Depends on your definition of future wars
The discussion of what Strategic-Operational-Tactical capabilities will be needed to fight the next war(s) is one based on perspective. Just what is meant by the 'the next war' and 'future war(s)' is not something easliy grasped.
Are we talking about peer (or near peer) conflict for hegemonic or hemispheric domination?
Or is it peer vs peer (peer refering to nation state) regional dominance, a conflict based on political and resource controls in a limited area capable of being confined to a particular region?
Or is it a conflict against a rouge state of moderate but inferior means such as Iran or Pakistan in relation to the U.S.?
Or is it a humanitarian conflict based on stabilizing and reconstructing a failed, failing state or region, such as seen in West Africa?
Or is it a conflict fought against transnational terrorist?
Does the future of conflict involve bits of all these?
Most Dangerous COA: it would seem obvious that a HIC involving peer to peer fighting such as China vs U.S. would be the most devestating, but perhaps the simpler of conflicts. It is doubtful that an invasion by large ground forces in order to conquer then stabilize and reconstruct would be involved. The target of this type of war would be to destroy the others capacity to wage offensive war and it would span many spectrums from electronic to economic as well as space and sea. Basically all other conflicts would pale in comparison. This type of conflict would change history for better or worse.
Most Likely COA: a LIC that revloves around stabilizing and reconstructiing a failed or failing state or region. The reason for intervention could be to prevent the growth of a transnational terrorist base, the need for stability to maintian the flow of precious natural resources (oil, bauxite etc) or a combination of both. This conflict requires a more nuanced approach as it is very likely to be done on the cheap, with limited resources across the board and with a coalition of various often competing international partners. Further direct combat operations would need to be kept to a minimum in a more 'hearts and minds' operation.
The two conflicts are vastly different and require different means. It reminds me of an arguement we used to have at AWS: what do you train for HIC with the intent that you can always ramp down to fight LIC or vice versa? Whixh is harder? What skills are the same and which are different. For one you don't have to seal off a battlefield to collect evidence in HIC.
-T
Unpredictability equates to a wide range of capabilities
I think the first thing we need to do is narrow the focus to what our national interests are (or will be) that may require the employment of our military.
The range of threats, and social collapse scenarios, that may require a military response are too numerous to list, and many are probably unforeseen such as social collapse due to disease, or global warming (global warming has already caused mass migrations in Bangladesh, and it will get worse, which has alarmed India and led to some border skirmishes).
The U.S. can only afford to put boots on the grounds in limited locations, and always maintain enough reserve to ensure the defense of other emerging threats, so not only do we need a wide range of capabilities, perhaps more importantly we need a wide range of friends with capabilities to share the work load. Rarely are there going to be situations that are restricted to one country's interests, so coalitions will be key.
Future Geopolitical Environment
Zenpundit - thanks for the link to the NIC 2020 piece. I'm still going through it, and it is intriguing. Of the scenarios featured in the piece, I think that today, two years after the production of the document, the Pax Americana scenario seems less plausible even though it attractively suggests some degree of stability that the others lack in varying degrees.
The chart of Relative Certainties and Key Uncertainties on page 8 is provocative alone. There are some underlying assumptions not specifically broken out in the chart that seem to suggest oversimplification. An example is the last Relative Certainty listed: "US will remain single most powerful actor economically, technologically, militarily." I think that once a region is selected as a vehicle to examine the ideas put forth, this becomes ambiguous. The context of the document when I read it today is different from the time of publication, and that may account for much of the complexity I see confronting some of these points.
Again, thanks for the input. Still reading...
The nature of war hasn't changed?
Quote:
War's essential character has not changed and will not change. The specific techniques required for close combat will probably remain stable. Jones
I have to challenge you on this one, or at least ask for clarification. The nature of war has changed considerably, and will continue to do so. I'm not sure what you mean by the character of war though?
