Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory?
The 8 December edition of Newsweek Magazine - Afghanistan: What's Our Definition of Victory? - Andrew J. Bacevich
Quote:
In Afghanistan today, the United States and its allies are using the wrong means to pursue the wrong mission. Sending more troops to the region, as incoming president Barack Obama and others have suggested we should, will only turn Operation Enduring Freedom into Operation Enduring Obligation. Afghanistan will be a sinkhole, consuming resources neither the US military nor the US government can afford to waste.
Hmm, yes and no, I think...
I'm inclined to agree with John, I rarely agree with Bacevich but do to an extent concur with this analysis. I agree that infusing a large number of additional troops is not wise and I agree that we need a definition -- not of victory, there will be no victory -- but of our aim in that nation and in the region.
I do disagree with the Bacevich statement that
Quote:
"No country poses a greater potential threat to U.S. national security—today and for the foreseeable future—than Pakistan."
Hyperbole, I believe. Further, he ends
Quote:
"Rather than sending more troops to the region, the new American president should start withdrawing them and devise a more realistic—and more affordable—strategy for Afghanistan."
Not smart and seemingly in contradiction to his concern for Pakistan as a threat.
Withdraw precipitously and leave a vacuum in the region? Bad plan. We don't need to devise a realistic and affordable strategy for Afghanistan. We do need to determine what precisely is the US and NATO goal in Afghanistan. From that, a logical operational plan will flow. We do not need to spend the next 20 or 30 years there trying to obtain the mirage of an effective government and a happy productive nation but too rapid a withdrawal would be unwise.
Slap, if Warden said: "Pakistan is the real COG in the so called War on Terror." Then I disagree with him also.
These two strategists, baby boomers both, are thinking in erudite terms but they grew up during the Cold War and that's colored their perceptions. In this age, there are no centers of gravity -- there are hundreds if not thousands of them. We're back to Victorian-Edwardian era chaos. You can shut down Pakistan and another 'COG' will quickly replace it. The current terror problem is amorphous, worldwide and not conducive to Clausewitzian treatment. Trying to make it so only confuses the issues. We're dealing with a Starfish -- cut off an arm and it will grow a new one, slightly different in form...
Better to watch the Starfish you know than create a new one that you may not recognize or otherwise lose sight of.
Ken, a sound general principle, but then ?
Quote:
(from Warden's
webpage)
One of these Cardinal Rules especially important to follow in geopolitical strategy development is Execute Good Enough Plans. The near universal tendency is to try for perfect plans and perfect Future Pictures; as nice as it might be to realize a perfect Future Picture, the likelihood of doing so is vanishing small while the cost will almost certainly be prohibitive.
The devil really seems to be in the details of the "good enough plan" - and how one gets there.
COL Warden's plan ends up with this:
Quote:
This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation.
Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted.
If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions.
All my principles are sound...
I agree with Warden in that first quote.
There is no devil in the detail of what constitutes a good enough plan; that's easy -- what's hard is convincing the risk averse to implement the plan instead of improving it until its too late or totally flummoxed... :mad:
The first quote from Warden contradicts his second quoted item. If he really believes
Quote:
"an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation."
that's worrisome because such an agreement (1) Wuldn't be worth the paper on which it was printed; (2) Could not be enforced by an Afghan government no matter how well meaning; (3) Could not be easily verified (he obviously has not been to Afghanistan and moved about on the ground a great deal); and (4) Deviance couldn't be addressed at all well; payments are good -- for the other, what strategic targets within the nation? Ludicrous. I say contradicts because that plan doesn't meet the 'good enough' test.
JMM said:
Quote:
"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."
Hopefully you said that in jest. 'Iron Clad' agreements mean nothing in the ME or South Asia. You can't enforce them and they know it. They will tell you what you wish to hear and do what they wish to do; the two will only rarely coincide.
Quote:
"If the Pashtuns would decide that AQ were no longer welcome, and if Pakistan would decide the same re: AQ-linked groups, one might say "good enough". "Afghanistan" (to the extent it is a nation in reality, as opposed to in law) is on the sidelines as to those decisions."
I wouldn't even bet on that. The area is too volatile and the religion is chameleon like in its ability to adapt and twist.
One cannot look at Afghanistan with western norms in mind and expect to achieve success.
