Send Maxwell Vol 8 SWJ magazine
Well if the good MG feels that the FM is too ground centric and not Dr. Strangelove enough, he would really like my article on civilian casualties in COIN. That he would even surface strikes in Somalia as related to COIN shows where he is coming from.
Best
Tom
If you are talking myths...
Hi Steve,
I really couldn't let this one pass ;).
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
There are people within the AF who do understand COIN and would like to see the AF make a distinct contribution to the effort. That said, the institution as embodied in its senior leadership tends to respond in a "burn the heretic" manner any time such discussions surface. We see that reaction in Dunlap's piece, as well as some others that have been discussed before. It's a semi-religious response to any discussion, and it does them no favors.
Yup. Sounds like some Anthropologists I could name :rolleyes:.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Steve Blair
You have to remember that the early foundation of the AF (strategic bombing) was a myth; one that later grew into "airpower can win any war." The danger of dealing with any institution that is founded on a myth is that parts of the organization can easily slide into this sort of response when they sense a "threat" (real or imagined) to their foundation myth. There are some good ideas in the AF, and much that they could and should contribute to COIN efforts. But until they outgrow this myth-centered reaction to discussion I'm afraid that most of their good ideas will die a slow death in the Air University files of student papers.
Okay, I really do have to make an observation here - all institutions are founded on myths. The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs carriers (or COIN vs "real combat" in the Army). In many ways, it's too bad that the USAF doesn't have the "Knights of the Air" myth as strongly as other air forces which fought more heavily in WW I (Top Gun aside). That would let them use a cavalry anology rather that the elephant-esque analogies that seem to dominate the Strategic Bombing myth (i.e. we can stomp anything).
Marc
GOs as Strategist or Aquisition officers
Does his (MG Dunlap's) view show service culture or service parochialism? I think picking up something Marc's comment hit on is worthwhile:
Quote:
The real trick is to "tweak" or "re-interpret" the foundation myth to meet current operational needs. For an historical example, think about the Battleship debate in the navy vs. carriers (or COIN vs. "real combat" in the Army).
Why is the AF not looking at their changing role and making bold adjustments, one could argue that the other services are also having a tough time, but necessity being the mother of re-invention..... Are we (in my case the Army) doing enough re-evaluation of the role of land power and making changes fast enough to provide advantages? If not, why? Is rapid change always possible; if so is it always wise?
I think MG Dunlap's comments are just the latest (amplified) version of public cultural bias we see in some leaders (military and political - active or retired). We all have it - sometimes its a good thing (since I believe it grows out of experience as much as environment).
What could be bad though would be a senior leader who is unaware of the impacts of his bias, or worse does not care. It takes us back to LTC Yingling's article and the focus of our leadership - what matters to them most? Is it solutions or distractions?
It may not be sexy to discuss the lift requirements or the number of sorties flown in support as much as kinetic targeting, but its certainly relevant. The USAF plays a large role in our ability to conduct COIN in a given location for a protracted period of time. In addition to actively flying men and materials (how'd all that stuff get over there anyway?), bombing (includes the AC 130 kinetics), shows of force, reconnaissance, they (and the navy) also provide deterrence in the region, and keep open the LOCs for projected forces. Their is some significant overhead associated with those missions. Its also worth mentioning their growing contribution to specialty jobs on the ground - lots of BOS guys out there from other services - filling OGA and backfilling DA jobs.
If part of our current strategy is one of employing limited means in limited wars to a political end, then certainly the USAF plays a vital role in that, two important questions are: do they understand it, and are they willing to accept it?
General Dunlap's Response
To "Non Cents" in the comments section...
Time for the USAF to step into the Arena
"It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat."
Theodore Roosevelt,
"Citizenship in a Republic,"
Speech at the Sorbonne, Paris, April 23, 1910
I say one thing here to the MGEN and to the rest of the USAF, with all do respect, get in the game or go home. The current fight is in Iraq and in Afghanistan and around the globe, the AF has a role, it may be a lead it may be in support. But if you have a suggestion let's hear it. Critique time is over, weigh in and get your hands dirty.