, is part of China, and any threat to Chinese control is wholly unacceptable.
The other implication is that China’s borders have been unduly affected and influenced by foreign pressure and domination, especially through the application of “unequal treaties.” Consequently, now that China is strong, it is Beijing that will determine whether it accepts the current borders or not. More to the point, from its perspective, China is under no obligation to accept borders that were demarcated by more powerful foreign parties.
See the Paragraphs on Chinese Relations with South Asian States.
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For the foreseeable future, Chinese strategic planners will need to pay increasing attention to China’s Indian Ocean flank. In the short term, China is concerned about its growing dependence on the sea lanes of communications for sustaining China’s economic growth. In 2010, for the first time, China imported more than 50 percent of its oil consumption. Chinese President Hu Jintao has already raised the issue of the Malacca Strait. There is little question that it is a key chokepoint on China’s oil supply routes. Part of China’s interest in developing alternative ports and pipelines, such as in Pakistan and Burma, would seem to be motivated by a desire to reduce the criticality of the Malacca Strait.
Even if China’s oil lifeline did not have to transit the Strait of Malacca, it would nonetheless traverse significant portions of the Indian Ocean. The growth of the Indian navy means that Chinese economic development is potentially at the mercy of India, as well as the United States. The forging of Indian security links with Japan and the United States is therefore a source of concern.
The Recommendations for U.S. Policy are also worth a dekko, as is Maintaining a Strong U.S. Presence in the Region.
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Given the rather interesting thread on the South China Seas and China, I thought that though dated article Aug 2010 would be worth discussing.
How much has changed in the strategic perspective in South Asia, the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea?
Where is it heading?
What are the options for those effected by the latest 'happenings' around South Asia and Asia Pacific countries?
How will China and the US handle the ever changing kaleidoscope in this region of South Asia and the Asia Pacific Rim?
Is strategic depth valid today?
Is the often cited phrase 'strategic depth' actually relevant in modern strategic thinking?
It appears to be only cited in the South Asian context. Secondly, apart from distance and consequent impact on travel time, what does Afghanistan have to offer?
From this armchair there is very little to offer, albeit with some very modern airfields added since 2001;); nor would any meaningful presence be sustainable locally.
From a puzzled civilian.:wry:
