This question does tie in
with the OP's question:
Quote:
from Carl
How come this country of ours that professes to be a cut above, the city on the hill, is probably going to abandon millions of people to lethal killers again?
In answer, it will continue to do so until (1) it ceases to preach that it is "the city on the hill"; and (2) it ceases to preach that it will safeguard "millions of people" from "lethal killers".
It will continue to do so so long as its strategy continues to be based on what was so clearly stated to be US strategy in Afghanistan from the gitgo:
Quote:
Future of Afghanistan
Richard N. Haass, Director, Office of the Policy Planning Staff, and U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan,
Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC
December 6,
2001
Mr. Chairman:
I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations in my capacity as U.S. Coordinator for the Future of Afghanistan.
Our aims in Afghanistan are well known to the American people and this Committee.
We seek to bring about an Afghanistan that is free of terrorists, that no longer is a source of poppy, and that allows its citizens -- including an estimated five million refugees and an unknown number of internally displaced persons -- to return to their homes and live normal lives in which opportunity comes to replace misery. ... (JMM: much more of the same in the rest of the statement).
Not to blame Mr Haass too much, who was simply following in the footsteps of a flock of US Presidents (from Wilson to GWB, at the time) and stating what his boss Colin Powell wanted stated.
If one believes that the US is "the city on the hill" and has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers", then one is obliged, I suppose, to preach what Mr Haass said. The problem is that, if in the course of these neo-colonial wars, one must pull the plug, charges of hypocrisy are well founded indeed.
I do not believe that the US is "the city on the hill"; or that it has an obligation to safeguard "millions of people" (actually "billions") from "lethal killers" - other than its own citizens. I am therefore a "bad, evil person".
Regards
Mike
But a promise is a promise
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Carl, you act like we somehow lured the Northern Alliance into doing something they were not already completely dedicated toward the accomplishment of. Or, as if the Afghan populace somehow has any more say now in who rules them than they did before. This is still a land where the only sure vote is cast in 7.62mm lead.
I don't give a darn about the warlords. I give a darn about all the people we made promises to and who will be subject to that 7.62 mm vote when we bug out, cut off the money and don't bother to try and make extraordinary efforts to take people who trusted us with us.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Think about it, if the election process was truly fair and functional, the Taliban government in exile would have simply rallied a "get out the vote" campaign rather than a long, bloody insurgency.
I have thought about it. I thought to myself that Taliban & Co have never much cared for elections. The results are too unpredictable for them. MO wrapped himself in the cloak of the Prophet, he doesn't do elections.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Government to government relations are contracts, not blood oaths. You worry about what happens if the US "abandons" GIRoA; but answer this, how long ago do you think that Northern Alliance-based government abandoned us?? 5 years ago? 10 years ago? Never really caring about what we wanted from the first place? We were "abandoned" long ago, but were too self-absorbed to notice or even much care.
Tell me, are there gradations in how seriously we should view promises? Does a promise or a commitment leave more wiggle room than a blood oath?
That is a nice bit of sophistry, us being abandoned. It cleverly shifts the blame. "Your honor I woulda kept the deal but they broke it first." And you always use "Northern Alliance" so we don't have to think about the little people we are going to bug out on. "Northern Alliance" sort of blocks them from view.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Will many good Afghan people suffer when we leave? Yes. But many good Afghan people suffer because we stay as well.
So one equals the other then? No I think not. That knife is sharp and it will cut deep when we bug out. We can lessen the pain for some if we try to take a bunch of them out with us when we go, or arrange for them to come later if things fall apart. I think we should do that. Do you think we should do that?
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
Time to stop make arguments based on false logic and poor facts. It is only just in the past few months that our senior leaders in Afghanistan are waking up to the fact that the interests and efforts promoted so heavily by ISAF are not anything that GIRoA is interested in at all. If we would have truly honored Afghan sovereignty from the start we would have realized this long ago. Allowing our General's opinions to trump the host nation's President is a bad policy that leads inevitably to places like the one we are in now.
I agree wholeheartedly with you last sentence. That speaks directly to the point the C's were making in their original post. As you said previously, our generals allowed scores to trump wisdom. That is poor soldiering. Of course since they have made it into the multi-star club, they will benefit now and forever from the impunity that comes from being in the club.
