TE Lawrence, "Evolution of a Revolt"
Latest history lesson:
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Then I estimated how many posts they would need to contain this attack in depth, sedition putting up her head in every unoccupied one of these hundred thousand square miles. I knew the Turkish Army inside and out, and allowing for its recent extension of faculty by guns and aeroplanes and armoured trains, still it seemed it would have need of a fortified post every four square miles, and a post could not be less than twenty men. The Turks would need six hundred thousand men to meet the combined ill wills of all the local Arab people. They had one hundred thousand men available... The Turk was stupid and would believe that rebellion was absolute, like war, and deal with it on the analogy of absolute warfare. Analogy is fudge, anyhow, and to make war upon rebellion is messy and slow, like eating soup with a knife.
This history lesson is both old and new. Old in that I am again offering T.E. Lawrence's Evolution of a Revolt, a paper I used in a history lesson back in 2003 when the application of the term "insurgency" in Iraq was under debate. New in that it bears looking at with the benefit of three years hindsight. The Combat Studies Institute offers this paper as a reprint (see the link below).
LAWRENCE AS AN ICON
Remember when you read this paper, that T.E. Lawrence was not the typical British officer of his day. Indeed he was not the typical Britain of his day. But much has been made of Lawrence as the prototype foreign area officer/unconventional warfare genius of his day. He was in many ways just that, a genius who found it difficult to fit into his own society and ultimately failed to fit into his adopted Arab world.
EVOLUTION OF A REVOLT
So why do I offer "Evolution of a Revolt" again? Simply that it remains a remarkable template for insurgent strategy in Iraq and even Afghanistan, one based on insights from a successful rebel/insurgent who unhinged the Turkish occupation of the Middle East.
CONVENTIONAL AND THE UNCONVENTIONAL
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As was almost inevitable in view of the general course of military thinking since Napoleon, we all looked only to the regulars to win the war. We were obsessed by the dictum of Foch that the ethic of modern war is to seek for the enemy's army, his centre of power, and destroy it in battle. Irregulars would not attack positions and so they seemed to us incapable of forcing a decision.
In this analysis, Lawrence broke away from what he describes as the trap of conventional thinking. Indeed, Lawrence admits that at first he and the other British and Arab leaders found themselves mired in that same trap, trying to use the irregular Arab forces to defend conventionally, when he had already realized they could not attack conventionally.
CONTINUED EXISTENCE EQUALS CONTINUED THREAT
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...the books gave me the aim in war quite pat, "the destruction of the organized forces of the enemy" by "the one process battle." Victory could only be purchased by blood. This was a hard saying for us, as the Arabs had no organized forces, and so a Turkish Foch would have no aim: and the Arabs would not endure casualties, so that an Arab Clausewitz could not buy his victory.
Lawrence realized that penning the Turks in Medina and allowing limited use of their rail supply lines essentially achieved the aim of the Arab Revolt years before WWI ended. A foe confined to base is a foe contained and possibly defeated. Indeed such confinement whether self-inflicted or enforced by an enemy surrenders not only "99 per cent" of the terrain but all of the population that resides on that terrain.
MEDIA WAR FOR HEARTS AND MINDS
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It was the ethical in war, and the process on which we mainly depended for victory on the Arab front. The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander, and we, being amateures in the art of command, began our war in the atmosphere of the twentieth century, and thought of our weapons without prejudice, not distinguishing one from another socially.
"The printing press is the greatest weapon in the armoury of the modern commander"hopefully jumps out at anyone reading the above paragraph. Lawrence states that the importance of the word as a weapon was more readily apparent to him as an amateur than his professional counterparts. Translate "printing press" to information operations and then ask yourself have we really changed that much from the days of T.E. Lawrence: have we truly grasped the primacy of IO in winning a population during counter-insurgency operations (COIN)? I believe that we have, although not as rapidly as we should have.
LAWRENCE'S REQUIREMENTS FOR SUCCESS
Finally in looking at this paper I urge you to read it through to the end for Lawrence reserved his most important messages for the final page. There Lawrence offers his requirements for a successful revolt (insurgency). And before those who would dismiss revolt as something different from insurgency, Lawrence uses the term insurgent to make his points.
AN UNASSAILABLE BASE
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It seemed that rebellion must have an unassailable base, something guarded not merely from attack, but from the fear of it: such a base as we had in the Red Sea Ports, the desert, or in the minds of the men we converted to our creed.