There was a time when we could have insisted and they (they being not necessarily Afghanistan but most nations) would have complied but 58 years of conducting 'limited war's and not adapting our Armed forces to changing norms and times has shown the world that we can be safely defied. that cannot be undone. It can be rectified to an extent and if we're smart, we'll do that but I'm not too hopeful. I'm afraid Colonel Warden and too many still serving senior folks are living in the past. Sorta sad when someone older than all of 'em says that... :(
Not only said in jest, Ken; but
Quote:
JMM said:
Quote:
"Well, at least it would give some I Law types some work in drafting an "iron-clad", "fire-proof" agreement. Perhaps, they could go back for help to the Clinton era, where IIRC something of the same strategy was attempted."
Hopefully you said that in jest.
with a couple of layers of irony and sarcasm.
Thanks Slap, for the "kind" words.
The Bergen piece is a good one. But, after reading it, I still don't know what his desired end state is and, therefore, I don't know whether achieving the objectives he lays out will do that. i don't see anything I really disagree with regarding his COA, but I am not sure what resources are required to carry them out. (Perhaps, that is asking too much of a short article.:))
As I said, I don't know if what he proposes will achieve the overarching goal since I don't know what his end state is. I also don't know from what is given if the resources he hints at are sufficient or can be made availble in sufficient quantities. Finally, I don't know if the cost is too high - oneexample for the Afghans is the cost of reducing the drug trade even by the methods Bergen advocates.
Cheers
JohnT
John and Eden are both correct IMO. Unfortunately, so is Entropy.
Entropy says:
Quote:
"...our current response to that challenge (nation-building to create a democratic central state authority that is friendly to the US and can control its own territory) is unlikely to succeed for a whole host of reasons."
John mentioned that Peter Bergen did not posit an end state while Eden lays out the Bergen prescriptions quite accurately and ends with what anyone concerned about Afghanistan should be considering:
Quote:
"Anyway, all of these suggestions seem reasonable. But remember the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long." (emphasis added / kw)
Note that he correctly says "...for the foreseeable future..." How long will that be? More importantly, my fear is that too many are unaware of or deliberately eliding the almost certain fact that Eden mentioned and I highlighted...
Victory is the wrong word to use
We might try to substitute "success," but I'm not sure that this much better. We would only be defining that success from our own frame of reference. As Eden notes in the following quote, either process is unlikely to yield much of a long term solution.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Eden
. . . the old Afghan loop: you can't build a state until you reconstruct the economy; you can't reconstruct the economy until you establish security; you can't establish security until you grow an army; you can't grow an army until you build the state. State, economy, security, army: Bergen is basically suggesting we provide for or fund three out of the four (your choice) for the forseeable future. Big price to pay for an end state that is not likely to last for long.
A long term solution is a solution that is freely adopted by the conglomeration of folks that make up Afghanistan, not one that is forced down their throats by a bunch of do-gooder Westerners. If the US/NATO coalition can do things to help the local denizens achieve their goals, then that is what should be the way ahead for the coalition. If not, then the coalition troops need to redeploy to home station. I suspect we have overstayed our welcome. We have already done about as much as we can to show the "terrorists" that we can kick butt when we want and need to. All we now show them is that we are not as good at some other things (like nation building). The longer we stay, the more we will show them how small is the wardrobe of clothes that the emperor has for wear.
Separate point about the comments on airpower discussion below:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Eden
8. End coalition air strikes that have a high probability of killing civilians.
Frankly, I don't think we execute many strikes that have a 'high probability of killing civilians'. The problem is, air strikes are the only way we have of attacking some of these folks. Minus air strikes, you have to go in with ground troops, and pulling off a surprise strike with ground troops is extremely difficult and extremely expensive and requires a lot more ground troops. Oh, and by the way, it doesn't always reduce the number of civilian casualties.
Airstrikes, the "easier wrong", are not the only way we have to attack. They are the only way we have to do so without putting too many of our own troops at risk. Maybe we ought to take the "harder right" of putting our forces (rather than the non-combatant locals) at risk and force our decision makers to see what it really costs to go do "nation-building" in oddball places. That might readjust the Washington bureaucrats' sight picture enough to make them rethink such adventures in the future.
(Yes, Ken, I know that is a forlorn wish. :()