Pashtun / Pashtunwali / Pashtunistan (catch all)
Excellent and informative article on Pashtun customary law by Tom Barfield. Found via Afghanistanica.
Quote:
...
Pashtuns, even wealthy ones, who moved to large cities were even farther removed from the values of the
Pashtunwali because there they were enmeshed in state systems of government that restricted autonomy and cash economies that valued money more than honor. It is for this reason that examples of customary law as a living tradition are found mainly in the marginal areas of rural Afghanistan even though the ethos of the Pashtunwali is common to all rural Pashtuns ...
The blog has some nice commentary as well:
Quote:
I would venture a guess that if it was possible to do a quantitative analysis of revenge in Afghanistan, a researcher would find that few Pashtuns actually attempt revenge and even fewer attain it. But damn it, that whole Pashtunwali thing makes for an interesting article. And never mind that it is a wee bit Orientalist and sensationalist; Whatsisname at that there newspaper wants to tell you that Pashtuns are an unthinking bunch of maniacs bent on revenge, guided only by their basest emotions and incapable of logic, reason, forgiveness or pragmatism. I’m not going to cite any articles because there are so many to choose from, and not just from second-rate rags like [insert name of any newspaper in the world], but in quality sources such as The Economist and The Christian Science Monitor.
What those journalists are leaving out are the concepts of Nanawatay, Rogha, Nagha and Jirga. All these concepts are, in some form or another, tools for reconciliation, forgiveness, compensation, punishment or justice. And guess what? They are included in Pashtunwali along with Badal.
The Struggle for Pashtunistan
CSIS, 17 Oct 07: The Struggle for “Pashtunistan”: The Afghan-Pakistan War
Quote:
- The security situation in Afghanistan is assessed by most analysts as having deteriorated at a constant rate through 2007. Statistics show that although the numbers of incidents are higher than comparable periods in 2006,they show the same seasonal pattern.
- The nature of the incidents has however changed considerably since last year, with high numbers of armed clashes in the field giving way to a combination of armed clashes and asymmetric attacks countrywide.
- The Afghan National Police (ANP) has become a primary target of insurgents and intimidation of all kinds has increased against the civilianpopulation, especially those perceived to be in support of the government, international military forces as well as the humanitarian and development community.
- The more significant change in 2007 is the shift from large-scale armed clashes in the field to asymmetric or terror-style attacks. The former do still take place and as air support is often used, casualty figures are still high. On average however these clashes are fewer and smaller than in 2006.
- Possible reasons include the high numbers of Taliban fighters killed during summer 2007 including many mid-level and senior commanders. Another reason must be the realization that these types of attacks are futile against a modern conventionally equipped military force supported by a wide range of air assets. The Afghan National Army (ANA) has also been improving throughout 2007
Complete 28 slide brief in pdf at the link.
The Struggle for Pashtunistan
Thank you for posting. The data are useful.
I'm not sure what the CSIS purports to show besides providing quantifiable data on what we already know. If Cordesman is suggesting that Pashtunistan is a prime goal of the Taliban, he's wrong.
Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan will cede territory to form a Pashtun homeland. This is an old Pashtun dream, and revived in some quarters. To quote an Afghan specialist (whom I will not name here), the Afghan leaders, “like poker players at a card game, are more interested in dividing the pot than they are in dividing the table at which they sit." Hypothetically, if there was to be a Pashtunistan, it would not receive the funding Afghanistan receives, and would be beset by neighbors on many sides. Afghanistan is not the Balkans: the Balkans were various ethnicities hastily cobbled together; however, Afghans consider their multi-ethnic state the norm. While Pashtunistan is a sore point, Pashtun thought and aspirations are not homogenous, i.e., while there may be some support for Pashtunistan, it is not universal.
There are multiple causes for the mosaic insurgencies in Afghanistan, and voluntary support for the Taliban varies from clan to clan, sub-clan to sub-clan, village to village, and is more complex than can be described herein. Which gets us into the "cultural intelligence" aspect, i.e., why do many Pashtuns support the Taliban? Why is their gravitational attraction increasing, while the attraction of the democracy project continues to decline?
