Haven't been there and i'm sure someone who has
Quote:
Originally Posted by
LawVol
What is the risk vs. benefit of foot patrols vs. vehicle patrols? Do we rely on vehicle patrols in an overabundance of caution? Does this reliance hurt our COIN effort?
I am phrasing the questions this way because I saw only vehicle patrols from the FOB where I was deployed. Maybe they dismounted after getting into town, but on the two I played tourist on, we didn't.
will provide a better answer but generically, foot patrols in COIN are far better and the more of them the better. The number of them will be highly dependent on the type of unit.
Light infantry will prefer to patrol on foot though many such units were mistakenly (IMO) forced into HMMWVs early on in Iraq. Mechanized infantry have vehicles to worry about; you cannot just leave them and they do vehicles for a living so they're more comfortable doing vehicular patrols. Artillery and Armor units operating as Infantry are a mixed bag.
Light infantry is usually willing to kick out Squad and even Team sized patrols; the mounted guys are used to operating as platoons and tend not to go to below that level. Command desires enter into it. For example, when Sanchez went into Kosovo with elements of the 1st Armored Division, the already on the ground units of the 82d Abn Div had LTs and even SSGs out in the villages acting as de facto Mayors; they were patrolling heavily. Sanchez upon arrival gathered small units into larger enclaves and insisted tha a Field Grad officer accompany all sorties. he was Armor and used to formation maneuver; he also in Iraq insisted on vehicles for light infantry units and on no less than platoon sized patrols. Different strokes...
All in all, it's terrain and situation dependent; the unit culture does have an effect. Foot patrols are subject to more fire fights, vehicles patrols to mines and IEDs. Casualty rates can vary depending on many parameters.
That's an overview, I'm sure someone will provide more accurate theater specifics.
"Focusing too much on force protection"
Pardon the semantics, but I don't think that's possible.
We only run into problems when we erroneously define force protection as armor, big walls, etc. that we think segregate us from the threat but instead fix us for them, and isolate us from success.
As opposed to preservation of the force in order to accomplish the mission, with that preservation and all good things achieved through HUMINT, immersion in the population, etc.
We are at that same point where the brave knight was, sick of seeing his compadres drilled by cross-bow bolts, who thought it is time to nude up and get more mobile.
Also reminds me of that scene from the Full Monty - "I didn't think they could be too big."
Force protection is not something you can never have either enough or too much of. It is just something you always need more of, but must always stay IN SUPPORT OF the mission. And must not be poorly "provided" in sophomoric, counter-productive ways.
I don't exactly recall that to be true
The highly restrictive rules of engagement issued at the beginning of the war were dropped. Soldiers were told to treat all Iraqis, whether they appeared to be civilians or not, as enemies first. The exact wording of the order was cautious, but the tone and meaning were unmistakable: Shoot first, ask questions later, and don't worry about the consequences. I
Is he joking?
And as much as I greatly admire Sewall, I believe he is caricaturing her points to fit a premise that's simply a cartoon.
With some competence, the author might have ventured into questions of the sagacity of our ongoing force structure, CMNF-I strategy to "lower the footprint" of US operations so that ISF would stand up or the uneven implementation of COPs by SF, MTT and USMC units (and the Tal Afar experiment), but to create a blanket view of our COIN efforts in such a way only distorts what was really going on.
I don't understand this because he's been to OIF, has written fairly good stories about complicated topics (http://www.nxtbook.com/nxtbooks/mh/d...p?startpage=30) and doesn't seem to be intentionally obtuse.
Is his audience so lacking in sophistication that they can't understand nuance when it comes to the actual ROE in 2003, questions about force structure or COP tactics that began in both Army and USMC units more than year before the so-called "Surge" finally began?