Some changes:
1. As you mentioned, strategic reach, we can launch nuclear weapons anywhere in the world with relative ease. Unfortunately we see the emergence of undesired peer competitors in this area. This gives a nation (or perhaps some day a non-state actor) the ability to launch a strategic attack in a matter of minutes, without mobilizing and deploying an Army. No change from say Napolean's time?
2. Globalization, global migration, global communications etc. have created what some call a Flat World, but the security implications are serious, because global communications gives an actor the ability (within reason) the ability to mobilize an amorphous army in any country, say radicalize a segment of the Muslim population in France, then pass information on how to disrupt the French economy. 9/11 was transmitted world wide within minutes, and so are our efforts in GWOT. We have to respond to several different audiences near real time to maintain acceptable relationships in globalized economy, which means our response options are very limited. No longer can we pass out small pox infected blankets to weaken our adversaries, but they can do it to us.
3. There are ways to fight wars now without conventional armies, or where conventional armies only play a supporting role (see unrestricted warfare).
4. I'll challenge your close combat statement also, because close combat normally was defined (in conventional terms, which are too limited) as armed foes fighting one another within rifle range, where fire and maneuver tactics were essential. Now close combat is suicide bombers attacking unarmed civilians, or insurgents hiding behind civilians while executing an attack knowing that our forces must limit collateral damage, and they fire back and kill a women and child it will have a near immediate strategic impact on the nightly news (or the 24/7 news shows now). No change? There was time when we didn't worry about collateral damage.
All that said, much will remain the same, so we can't throw the baby out with the bath water. However, instead of us developing an ever bigger Army (light infantry or not, it is expensive), I think we need to pursue stronger relations with our allies. I don't like coalitions of the willing, because as we're seeing that isn't binding, but we need something along the lines of NATO, but more globalized (not regionally focused), and a new list of threats (beyond Warsaw) that are agreed to, if we ever hope to generate enough forces to mitigate the emerging threats during this period of massive economic and social change, which I think is a transition period, much like the Middle Ages, but we still have to maintain an acceptable level of security during this period.
Motive,Method,Opportunity
The motives of war like the motives for crimes are eternal, it is the methods and opportunities that will change largely because of newer technologies.
From the US JCS: on future conflict/concepts
JOpsC Family of Joint Concepts -
Executive Summaries
www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare
Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO)
•Purpose: Overarching concept of the JOpsC family that guides development of future joint force capabilities. Broadly describes how the joint force is expected to operate in the mid to far term, reflects enduring national interests derived from strategic guidance, and identifies the key characteristics of the Future Joint Force.
•Scope: Describes the environment/military problem expected in 2012-2025 Proposes a solution to meet challenges across the ROMO to guide force development, organization, training and employment.
•Problem: Complex and adaptive adversaries will likely employ traditional, irregular, disruptive and catastrophic methods, singularly or in combinations to keep the future joint force from being successful across the ROMO.
•Central Idea: Joint Forces, in concert with other elements of national and multinational power, will conduct integrated, tempo-controlling actions to dominate any adversary and control any situation in support of strategic objectives.
Major Combat Operations (MCO): Joint operating concept (JOC)
•Purpose: Proposes seven core building blocks that form the foundations for US success in future major combat operations as well as eleven principles to guide the decisions and actions of Operational Commanders in conducting major combat operations.
•Scope: Captures the most challenging of the likely adversaries and conditions the US may face in the next decade against a regional competitor.
•Problem: Our understanding of the operational level of war and operational art must change in response to the changes in the environment and increasingly dynamic adversaries.
•Central Idea: Compel the enemy to accede to our will by: achieving decisive conclusions to combat; setting conditions for decisive conclusion of the confrontation; using joint, interdependent forces to swiftly apply overmatching power, simultaneously and sequentially; employing joint power at all points of action necessary; and creating an asynchronous perception of our actions in the mind of our enemy.
STABILITY OPERATIONS: (JOC)
•Purpose: Articulates how a future joint force commander plans, prepares, deploys, employs, and sustains a joint force conducting stability operations. Proposes 10 principles to guide a joint force commander’s thoughts on the conduct of operations pre, during, and post- conflict.