I agree with you first sentence also, though probably in a different way. I would apply it to our relations with our enemy, the Pak Army/ISI. But it is probably too late now.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
As soon as we stop driving the train as to what "must" be done, there will be a HUGE compression and reduction of security effort by GIRoA. As soon as we stop funding development and security forces there will be an immediate halt to 90% of that as well. We have been self-serving in our approaches just as much as GIRoA has. Time to let this situation find a more natural balance. That is a balance that may well end up with significant Taliban influence over it. We need to prepare for that reality and be willing to swallow our pride and reach out to embrace it.
I think India, Iran, the Stans, Russia and Turkey are all going to have something to say about that. As for us, if we are going to bug out, which it seems we are fated to do, why on earth would we entreat with Taliban & Co? All those countries know a lot more about it and are a lot closer. After bugging out we wouldn't have any pull with anybody anyway.
I asked way above if you thought we should stop funding the ANSF after we bug out. I take it that you think we should. We didn't take a blood oath so that is OK I guess.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Bob's World
The only way our true enemies gain undue influence or sanctuary in Afghanistan is if we once again turn our backs on the place or are too proud to reach out to the new management that is sure to rise. Judging by our spiteful positions on Cuba, Vietnam and Iran, however, I am not optimistic that we will this time decide to be the bigger man and extend our hand first. Most likely we will allow ourselves to be manipulated by a vocal diaspora that has fled in our wake to enjoy their il-gotten gains in the safety of our borders
Yeah, that diaspora will have a voice. Their throats won't be sliced. The ones we made promises too whom we won't take with us, they won't be heard, for they will be dead.
A lot of your arguments, they abandoned us, things will reach their natural level when we leave, the enemy isn't really that bad (Mullah Omar, the getter outer of the vote) remind me of the things that were said from 1973-1975. It was all said then too so our self esteem wouldn't be lessened when we pulled the plug.
Afghan Exit:why, how and more in country and beyond
There are now over three hundred threads in this forum and time for a new one to cover what may happen, is planned to happen and not only the impact within Afghanistan, but at home too. Home of course being wider than just the USA, the ISAF coalition and those nations who have participated in Afghanistan.
The catalyst for this thread came from a number of posts on the 'The Best Trained, Most Professional Military...Just Lost Two Wars? ' thread which IMHO contribute to that subject and are more pertinent here.
Secondly after a review there are a number of threads that cover aspects of an exit, most of them from a historical angle; back to three years ago only:
a) Leaving Afghanistan: is the USA following the USSR strategy? http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16855
b) The best thing we can do is leave: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16590
c) Leave or Stay: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14354
d) Withdrawal deadlines discussion: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=10789
e) What If We Fail in Afghanistan?: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=8990
Political statements abound on a change of roles, notably the end of a direct combat role for ISAF by 2014 and on the exit of contributors beforehand, such as France. Strategic value and partnership are mentioned, although the exact form is very dependent on the Afghan national government's stance.
What does an exit mean for the Afghan people, recent posts have asked what does it mean to those who have fought with us, been interpreters and the like?
Exit Strategies and State Building
Professor Richard Caplan of Oxford University has a edited volume 'Exit Strategies and State Building' and a relevant short article in Survival, June-July 2012 issue. Link to the book:http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/index.p...rd-caplan.html
To Amazon, no reviews yet:http://www.amazon.com/Strategies-Sta.../dp/0199760128
From his university bio:
Quote:
Richard Caplan is Professor of International Relations and Official Fellow of Linacre College. His principal research interests are concerned with international organisations and conflict management. His current research is focused on post-conflict state-building. He is directing a research project on 'Exit Strategies and Peace Consolidation' that is examining the empirical experiences of, and scholarly and policy questions associated with, exit in relation to four types of international operations where state-building has been a major objective: colonial administrations, peacekeeping operations, military occupations and international administrations.
I enjoyed reading the article, especially the point that:
Quote:
...benchmarks need to be concrete and measurable, using meaningful indicators....
Then I read the SWJ article on the Soviet exit, which quite clearly had 'benchmarks' in place.