Experts Advise Bush Not to Reduce Troops

12 December Washington Post - Experts Advise Bush Not to Reduce Troops by Michael Fletcher and Thomas Ricks.

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President Bush heard a blunt and dismal assessment of his handling of Iraq from a group of military experts yesterday, but the advisers shared the White House's skeptical view of the recommendations made last week by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, sources said.

The three retired generals and two academics disagreed in particular with the study group's plans to reduce the number of U.S. combat troops in Iraq and to reach out for help to Iran and Syria, according to sources familiar with the meeting, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the session was private.

The White House gathering was part of a series of high-profile meetings Bush is holding to search for "a new way forward" amid the increasing chaos and carnage in Iraq. Earlier in the day, Bush met with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other high-ranking officials at the State Department, where he was briefed on reconstruction and regional diplomatic efforts in Iraq...

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It takes more than just maintaining or increasing troop numbers....

WSJ, 11 Dec 06: Despite Its $168 Billion Budget, The Army Faces a Cash Crunch

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With just six weeks before they leave for Iraq, the 3,500 soldiers from the Third Infantry Division's First Brigade should be learning about Ramadi, the insurgent stronghold where they will spend a year.

Many of the troops don't even know the basic ethnic makeup of the largely Sunni city. "We haven't spent as much time as I would like on learning the local culture, language, and politics -- all the stuff that takes a while to really get good at," says Lt. Col. Clifford Wheeler, who commands one of the brigade's 800-soldier units....

....As it has brought in more borderline recruits, the Army has found itself short of officers and sergeants. Today, it is down about 3,000 active-duty officers, a deficiency that it says will grow to about 3,700 in 2008. It is short more than 7,500 reserve and National Guard officers, according to internal Army documents.

One of the most pressing personnel problems is the lack of sergeants, the enlisted leaders who do most of the day-to-day supervising of the rank-and-file soldiers.

At Fort Hood, Texas, the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which returned from Iraq in March, has about 75% of the soldiers it needs to fill its ranks, but only about half of its sergeants. The 5,000-soldier unit likely will go back to Iraq in the fall of next year, and leaders in the regiment say they will get more sergeants before they deploy, but not as many as they would like....

...the Third Armored Cavalry Regiment, which returned from Iraq in March and will go back in fall 2007, is already worried about time to prepare. The regiment will spend most of the winter receiving new soldiers, fielding new equipment and learning to use it. The regiment left most of its tanks and Humvees in Iraq for follow-on units.

That means troops won't have much time to train for other critical tasks. Junior leaders need to know everything from how to assess a water plant to the tribal politics of the area where they are deploying, says Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, the unit's deputy commander. They must know enough Arabic to interact with locals.

"It is incredibly frustrating for combat veterans to return to Iraq for the third time with only minimal training on the skills we know are essential, like language, culture, intelligence and local security force development" Col. Yingling says. "Army units don't fail to train on these tasks because we're stupid or lazy; we fail because we don't have the time to do it right.".....

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I trust that the administration will carefully consider the pros and cons of reducing or increasing forces. Since there was little new in the ISG report I imagine the rhetoric will quiet down in a few weeks, and in the meantime strategists will be working on feasible courses of action for the way ahead.

Quality of training is part of the equation that indicates the quality of troops, and in this type of fight quality is essential. I still think the Strategic Corporal concept is a bridge too far, but it is still a goal we need to aggressively pursue. Our soldiers and marines must be nuanced in the local culture, so they can determine on the ground without calling higher what the potential second order effects of their anticipated actions will be. Then they can make the risk versus gain call at the tip of the spear where it needs to be made, not at a BDE TOC or higher.

President Talibani, in discussing the ISG report, said the big problem was that we were training troops who were loyal to entities other than the government, be they tribal or clerical. What he was implying was that rather than pushing people through the training process more care needed to be given to the vetting process. I would add that once trained those who demonstrate the loyalty problem needed to be weeded out. Too often people focus only on the training of the troops and do not focus enough on the infrastructure of NCO's and mid level offices that are needed to make the troops effective. It will take more time to build that infrastructure than it takes to train the troops.

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Originally Posted by Merv Benson

President Talibani, in discussing the ISG report, said the big problem was that we were training troops who were loyal to entities other than the government, be they tribal or clerical. What he was implying was that rather than pushing people through the training process more care needed to be given to the vetting process. I would add that once trained those who demonstrate the loyalty problem needed to be weeded out. Too often people focus only on the training of the troops and do not focus enough on the infrastructure of NCO's and mid level offices that are needed to make the troops effective. It will take more time to build that infrastructure than it takes to train the troops.

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Talibani was right, because without good vetting, the amred forces are only going to be a house of cards. The problem is with the vetting itself. The task is so ponderous that I think we are simply doing the best we can, and not trying to develop revolutionary ways to improve it.

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Originally Posted by Merv Benson

President Talibani, in discussing the ISG report, said the big problem was that we were training troops who were loyal to entities other than the government, be they tribal or clerical. What he was implying was that rather than pushing people through the training process more care needed to be given to the vetting process. I would add that once trained those who demonstrate the loyalty problem needed to be weeded out. Too often people focus only on the training of the troops and do not focus enough on the infrastructure of NCO's and mid level offices that are needed to make the troops effective. It will take more time to build that infrastructure than it takes to train the troops.

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Though the question is how to prevent infiltrations from various militias and insurgents? Who is going to vet recruits? If Americans do they have the knowledge to do it? If Iraqis can they be trusted (who is going to vet the veters :eek: )

I have several humorous (to the point of tragedy) stories about dealing with this exact subject. I'll try to throw one out this weekend.

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I recall that we did have a vetting process initially, but when our exit plan equated to so many Iraqi units trained (numbers = success) the vetting process was tossed out the window. I'll have to go back and dig up some old articles for supporting data. However, like one of you posted, I wonder who we go about vetting civilians in a nation where we have little knowledge on the average Joe. This is a critical small wars task that we should futher investigate.

Addressing the comment on developing NCOs, while I agree that NCOs are critical in our Army, very few Armies outside of the West utilize their NCOs the way we do. From one aspect that is fine with me, since I am confident that is what allows us to kick their butts. We have competent tactical leadership at the lowest levels (fire team). Getting back to the issue at hand, I think attempting to impose a Western like NCO Corp on the Iraqi Army violates one the COIN tennants, which is we shouldn't train their Army to look like ours. Culture plays a huge role in command relationships, and in some cultures super NCOs are not accepted. We can tilt against windmills, or we can adapt our training to fit their culture. Developing an NCO Corps that is "culturally" acceptable will take years, regardless of the fact that we have proven the effectiveness of our NCO system.

Bill, you just shot a three-pointer with that one...