•Scope: US government and coalition partner response when war is thrust upon us, and under circumstances including a change in the political arrangement of an opponent’s government that precede, are concurrent with, and follow MCO.
•Problem: US and allies face future challenges conducting stability operations due to a complex mix of global dangers, problematic nation-states, and illegal transnational organizations.
•Central Idea: The joint force, as part of a multinational and integrated, multi-agency operation, provides security as well as initial humanitarian assistance, limited governance, restoration of essential public services, and other reconstruction assistance—until the security environment permits civilian agencies to perform these functions.
STRATEGIC DETERRENCE: JOC
•Purpose: Prevention of adversary aggression or coercion threatening vital interests of the US and/or our national survival. Convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.
•Scope: Describes how Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) will plan, prepare, deploy, employ, and sustain a joint force to contribute to a strategic deterrence strategy set forth by national leadership through 2015.
•Problem: Shift from optimized planning against specific adversaries to planning designed to address a wider spectrum of contingencies to deter both initial and escalatory use of WMD as well as the transfer of WMD.
•Central Idea: To exercise decisive influence over a potential adversary’s strategic deterrence Center of Gravity: the decision-making calculus of key adversary decision-makers.
BATTLESPACE AWARNESS: JOC
•Purpose: Provides commanders and force elements the ability to make better decisions faster by enabling a more thorough understanding of the environment in which they operate, relevant friendly force data, the adversaries they face, and non-aligned actors that could aid in or detract from friendly force success.
•Scope: Future Joint Force Battlespace Awareness capabilities to support the full ROMO as envisioned circa 2015.
•Problem: Describes the envisioned changes to friendly operations that will drive BA capabilities to support these new operational concepts and anticipated changes in adversary capabilities and operations that will necessitate alterations in BA capabilities.
•Central Idea: Enables Joint C2, Force Application, and Force Protection to: bring military means to bear at critical points; allowing commanders to make efficient operational decisions; avoid enemy denial and deceptions; break-through or circumvent anti-access and area denial strategies; and, thwart enemy attempts to harm U.S. interests worldwide.
JOINT C2: JOC
•Purpose: Enabled by a robust, secure, integrated network, and through the employment of collaborative information environments, the Joint Force Commander will possess a seamless, deployable command and control capability, agile across the ROMO. •Scope: Describes a vision of how Joint Command and Control (C2) will be executed in 2015 in support of the Joint Force Commander. •Problem: Instead of de-conflicting the operations of service components, the 21st century Joint Force Commander must integrate separate capabilities of the service components so that they are able to conduct cohesive operations.
•Central Idea: Joint C2 will be a joint decision making process that is dynamic, decentralized, distributed, deployable, and highly adaptive. Provides the Joint Force Commander a networked, dispersed, joint force that can work together in a virtual problem space, accessing any piece of information, any place and at any time, in response to any operation across the ROMO
FORCE APPLICATION: JOC
•Purpose: Guide the transformation of the US Armed Forces by describing those overarching force application (FA) capabilities and associated attributes needed to meet future military challenges.
•Scope: Capabilities required to effectively apply force against large-scale enemy forces in the 2015 timeframe, described in the context of Major Combat Operations.
•Problem: US Forces must be able to respond rapidly anywhere around the globe, to include within the US, and provide overwhelming force to meet any contingency. In addition, the joint force must be ready to operate in a multinational and interagency environment as a member of a hastily created coalition.
•Central Idea: FA attributes characterize the two overarching force application capabilities – the ability to maneuver and the ability to engage – required to meet future military challenges. Stated as twelve broad categories that build on the attributes in the JOpsC, and put a focus on desirable qualities to be pursued when considering force application improvements.
NET-CENT OPERATIONS: JOC
•Purpose: Identify the principles, capabilities, and attributes required for the Joint Force to function in a fully connected framework for full human and technical connectivity and interoperability that allows all DOD users and mission partners to share the information they need, when they need it, in a form they can understand.
