The concept of "adaptation"
As an outsider looking in, I wonder if anyone would be able to point me to any papers, books, or other publications that analyze the concept of adaptation from a military perspective. I'm an evolutionary biologist, and my people have been talking, thinking, and getting confused about adaptation for nigh on 200 years. But have there been specific, detailed analyses of this concept in the military sphere? It's popular now to say that forces must be adaptable, that quick adaptation is needed in small wars, that insurgents adapt to counterinsurgents, etc.
Since I'm coming from the academic side of the house, there may well be a three volume work by some nineteenth-century German on Theorie der militarisch Adaptation that everybody studies at the War College but that I don't know about; if so, I'd be glad to be educated.
If there isn't such an analysis, I might be interested in writing one. (Not in three volumes, though.)
Many thanks.
Bob
Evolutionary Biology and Military Change
Bob,
Ah, I see said the visually impaired person as they looked through the knot hole in the barbed wire fence….
No, seriously, I do comprehend your thinking. Certainly there are at least some broad correlations between ‘evolution’ and what is in the literature on military change. To abuse your metaphor somewhat, you might find a rough sketch of the skyline of that mountain range you refer to useful, in as much it may help you to navigate your way through the literature. I emailed a brief ‘sketch’ to you, though, as my ramblings are somewhat long and boring.
The devil will be, as always, in the detail.
PS I find that sometime my messages sometimes get bounced back (possibly because I have degenerated from a computer geek to a computer klutz). So let me know if do you not receive it shortly.
Pt 2 This is getting too long.....
Q3 'How long is does this continue to occur after the war ends and we become more resistant to change (where an organization becomes stable and change resistant?)'
Part of ‘an’ answer to this I addressed above. The process will continue after the war, but most likely only in terms of making the many adjustments needed to fully integrate what was learned and successfully applied during the war (and deemed of continuing benefit). Equally, the historical record is replete with militaries undertaking major change after a having a lost a war to an opponent using different forms of warfare, or better tech, as they seek to redress their weaknesses and failures. I am not aware, however, of any studies that look at how long the period of such post war adaptation continues, for most studies examine why militaries change or why they do not (particularly when circumstances strongly suggest they should change). So the issue of how long this process may continue is just not something that is really examined for; this is reflected in the fact most studies do not really examine the detailed implementation of changes, rather focus on the circumstances and factors that influence the introduction and acceptance of a particular change.
Q4 'How does this impact our ability to inculcate the required changes to remain successful, while not abandoning the ability to recognize new requirements?'
This is an excellent question but I one I do not have a good answer to. My strong sense is that, at the end of the day, the willingness and capability to adapt in wartime has little real impact on whether a military will remain very innovative in preparing for some uncertain future. The is more than a grain of truth in the old saw that generals prepare to last war, or the last battle of the last war. Militaries are innately conservative, or, rather, cautious. If they undertake a ‘jump into the future’ there is risk that the change undertaken could be maladapted to the actual conditions they confront there, there may well be potentially disastrous consequences for them and the nation they serve. Being cautious, they revert to instrumentalism as a less risky approach (there are other reasons, such as military culture, political culture, and so on, that can strongly impact on this propensity as well). This tendency, it seems to me, is likely to be more pronounced when a military has been successful in the war just concluded.
This said, now to turn to the first part of your question. I am going to be bold and presume that you are thinking about how we inculcate the lessons and adaptations with respect to COIN and even irregular warfare. In very broad terms, I have argued elsewhere that what is required is a new ‘narrative’, ‘behaviour’ and demonstrated ‘benefit’, particularly if military organizational culture needs to be adjusted to ensure change takes place. And it usually does. You change behaviour through by altering education and training, you alter promotional pathways, and so on and so forth. The US military is changing education, training, etc. The hard question is whether these changes in the US military are merely a function of the expedience of needing to prepare personnel before deployment, due to the wars they are engaged in, or whether the change in behaviour is aimed to change the US military more permanently, or will have that consequence. My suspicion from I what have read, seen and been told is that the lean is toward ‘expediency’, as the changes are not as far ranging and as deep as I would think they would need to be to effect more permanent change.
And this points to changing the narrative, by which I mean that the military needs to change how it 'sees itself' and 'what it does'. Put another way, it needs to redefine its ‘self-identity’. To use the example of the US Army, its narrative is (or was) that it is, to keep it very simple, an armoured force (who we are) that fought wars against other like militaries (what we do). This 'narrative' is not so simple by any means, for it is composed of the entire history of the US Army, and more particularly about how the US Army has and does perceive, interpret and articulate this history (and here is where myths and legends creep in). To return to the US Army, this idea of what its narrative will be is bound up in the debates about whether COIN/IW is the future or whether it is conventional, classical state-vs-state warfare (ie the threat posed by China).
Demonstrating benefit is fairly straightforward – benefit on the battlefield through to benefit, at a more personal level, of, say, gaining promotion because of excellence in the practice of these new methods (as a very narrow example, it has been discussed elsewhere on these board, I believe, the problem of MiTT personnel and whether they are rewarded for this duty).
My view is that all three need to be achieved. Easy to say, much, much,much harder to do.
To come to one of the more specific points of your question, inculcating the new while retaining the capacity to ‘recognize new requirements’, my view would be that as part of the above process you need to inculcate or foster a mindset of innovation and adaptation, as well as a broad mindset that is forward leaning in outlook. I am of course leaving aside the capacity to analyze for new requirements, though I would think that this would be linked. Again, easy to say……
I apologize, Rob, for having twisted one or two of your questions abit. I also apologize, profusely, to one and all for going on and on, and then on some more.
Sad to say but one of the things they do not tell you when you start your doctoral studies is that when they hand you that particular sheepskin (all I got was a piece of paper - :() several big, burly guys grab you, hold you down and inject you with several serums that seem to make you genetically long winded and pedantic……
Best
TT