The new strategy: ANSF expansion
I see two problems with the "Growing the ANSF" policy:
1. How do you get an effective police force when working with human material that is 90 percent illiterate and 50 percent drug-addicted? Not to mention being plagued with systematic corruption that originates at the top in Kabul? I'm not convinced that CSTC-A and others involved in police training have the solutions to these problems.
2. Who pays for an expanded ANSF at a 400-500,000 force size level? I've heard cost figures in the billions of dollars. I suspect that the Afghan Government is many years from being able to sustain such a financial burden through its own budgetary resources. Can we count on our coalition partners and the international community to subsidize these expenses for the long term? Do we have the political will to fund it alone, in necessary?
Despite the above comments, I agree that a troop increase is needed to reverse the current trends and buy some breathing space. We need, however, to revisit the civil defense-cum-tribal militia option in order to gain more boots on the ground. To cite one supporting example: Ghorak, Khakrez, and Maruf Districts in Kandahar Province have been dominated by the Taliban with only a minimal ANP presence at the district administrative centers. Even deploying coalition or ANA units to these districts is problematic because the lines of communication are extremely vulnerable to interdiction by IEDs. In the absence of an unlimited supply of helicopter lift for resupply, it makes more sense to raise tribal militia/civil defense units to secure these districts, with support from an embedded advisory detachment and over-the-horizon QRF. Some analysts would argue that the above-mentioned districts do not have sufficient population to be worth an investment of coalition or government effort but I would counter that the psychological perception of lack of government control - together with the benefits to the Taliban of freedom of movement - compel action to secure these districts. There is admittedly a bad track record on the employment of militias and auxiliary police Afghanistan but I believe that most of the problems have been caused by a lack of understanding of the social and tribal dynamics and by an insistence on supporting and managing these forces through a Ministry of Interior that is too corrupt and too inept to execute the required program oversight.
Expectations management...
...is always important.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Pol-Mil FSO
1. How do you get an effective police force when working with human material that is 90 percent illiterate and 50 percent drug-addicted? Not to mention being plagued with systematic corruption that originates at the top in Kabul? I'm not convinced that CSTC-A and others involved in police training have the solutions to these problems.
Illiteracy and the ability to provide acceptable police/security services are not mutually exclusive. I suspect that surveys of surrounding countries as well as some in Africa would provide some interesting benchmarks to compare Afghanistan against. With this in mind please define effective police force (desired vs. good enough).
I would also be interested in sources for "...50 percent drug-addicted..."
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Pol-Mil FSO
2. Who pays for an expanded ANSF at a 400-500,000 force size level? I've heard cost figures in the billions of dollars. I suspect that the Afghan Government is many years from being able to sustain such a financial burden through its own budgetary resources. Can we count on our coalition partners and the international community to subsidize these expenses for the long term? Do we have the political will to fund it alone, in necessary?
My view with respect to cost estimates is similar to yours in that sustainability appears to be an issue. If per capita GDP is indeed around the $300 USD mark, and we assume a 500,000 person force we of course see an annual $150,000,000 cost for base salaries alone not counting incentive pays and overhead costs as a low ball number, this estimate (2.5 billion/year Army plus 1 billion/year Police) is probably much closer to the western expectation of acceptable. The American taxpayer is counting upon our FSO's to create dialogue and find acceptable solutions among the concerned parties as we wait for the PRT's and other elements to help the GoA resuscitate its economy and governance.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Pol-Mil FSO
Despite the above comments, I agree that a troop increase is needed to reverse the current trends and buy some breathing space. We need, however, to revisit the civil defense-cum-tribal militia option in order to gain more boots on the ground. To cite one supporting example: Ghorak, Khakrez, and Maruf Districts in Kandahar Province have been dominated by the Taliban with only a minimal ANP presence at the district administrative centers. Even deploying coalition or ANA units to these districts is problematic because the lines of communication are extremely vulnerable to interdiction by IEDs. In the absence of an unlimited supply of helicopter lift for resupply, it makes more sense to raise tribal militia/civil defense units to secure these districts, with support from an embedded advisory detachment and over-the-horizon QRF. Some analysts would argue that the above-mentioned districts do not have sufficient population to be worth an investment of coalition or government effort but I would counter that the psychological perception of lack of government control - together with the benefits to the Taliban of freedom of movement - compel action to secure these districts. There is admittedly a bad track record on the employment of militias and auxiliary police Afghanistan but I believe that most of the problems have been caused by a lack of understanding of the social and tribal dynamics and by an insistence on supporting and managing these forces through a Ministry of Interior that is too corrupt and too inept to execute the required program oversight.