•Scope: Information and decision superiority-based concept describing how joint forces might function in a fully networked environment 10 to 20 years in the future
•Problem: Current human and technical connectivity/interoperability of the Joint Force, and the ability of the Joint Force to exploit that connectivity and interoperability, are inadequate to achieve the levels of operational effectiveness and efficiency necessary for success in the emerging operational environment.
•Central Idea: Proposes is that if the Joint Force fully exploits both shared knowledge and technical connectivity, then the resulting capabilities will dramatically increase mission effectiveness and efficiency.
From the US JCS: Joint Integrating Concepts JIC
Joint Forcible Entry Operations: Joint Integrating Concept (JIC)
•Purpose: To examine operations conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into the territory of an adversary as rapidly as possible in order to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular operation.
•Scope: JFEO against a high-end regional competitor possessing significant military capabilities circa 2015.
•Problem: Enemy anti-access campaigns prevent freedom of maneuver.
•Central Idea: A tailored combination of forward-based, forward deployed, pre-positioned and CONUS surge forces in various force postures will enhance the ability to maneuver from operational and strategic distances to an objective to gain access. JFEO force will employ complimentary force multiplying effects that will synchronize Joint, inter-agency, and possibly multinational forces. .
Joint Under Sea Superiority JIC
•Purpose: Identify the critical capabilities required to execute undersea warfare—the conduct of operations to establish battlespace dominance in the undersea environment, permitting friendly forces to accomplish the full range of potential missions and denying an opposing force the effective use of undersea systems and weapons. It includes offensive and defensive submarine, antisubmarine, undersea vehicle, and mine warfare operations.
•Scope: JUSS is an enabling concept covering all undersea warfare missions and primarily supports the Major Combat Operations and the Strategic Deterrence joint operating concepts. It discusses required capabilities without identifying systems that might provide them.
•Problem: Regional adversaries interfere with US interests by attempting to coerce US allies. Littoral areas are involved.
•Central idea: The US assures threatened allies by dissuading and deterring adversary coercion, and defeating any exhibited adversary aggression using undersea warfare, among other types of warfare.
Global Strike JIC
•Purpose: Describes a concept for conducting Global Strike operations during the Seize the Initiative phase of a major combat operation (MCO) in 2015.
•Scope: Identifies and describes the capabilities for conducting Global Strike operations in 2015 and is consistent with and does not deviate from current strategic guidance.
•Problem: The set of enemy targets most applicable for Global Strike (IADS, WMD/WME, TBMs, leadership, C2 infrastructure and networks, etc.) are likely to be employed and protected in ways that offer significant challenges to location, identification, and negation or destruction.
•Central Idea: Describes the capabilities and tasks that will be required to achieve Global Strike effects during the first ten days of an MCO campaign – specifically, the Seize the Initiative Phase.
Integrated Air and Missile Defense JIC
•Purpose: Describes how the Joint Force Commander will integrate capabilities to generate effects and achieve objectives for countering air and missile threats in the context of seizing the initiative during Major Combat Operations circa 2015.
•Scope: Integration of capabilities and overlapping operations to defend the Homeland and US National interests, protect the Joint Force and enable freedom of action by negating an adversaries ability to achieve adverse effects from air and missile capabilities.
•Problem: The future joint force will have to simultaneously defend the Homeland and execute multiple, distributed, and decentralized operations throughout the global battle space, placing unique demands on Joint Force capabilities for countering air and missile threats.
•Central Idea: IAMD requires the integration of capabilities within and among six broad mission areas into a holistic approach that provides interrelated, end-to-end solution sets for countering air and missile threats
SEABASING JIC
•Purpose: Explains relevance to strategic guidance and joint concepts, lays out assumptions and risks, identifies essential capabilities, defines attributes, and provides guidelines of how joint Seabasing can be executed to support national military objectives.
•Scope: Outlines the concept for closing, assembling, employing, and sustaining joint forces from a sea base across the ROMO, circa 2015 to 2025.
