What are the US Strategic Goals in Iraq?
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Originally Posted by
Rob Thornton
One of the questions that Ambassador Crocker mentioned in his opening statement during his testimony to the Senate was the declared intention of Iran to fill any vacuum provided by the U.S. - but how much of a vacuum could they actually fill?
I don't want to overstate this, but in some ways I don't think the danger is of Iran extending influence in areas where the Iraqi central government has no writ--it is (in part) the opposite: Iranian influence is becoming strongest in those areas supposedly most under the control of the central government (or, more accurately, its primary Shi'ite parties). The south is a case in point. This is very different from the danger of Sunni jihadists (whether AQI or others) flourishing in the "wild west" (at least, prior to the "Anbar Awakening") of a weak Iraq, or the general problem of insurgent sanctuaries in failed states.
As a side note (arising from Rob's original posting on ungoverned spaces, in another thread) I sometimes think we draw a slightly erroneous lesson from Afghanistan: AQ flourished there not during the period of most intense state failure (the civil war), but rather when the Taliban had reasserted control over most of central and southern Afghanistan, really did have governmental power in these areas--and as a matter of deliberate policy provided shelter for its AQ allies.
All of which--coupled with President Bush's speech tonight--raises a question that I've been grappling with these last few days: What are US strategic priorities in Iraq? How might they be ranked-ordered, particularly if only some can be achieved? To some extent, much of the recent discission of COGs and other COIN issues on SWJ is entirely contingent on this question.
I'll throw a few of the obvious ones out:
- Preventing Iraq from becoming a sanctuary for AQI or other Sunni jihadist groups that would threaten the US or its allies.
- Preventing Iran from extending its political influence in Iraq.
- Creating a "free" Iraq. This figured much in the President's speech, and its easy in 2007 (when the "Forward Strategy of Freedom" seems largely defunct) to dismiss it as rhetoric. However, I don't think it is in the President's mind, and I do think there is a degree of normative obligation.
- Creating a stable Iraq. Not necessarily the same as #3, of course.
- Maintaining a long-term US military presence for power-project or other similar broader strategic reasons.
- Not being seen to lose, so as not to erode US deterrent capabilities and political credibility, and so as not to encourage current or future challengers.
Some of these go together. Others don't: the current tactical alliances with Sunni tribes and others, for example, could potentially push Iraqi Shi'ite leaders closer to Iran. A "free" Iraq might be less stable than an authoritarian one, and might be less able to prevent the emergence of jihadist groups. Attaining #5 might appear to help #2, but also guarantees the Iranians redouble their efforts to offset the US position. #6 is probably quite important, but may be hard to design a COIN strategy around.
To return to your original point, how would the US choose between the prospects of a failed Iraq state, or a "less failed" Iraq under greater Iranian influence?
I would be interested in how others perceive "what the war is for..."
I've been saying for five years that 2008 would be
the year for moderate stability and the beginning of a drawdown -- based on the fact that it would take five years to stand up the Iraqi Army and Police. I'm still okay with that even though we lost a year and a half in dithering early on due to lack of prewar training on occupation and counterinsurgency efforts (and flawed Intel). That dithering may delay it until '09, may not.
I've also said it would take 15 years (2018) to get the rule of law and general tranquility across Iraq and 30 years (2033) before it would be a fully functioning nation in accordance with world (not western) norms.
My bet is we'll be there the whole time...
The Middle East is the Middle East and there's
a tempo and an attitude there that will adapt to perceived need. They would like us to be elsewhere but realize they cannot force the issue though some will try; those few will also wait patiently for us to stumble. Those folks are nothing if not pragmatic. I think the intensive high cost will still be the case in 08-09 but will then sluff to low cost over the next six or eight years. :cool:
The costs will become bearable even in our low budget future as Germany, Japan and Korea see fewer troops and Guam and SWA go into sustainment mode.
The big plus in this is that on the strips outside the gates of installations, the German Restaurants that gave way to Viet Namese and Thai Restaurants and then to Korean and Okinawan Restaurants will now have Middle Eastern Restaurants... :D
Can't speak for others, but as for me, it's the
ME. Who knows. No partition would be better but don't think it'll be our call if it occurs -- and IMO, it should not be. We'll just have to deal with it. :cool:
We might have to agree to disagree
Hey Rex,
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I think both the National Strategy, and the President's speech, rather starkly highlight precisely the sort of issue that I'm trying to point to: they lump potentially contradictory policy goals together, sometimes even into the same sentence.
For example, far from a
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A free Iraq will counter the destructive ambitions of Iran.
. Really? I think an argument can be made that a "free" Iraq will likely prove a fairly close Iranian ally. If so, which is more important?
I think your point about considering what can happen - freedom, where there was none can lead to its own kind of instability - its going to be a hard, long process and there is no guarantee of success.
The hard question is - is it worth it? I think it is.
I don't think the President meant an Iraq that goes its own way and heads off to vote in someone we can't live with when he said " a free Iraq". I think he meant a long term partner - on a number of levels diplomatic, economic and security. I also don't think he meant a "junior partner" relationship - we will have differences. However, we also have allot in common in terms of goals - similar fears and interests, and perhaps even sharing honor. The world has been changing for sometime and we are just now starting to shape our thoughts and policy on how best to secure our interests in it - I don't think we'll fully come to grips with it for some time to come yet.
At any rate - I think your point about the destabilizing effects of freedom, or that we have to be darn careful in assuming that people when given the opportunity to pick their own leaders will pick the ones that reflect our interests are well advised - mirror imaging cultures can lead to some bad decisions - there has to be more to it then wishful thinking.
BTW - an excellent thread and one that highlights the question we should always ask before investing military forces or scarce resources - although sometimes - we might be served well to do it anyway - but we should always ask
Best Regards, Rob