Much has been written since WWII especially on Algeria and Indochina (Vietnam) on the subject of COIN. And gratefully much of that writing has resurfaced and been incorporated in discussions on COIN in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the greater COIN effort called the Global War on Terror. Nearly all of those writings have postulated that a successful insurgency must have a sanctuary or base beyond the reach of counter insurgent forces. Lawrence writing this paper in 1920 correctly points out that the ultimate sanctuary of the insurgent is inside the minds of the insurgents and their supporters.
AN ALIEN ENEMY LIMITED IN NUMBERS
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It must have a sophisticated alien enemy, in the form of a disciplined army of occupation too small to fulfill the doctrine of acreage: too few to adjust number to space, in order to dominate the whole area effectively from fortified posts.
Lawrence choice of words--or at least as I interpret his writing--was careful. This short quote reflects that care; the numbers issue is obvious and has been well debated in terms of OIF and more recently OEF. But look at the concept of an "alien" enemy. At first glance, one might--wrongly--assume all enemies are alien. Certainly in the case of an occupying force that is usually the case. But in a COIN environment, not all enemies are alien; in this short paper, Lawrence highlights the use of Arab members of the Turkish Army who defected to the rebel cause. In a larger sense, though, Lawrence was speaking of an enemy that remains alien or alienates itself from the population.
DEFINING A FRIENDLY POPULATION
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It must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Rebellions can be made by 2 per cent. active in a striking force, and 98 per cent. passively sympathetic.
COIN theory keys on the role of the population as the objective of COIN operations and strategy. Dr. Kalev Sepp in his "Best Practices in COIN" article for Military Review rightly highlights this factor. French Colonel (now deceased) David Galula similarly points out the pivotal role of the population in COIN. Lawrence offers the insight that a passive population is a population essentially friendly to the insurgents.
MILITARY CAPABILITIES OF THE INSURGENTS
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The few active rebels must have the qualities of speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply. They must have the technical equipment to destroy or paralyze the enemy's organized communications, for irregular war is fairly Willisen's definition of strategy, "the study of communication" in its extreme degree, of attack where the enemy is not.
Lawrence's campaign against the Turkish rail net was not to cut them as lines of communications, but to make the Turks feel the pinch of lost supplies and infrastructure. In this paper he essentially identifies material as a Turk center of gravity, stating that the Turks cared about lost equipment--especially rail--much more than losses in soldiers. The Arabs on the other could not sustain casualties and Lawrence sought to hurt the Turks by targeting their rail LOCs, not their strong points. In many ways the enemy's use of improvised explosive devices has repeated this strategy while changing its target to Coalition soldiers.
INSURGENCY IN 50 WORDS
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In fifty words: Granted mobility, security (in the form of denying targets to the enemy), time, and doctrine (the idea to convert every subject to friendliness), victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraical factors are in the end decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit struggle quite in vain.
Ypu can read or download this paper at CSI .
Best
Tom
Lawrence and his Message - by Robert Bateman @ the SWJ Blog
I thought Robert Bateman's latest blog had some good insights - it is all too often that we take what sounds like a good piece of advice from its proper context and apply it liberally to whatever ails us.
However, I think he basically uses the same the same type of bias in his closing paragraph:
From Blog:
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If Lawrence were still around, working as a strategist for the Iranians, for example, he would certainly be advocating this position. After all, so long as the greater part of the land combat power of the United States is consumed in attempting to squelch violence in Iraq, those forces cannot be used elsewhere. He would, as he did along the Hejaz railway, recommend calibrated support to agitated elements inside Iraq. His advice to his higher command would be that they never allow the pressure to drop so much that we withdraw after declaring a victory, nor raising the pressure so high that we actually quit the place. Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina.
I think its wrong to assume Lawrence would try and advocate the same position as though the political context of his time could be laid down upon the current one. The Iraqis are not the Bedu, Iraq is not Arabia as Lawrence knew it. The Americans are not the Ottomans or the Germans. Iran is Iran, and the political context of today is different for a number of reasons. Iran may or may not view its interests as keeping a large U.S. presence in Iraq, from our standpoint we are strengthening Iran's neighbor who also happens to have been a formidable enemy in the not too distant past. Our presence there and our commitment to regional allies could also be seen as standing in the way of Iran extending its influence.
I think a legitimate argument could be made that if Iran continues to foment distrust against its Arab neighbors across the Gulf, and if it continues to threaten Israel, and if it continues to support terrorism, and if it continues to support proxies, and if it continues to pursue a nuclear program that seems geared toward nuclear armament, then it will create a political context that put it at odds in the region and possibly with regard to much of the West.