•Problem: U.S. forces must react promptly to theater needs from a posture that minimizes footprint, partly because the regions’ low tolerance for long-term foreign military presence no matter how well intentioned.
•Central Idea: Rapid deployment, assembly, command, projection, reconstitution, and re-employment of joint combat power from the sea, while providing continuous support, sustainment, and force protection to select expeditionary joint forces without reliance on land bases within the Joint Operating Area (JOA).
Pervasive Instability and the Challenge to Interoperate
There is potential for globalization, demographic trends, regional tensions, energy appetites, and identity or religion politics to conspire to create a greater and more pervasive instability. International relief organizations may become overwhelmed. I think that this paints a picture that calls for dramtically enhanced interservice, interagency and international capacity to plan together as well as execute together in a variety of efforts from economic development to humanitarian assistance to support to governance to conflict engagement and resolution. This is a present problem. At a recent event including participation of an international and interdisciplinary collection of government and nongovernment professionals, the observation was offerred that one can get a Brit, an American and a Canadian to agree on a definition of a problem much more easily than on a process for planning. One issue, but instructive.
I think that as difficult as the effort associated with enhancing US service interoperability has been, it is simple compared to the same challenge applied to US efforts involving multiple agencies of the government. In turn I think that challenge may look tame when compared to the complexity of the challenge to improve the capability for international coordination of several teams, each representing a "whole government approach" for their respective nation, and all seeking to work together to accomplish a common goal.
Again, in the context of the future environment described, it appears that the capability to plan and execute efforts aimed at reducing the causes of conflict, mitigating the residual sources of insecurity and instability (economic, technological, etc.) and resolving conflicts that occur (including engaging directly in conflicts when necessary) will be very important.
Global Trends 2025 Report
Below is the link to the full text of the NIC Report-Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed.
http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025...nal_Report.pdf
By 2025, the accelerating pace of globalization and the emergence of new powers will produce a world order vastly different from the system in place for most of the post-World War II era, according to a projection by the federal government's top intelligence analysts.
The projection, prepared by the National Intelligence Council of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, was made public by the ODNI today.
The ODNI report, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World” projects a still-preeminent U.S. joined by fast developing powers, notably India and China, atop a multipolar international system. The world of the near future will be subject to an increased likelihood of conflict over scarce resources, including food and water, and will be haunted by the persistence of rogue states and terrorist groups with greater access to nuclear weapons, the report says. Widening gaps in birth rates and wealth-to-poverty ratios, and the uneven impact of climate change, could further exacerbate tensions, “Global Trends 2025” concludes.
The report extrapolates from current and projected trends. It is not a prediction, and the authors stress that “bad outcomes are not inevitable.”
“International leadership and cooperation will be necessary to solve the global challenges and to understand the complexities surrounding them,” the report concludes.
“By laying out some of the alternative possibilities we hope to help policymakers steer us toward more positive solutions.”
Other projections in “Global Trends 2025”: include:
• Russia's emergence as a world power is clouded by lagging investment in its energy sector and the persistence of crime and government corruption.
• Muslim states outside the Arab core – Turkey, Indonesia, even a post-clerical Iran – could take on expanded roles in the new international order.
• A government in Eastern or Central Europe could be effectively taken over and run by organized crime. In parts of Africa and South Asia, some states might wither away as governments fail to provide security and other basic needs.
• A worldwide shift to a new technology that replaces oil will be under way or accomplished by 2025.
• Multiple financial centers will serve as 'shock absorbers' in the world financial system. The U.S. dollar's role will shrink to 'first among equals' in a basket of key world currencies.
• The likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used will increase with expanded access to technology and a widening range of options for limited strikes.
• The impact of climate change will be uneven, with some Northern economies, notably Russia and Canada, profiting from longer growing seasons and improved access to resource reserves.
The Global Trends series examines geopolitical trends and analyzes their likely outcomes, in an attempt to prompt public discussion of possible responses. The projections have covered five-year intervals, beginning with Global Trends 2010 issued in November 1997.