Paper: Rethinking Role of Religious Conflict in Doctrine
Copy of "Religion and Resistance: Examining the Role of Religion in Irregular Warfare" by Matthew A. Lauder, Defence R&D Canada – Toronto available for download here (26 page .pdf).
Abstract
Quote:
The US counter-insurgency manual (FM 3-24) has been criticised by several theorists for a lack of attention paid to the issue of religion. For example, critics of the manual indicate that religion is mentioned only a handful of times, and merely in-passing or as a secondary factor within a broader appreciation of the cultural context of the operating environment. The superficial treatment of religion in counter-insurgency doctrine, and a trend of dismissing the grievances of religiously-inspired antagonists as illegitimate, serves to illustrate a general lack of appreciation for the mingling of the religious and the political that exists outside of Western society. In other words, there is an overall lack of recognition of, and appreciation for, the ways in which religion underlies social, cultural, political, and economic discourse and action, and, more specifically, the role of religion in conflict. The aim of this paper is two-fold: (1) it will critically examine the treatment of religion and religious concepts in US and Canadian counter-insurgency doctrine; and (2) by drawing upon Religious Studies scholars, and by comparing historical and contemporary examples of religious conflict between states and non-state actors, it will argue that spiritual insurgencies are forms of violent new religious movements. The objective of this paper is to encourage the re-thinking of the problem-space and a reassessment of how we classify and treat religious conflict in doctrine and engage religious antagonists in the contemporary operating environment.
Found the link, but it's slooooooow
Found Milnews.ca's link here.
Quote:
(101.99 kB - downloaded 10 times.)
Still no joy on the file, but
A very wise mentor once told me "Islam is politics", and I would argue it applies to religion as a whole. Any religious leader worth their salt can whip their followers into a murderous frenzy over the most miniscule issue. Why? You start pulling the threads that are attached to someone's beliefs in how the Universe functions and you can watch them start frothing at the mouth. Same thing goes for ethnic/cultural aspects. However, I would hesitate labeling conflicts as purely 'religious', or 'ethnic', or 'political' because they all come to bear and all are a part of human culture (I'm having flashback's of Gadamer's Truth & Method now).
Religion, culture, and ethnicity are used as political currency every day- even in America and Europe. And the arguments I saw on the other forum of 'It's not rational- only emotional' 'It's a crutch' are weak. Marx is dead. The Enlightenment is over. Let the Post-Modern java flow :D
MA- I'm not really sure what you mean by legalities. Can you explain a bit more for me please?
My quick thoughts while I wait for the document to download...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve the Planner
I remain in awe of Grand Ayatollah Sistani's moral conviction not to engage in politics if at all possible.
Steve
This reminded me of something Carl Schmitt said in The Concept of the Political..."To define something as non-political is itself a political act"
Sistani's decision to not engage in or lend his support to the Iraqi Shia insurgency, the Mahdi army and parliament was a political decision. Let's not forget that the overt political participation in political affairs was almost purely due to the innovating ideological acrobatics of Ayatollah Khomeini. When he wrote Kashf Al-Asrar (The Revealling of Secrets) in 47(?) he was still adhering to the traditional Shia' position (for mujtahids that is) of quietism wherein the Ulema did not overtly participate in the political process instead prefering to remain aloof and influence events through the processes of "emulation" and their monopoly on Shaira' law (and the fact the Shah didn't want a head on confrontation). Those Shia that did participate in politics did so by supporting authority to preserve Shi'ism and even, on the rare occassion, threatened revolution (1906 and the Tobbacco Revolution/Constituional Revolution) but always only to protect the status of the cerlicical establishment and the role of Shi'ism and never to further a political/transformational (modernist) project (that right properly belonged only to the Hidden Imam/Imam Mahdi). It was only in the sixties with the rise of the likes of Ali Shariati (especially his Red Shism wherein he castigated collaborationist clerics as traitors to the revolutionary spirit of Ali) that Khomeini's views began to change. By Wilayat-e-Faqih (the rule of the Faqih) he abandoned the traditionalist position (of quietism) in favour of "red shi'ism" (though he himself would have deinied that given Shariati's socialism/marxism). It was Khomeini who broke with tradition and stated that the Shia' had no need to wait for the retrun of Imam Mahdi. Our view of the role claerics have in politics is coloured by the Iranian/Islamic revolution. Nonethless, for a weltanshauung/lebenswelt that defines itself as din-wa-daula (loosely translated as religion and "state"/ or more properly the spiritual and secular authority) the commentators here are correct in that segregating lived experience into phenomenoligically discreet entities is unhelpful at best (although some academics, who make their living by dividing up the world into intellectual categories would disagree).
Have to rush, need to pick up best friend's daughter from nursery...
(apologies for the grammar, slepping, syntax and)
Basic primer & basic capabilities
Agree with this:
Quote:
from STP
Personally, I wish folks in the field had a basic primer in the practical and administrative aspects of political organization and operation (at the internal and sub-national levels, not foreign policy/nation state stuff) It would make life easier.
re: local governance (which covers a lot of bases) in villages and districts and their interface with provinces.
But, more so than the primer (which could be compiled from numerous "lessons learned"), is developing the basic capabilities (organized people, whether military, civilian or mixed) who will use the primer.
For example, looking at MG Flynn "guidance" on intelligence, I saw many items that would be useful to me if I were advising on a local (village or district) level re: local governance, civil and criminal justice systems, etc. E.g. (p.7):
Quote:
... census data and patrol debriefs; minutes from shuras with local farmers and tribal leaders; after-action reports from civil affairs officers and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); polling data and atmospherics reports from psychological operations and female engagement teams; and translated summaries of radio broadcasts that influence local farmers, not to mention the field observations of Afghan soldiers, United Nations officials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Even Legrange could get into the act. :)
I suppose many of the same items would be useful to a combat commander in the same environment. Our military effort (in some places) reaches down to the district and village levels, in sufficient force projection to make a difference. E.g. (p.13, 14):
Quote:
The tide began to turn in Nawa on July 2, when 800 Marines descended in helicopters and began sweeping across the district on foot, establishing nearly two dozen patrol bases in villages and cornfields along the way. Five months later and with few shots fired by Marines after their initial operation, the situation in Nawa is radically different. Insurgents find it substantially more difficult to operate without being ostracized or reported by farmers; government officials meet regularly with citizens to address their grievances, removing this powerful instrument of local control from the Taliban’s arsenal; the district center has transformed from a ghost town into a bustling bazaar; and IED incidents are down 90 percent.
....
To be sure, various chips had to fall the right way in order for our forces to enable this positive turn of events. Nawa was lucky to have a charismatic governor and a modern battalion commander who, together, ran their
joint effort like a political campaign as much as a military operation. The robust presence of security personnel (there was one Marine or Afghan soldier or policeman for every 50 citizens) was also vital. [6]
[6] 6 following report: Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley,
Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2005).
Note also the force ratio 1:50. The 2005 Rand monograph is interesting (Astan is one of the countries considered); but have we gotten any better than we were then with respect to the political effort being made at the local (district and village level). At that level, the military (as part of the military effort) is an intelligence consumer. Where is the equivalent consumer organization, at that level, to implement the political effort ?
The political effort would include religious considerations where they are material; but also goes beyond that into my "law" areas, STP's mapping and records area, and "Commandant" (;)) Surferbeetle's development area. I see a "whole of government" approach at national and provincial levels (less so there); but don't see it at the lower levels.
Regards
Mike