Not having reviewed the pol-mil situation for these areas I for one would be interested in any open source references which would help me to understand your concerns...
Having thought a bit about militas/armed organizations, the DDR process and their derivatives in Latin America and having seen some of the associated residual effects I am sensitive to the potential implications and always willing to learn more...
Case study on the west side...
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Originally Posted by
TheCurmudgeon
Maybe we should be asking "What does the Taliban offer to these remote towns and villages that the government does not? What is their appeal to the people?"
I doubt it is the Taliban’s liberal mindset or their equal rights for women. I also believe that, if the remote villages were so inclined, they could remove the Taliban themselves or at least would accept and support our efforts to rid the Taliban from A'Stan.
I don't think traditional COIN doctrine will work here because it assumes the people are the center of gravity. I saw the people in the remote regions I travelled to as pragmatic. They did not care about governments. They cared about living from day to day. And a new building or a well does not impress them. A road might. But in the end, life will be the same miserable existence it was yesterday no matter who is in charge.
I am going to way oversimplify, but... life in remote A'Stan is harsh. The Taliban are harsh. Kind of reminds me of the Amish and the strict rules they live by (with the difference being that the Amish do it by choice). The Taliban mindset is more closely aligned with the mindset of the people - thier answers make sense.
Another way to vote...
From the WSJ by YAROSLAV TROFIMOV Warlord's Switch to Taliban Shows Rising Afghan Threat
Quote:
HERAT, Afghanistan -- Ghulam Yahya, a former mayor of this ancient city along the Silk Road, battled the Taliban for years and worked hand in hand with Western officials to rebuild the country's industrial hub.
Now, Mr. Yahya is firing rockets at the Herat airport and nearby coalition military headquarters. He has kidnapped soldiers and foreign contractors, claimed the downing of an Afghan army helicopter and planted bombs in central Herat -- including one that killed a district police chief and more than a dozen bystanders last month.
Mr. Yahya's stranglehold over the outskirts of Herat has destabilized a former oasis of calm and relative prosperity. "The security situation here is critical," said Herat's current mayor, Mohammed Salim Taraki.
Quote:
Unlike Mr. Khan, the water and power minister, Mr. Yahya failed to secure another government job. He retreated to his ancestral stronghold in the Gozara district, a densely populated expanse of mudbrick villages that straddles the road between Herat's airport and the city itself. There, he quietly built up a militia that now numbers hundreds of men. "He was forced to go and take up arms," said Mr. Khan, who said he still maintains contacts with his former protégé.
According to area residents, Mr. Yahya hasn't enforced in Gozara the kind of harsh Islamic restrictions that are implemented by the Pashtun Taliban elsewhere in the country: Girls' schools remain open and youths in the villages are allowed to listen to music and watch television and pirated DVDs. But, like the Taliban -- whose ascent in the 1990s was welcomed by many Afghans tired of lawlessness -- Mr. Yahya has been ruthless in cracking down on crime.
"People love him. He has punished all the thieves: now, not a single thief is left in our area," said shepherd Saif ud-Din as he tends his flock of sheep near the airport road in Gozara. "The only people who fear Ghulam Yahya are the criminals," adds local flower grower Noor Ahmad.
It is hard to find anyone in Gozara -- and even in Herat -- willing to openly criticize Mr. Yahya. The insurgent levies taxes on peasants, and forbids them from paying land rent to the government or absentee landlords. Local youths are conscripted into his force. Some people who disparage Mr. Yahya in public have turned up dead. "Everyone is afraid of him. No one can speak out," said Mr. Taraki, the city's mayor.