While Afghanistan may not be sectarian like Iraq, Cordesman fails to acknowledge the importance of its ethnic diversity, with about 55 identifiable ethnicities. It is also more linguistically diverse, with several dialects and languages falling into the broad category of Indo-European (e.g. Persian) and Turkic (e.g., Turko-Mongolian). I disagree with his claim that Afghanistan is religiously more "homogenous" (p.5): Sunni religious orthopraxy varies sharply, and there is no established orthodoxy in the land, and never has, despite the best efforts of Amir 'Abd al-Rahman (1880-1901). Finally, the Shi'ites come in several stripes: from Twelver Shi'a (as in Iran) to Sevener Shi'a (Ismā‘īlī) to Nizāri Ismā‘īlī (commonly, the "Assassins").
There is thus bound to be some friction, and why Afghanistan should devolve power to regions, be it by de jure or de facto means. A strong central state is not one which most Afghans favor, being accustomed to greater regional, local/tribal autonomy.
Not sure who you are responding to...
Bourbon,
If it is me, then I wasn't nearly clear enough... I suppose either way I don't see any single group wanting a seperate nation of Pashtun-stan. My impression is that the huddled masses of Pashtun's on either side of the border are pretty ambivalent. In the FATA, they are already considered an autonomous zone, on the AFG side they are not nearly as postured to do what the Kurds did in the Northern Zone. Insurgents don't benefit from a Pahstun-stan - because the ambiguity of the current situation far better suits their needs. Neither the Pak nor Afg gov'ts want to jetison the areas.
So.... All around I don't see any group that when pressed would support the idea of Pashtun-stan.
Live well and row
Well, that's what I thought
Score 4:0 against pushtoonistan
BUT, as I am ever in a debate mode here are some historical precedents and some of my own thoughts having been looking hard at the region lately.
Here is a JSTOR article from 1973. Dated yes, but the folks in this region don't follow timelines the way westerners do.
http://www.jstor.org/pss/2569059
The seed for the Pushtoonistan concept was planted in the 1947 at the time of the Partition of Pakistan and India. The Brits offered the NWFP residents the choice of Pakistan or India, and not of joining Afghanistan. It is deeper than that as it actually goes back several dynasties of Afghans claiming Peshawar, but for sake of this argument the 1947 date will suffice. There was a movement in the tribal agencies for a plebiscite for self determination as had been held in Kashmir. Pakistan held on and defeated this movement despite a 1949 Loya Jirga in Afghanistan in support of Pushtooinstan.
In any event there exists a deep rooted concept of pushtun ethnic unity that could be the basis of a greater organization.
Now looking at it many of the points made by council members are valid, an overt "state" would be futile. We cannot think in the terms of state in this region. That the Pakistan Taliban and the Afghan Taliban are one in the same, which is the concept here. Traditionalist Pashtuns forming up across the border as a tribal confederacy of sorts. The Taliban may be seeing greater gains in driving into Pakistan as it only has to face the Pakistan Army vice NATO. But this concept of Pushtunistan goes beyond that. It allows them to operate cross border without thought.
In any event the prominence of the minorities in the Afghan government are also a driving factor. Pashtuns are the majority but may feel under represented in the government. The Pashtuns Traditionalist may be looking at the world in a different way, a state for the Pashtuns, ethnically and religiously “pure”.
By the way I am not advocating this idea, I am only looking at the fight we have and see a change in the goals of the Taliban and their supporters. Namely the formation (even covert) of a Pushtoonistan- the fulfillment of an ancient desire to unify all Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand line.
The Pashtun factor (catch all)
Ran across this over at Ghosts of Alexander and it seems like it is something the COIN center in Kabul or any deployer would want to read. Maybe we can get a PDF copy here.
Thanks for Pakhtun numerous Internet reserach sites
Thanks for all these Pashtun background info posts, some of which I did not know about.
Simplified the folks who are the Taliban are Pakhtuns, in the main, in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is nothing "honorable" about abusing women and children, and other more gross and fatal acts that are common practice by the Taliban "using the excuse of religion" in today's world.
But you all know this.
Again, thanks for some citations I will not take time to explore which I formerly was unaware of.