If Iraq gains strength militarily, economically and politically (and I believe it will) - it alters the context further. With its oil revenue, Iraq stands to be a different state then it was under Saddam. Its a combination of its how it is reforming (yes it is slow, and it is violent - political transformation usually is) and its economic potential that stand to make it among the most powerful states in the region. Its alliance with the United States - and yes I call them an ally, and the process which have grown its institutions will make it a formidable regional player.
My point is the same one that Robert Bateman used in developing the argument - context matters. The conditions and all the possibilities must be considered. I'm not so sure that:
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His advice to his higher command would be that they never allow the pressure to drop so much that we withdraw after declaring a victory, nor raising the pressure so high that we actually quit the place. Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina.
is sound advice to Iranian leadership, we are not just sitting idly by allowing ourselves to be strategically fixed - there is more to our end then extracting ourself from Iraq. There is also the question of crossing a threshold you did not intend to cross by upping the ante with regard to "keeping up the pressure" and triggering an event you did not anticipate, or wish to happen, after all, this an environment where chance often influences policy in unanticipated ways.
Best, Rob
1 Attachment(s)
Lawrence and The Evolution of a Revolt
As a historical metaphor. Rob, I have used Lawrence twice in the past 5 years to illustrate what was happening with the insurgency in Iraq via my history lessons.
The problem with Bateman's sourcing is that he would have been on much safer ground had he done the same. Seven Pillars of Wisdom is a turgid, wandering, and very much self-promotying memoir that has been effectively challenged with regards to accuracy.
You can read a better essay by Lawrence here at The Evolution of Revolt
My last use of this essay is introduced in the attachment.
Tom
Loads of good stuff in your posts and thanks for taking the time to reply.
Steve I had read your blog post and am in complete agreement re the limited scope for escalation then – as opposed to now – and off course the obvious adjustments Lawrence would have had to make to is math if he had had satellite surveillance, UAVs, instant radio communication and supersonic air support to contend with. From Rob’s post
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e.g. they may believe its a question of regime survival, or it may be that they believe they are somehow immune. If its the former, then diplomacy may work over time. If its the latter, sooner or later diplomacy will be ineffective.
what I was trying to argue was that – regardless of any lessons we could learn from Lawrence – Iran may well have viewed the situation at the end of OIF phase III as ‘a question of regime survival’. Iran and the US have obviously not learnt to play nicely together and the level of mistrust and propaganda is very high leading to an increased risk of escalation by miscalculation.
I went back to the blog to re-read the comments before writing this and found three new comments: Zenpundits (always worth reading), Ken’s (pithy and astute as usual) and this one which rather makes my point for me.
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arifJAA :
Excellent article, excellent points.
With the Iranian youth largely anti-regime why we can't do the same to them eludes me. It's more than justified.
I have a confession...when I came back in 2003 I thought Iraq was the toehold and we were going to sweep the region...at least Iran and Syria. As the Iranian youth rose in spontaneous revolt at the time of the 2003 invasion I may not have been as foolish as I feel now, or perhaps I was not the only one fooled.
Anyone else care to share?
"*The American Army's seduction over Galula
*The Straight line drawn between Generals Abrams and Petraeus"
If LTC Gentile wants to draw eerie parallels to Vietnam...one of my early mentors was a SF Advisor in 1965. He said at the time of LBJ's major infusion of troops the Army officers of Company and Field Grade rank thought they would drive into North Vietnam. We know what happened instead.
[the bold is mine - JJ]
Leaving aside the reliability of “With the Iranian youth largely anti-regime”.
Also leaving aside the legality/moral legitimacy of The ‘Democratic Crescent’ dream arifJAA refers to it was prevalent at the time and it, along with, axis-of-evil status, calls for regime change, claims of WMD production and the carte-blanche afforded by the pre-emptive use of force doctrine combine to leave Iran with little choice but to view the US threat as existential. I would further argue that the US has, in its GWOT response to 9/11, ‘re-assessed’ its position on a large number of hitherto generally accepted norms of international behaviour (extraordinary rendition, treatment of prisoners (detention without trial & ‘enhanced interrogation’), the whole issue of State Sovereignty & fragile States and the aforementioned pre-emptive use of force). This combination has left other State and non-State actors– myself included – confused as to where the US stands and how it is likely to react in any given situation. Which leads me back to Rob & Steve’s point re escalation; how can any state now assess the likelihood of escalation, and if they can’t reliably, will they not default to planning for a worst case scenario: massive military build up and more nuclear weapon states.
Pre 9/11 I would have accused anyone who told me that within five years the US might think it had the right to march an army through the Middle East, replacing regimes it did not like as it went, a paranoid lunatic – I wish I could say the same today.