McMaster on war (merged thread)
Successful COIN in Tal Afar, Iraq - New Yorker Magazine narrated slideshow on 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the CO - COL H.R. McMaster. Also see this 16 February Washington Post article by Tom Ricks - The Lessons of Counterinsurgency and this PBS Frontline interview of COL McMaster.
3rd ACR Loses Its Famous Chief
29 June Colorado Springs Gazette - 3rd ACR Loses Its Famous Chief.
Quote:
3rd ACR Loses Its Famous Chief
McMaster, who used cultural and war strategy in Iraq, heads to think tank
By Tom Roeder, The Gazette
The most famous commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment since World War II hero George S. Patton will hand over the reins of the unit in a ceremony today at Fort Carson.
Col. H.R. McMaster, described in some circles as the Bush administration’s poster boy for the Iraq war, has led the regiment since 2004, earning presidential praise for tactics that drove insurgents from the city of Tal Afar.
His troops first surrounded the city and then ordered a mass evacuation, assuming that only the enemy would defy the order. Then the troops launched a house-tohouse sweep to root out insurgents.
The tactics in Tal Afar countered a problem that plagued American commanders in Iraq — insurgents who would evade capture by fleeing when the Army showed up. McMaster’s approach has been adopted by the Army and Marines in sectors of Baghdad and Ramadi.
President Bush praised McMaster’s success in Tal Afar...
McMaster’s next assignment is a think-tank job at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, where he’s charged with devising better tactics to battle terrorism...
Many of the 5,200 soldiers who served under McMaster in the 3rd ACR worship him as a leader whose sheer intelligence saved lives in Iraq.
Capt. Russ Nowels said McMaster was so well-studied in Arabic language, history and culture that he gained instant respect from the Iraqis he encountered...
McMaster, a 1984 graduate of West Point who holds a doctorate in military history, ordered his officers to complete an extensive reading list on the Middle East before their Iraq deployment and emphasized cultural training for his troops.
Nowels said the training ordered by McMaster better prepared soldiers for Iraq, where they are part-time warriors and part-time peacekeepers...
Between the two Iraq wars, McMaster stayed in the spotlight as a critic of American leadership during the Vietnam War.
His 1997 book, “Dereliction of Duty,” which outlined the failures of leadership that led to defeat in Vietnam, became a Pentagon must-read. Its criticism of military leaders who refused to speak out against disastrous policies set by the Johnson administration has emboldened military critics of the Iraq war, who have cited McMaster’s work as a reason generals should stand up to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.
McMaster has also penned scholarly papers on the military’s modernization plans. He has labeled as nonsensical the military’s assumption of the possibility of total knowledge on future battlefields through technology...
McMaster is especially critical of the Air Force and its high-technology satellite and aircraft purchases.
“The Air Force has become a force that is marketing flawed ideas that harm our defense,” he said.
On War: Lessons to be Learned by Colonel H.R. McMaster
I brought this over from the Blog -
On War: Lessons to be Learned by Colonel H.R. McMaster
Money Quotes:
Quote:
"During the decade prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, thinking about defence was driven by a fantastical theory about the character of future war rather than by clear visions of emerging threats to national security in the context of history and contemporary conflict. Proponents of what became known as military transformation argued for a ‘capabilities based’ method of thinking about future war. In practice, however, capabilities-based analysis focused narrowly on how the United States would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant."
And
Quote:
"So-called capabilities-based approaches to force development and constructive simulations that validate those approaches ought to be abandoned in favour of clear-headed thinking about contemporary and future conflict. Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon reveal the need for balanced joint capabilities and additional capacity in other agencies to assist in postconflict stability and counter-insurgency operations. At the operational level, forces must be capable of conducting counter-insurgency, stability or state-building operations. At the tactical level, forces must be able to fight under conditions of uncertainty and be employed in sufficient force and in the right combination to establish security and overwhelm the enemy in their area of operations."
A stinging and on target commentary. Doubt it will help him on the third look to BG. :(
Partly agree. I think McMasters realizes
Quote:
Originally Posted by
William F. Owen
...
Forces should be capability based. What is always missing is a clear doctrinal understanding of why the capabilities should be limited. The US problem has always been to assume that military power comes from maximising capabilities. Obviously it does not! Sorry to state the obvious, but it needs to be stated.
that military power does not come from maximizing capabilities. Seems to me he's saying that they should be doctrinally based on needed capabilities, not the same thing as our current technique, thus his use of the words "so-called."
He's also aware of our (and most everyone's) problem of political dithering and meddling in the force design process.
Interesting discussion...but...
can we at least get his name right? It's McMaster, not McMasters. That last 's' doesn't belong.
Pet peeve of mine.
As for Anaconda...there was certainly enough blame/confusion/whatever to go around, but it also played into what the AF does not really want to do: CAS. They don't like it. Never have, no matter how much lip service it gets. We've had instructors here dismiss it as a waste of assets (and yes...I'm serious. And we're talking about O-5s instructing future AF officers). The Army messed up to be sure in a number of areas (some of which can be traced back to Franks, who is not high on my favorite 'leader' list), as Ken points out.