Strategic Culture - one for Marc & others
Marc (and all those interested),
Reading Colin Gray's Modern Strategy and discussing the idea of Strategic Culture and Strategic Military Culture. At first I was limiting myself, but Gray brings up the concept of using strategic behaviour to examine Strategic Culture. I'm now find myself broadening my thinking:) What are your thoughts?
Thanks, Rob
Cultural Innovation & Strategic Culture
I was thinking about what Troufion wrote in regards to the SWJ VOL 8 article and how it relates to strategic culture and military culture. I bolded the piece that sticks out in my mind and gets to the heart of the difficulty in stepping outside both your own culture and even individual relevant experiences.
From T
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MAJ Thornton does an excellent job discussing, from his own experience, the difficulties that US Forces have building Iraqi security forces. From cultural dissimilarities and technology shortfalls to the problems of building a force under fire. His suggestions for the command and control structure deal head on with the differences between US and Iraqi forces. His conclusion that the structure of local forces must be based off the local needs is right on and seems obvious enough, of course that is until you try to do it. A good discussion for anyone heading into this environment.
We've hit on "mirroring" and other useful concepts in a few other threads, but understanding why we might be pre-disposed or biased is probably fundamental. Not all pre-disposition or bias is necessarily bad either, it just reflects our experiences - a type of "cultural selection"?. What might be bad though is an inability to contrast successes or failures against a new environment and make adjustments. his could be a mind set, or it could be resource issue. While I had made a case for a certain organizational structure for an indigenous force in a certain set of conditions, that organization might be a misapplication of resources given another set of conditions (for ex. sparsely inhabited areas where civilians are less of a factor).
Not only does cultural innovation require a catalyst to detour or depart from
cultural norms, but it requires reinforcement to strengthen and sustain it, as well as the need to place it in its proper context - i.e. what works in Iraq may not work somewhere else dependent on the circumstances and conditions. The ability then to step outside your cultural experiences then is a powerful, useful tool.
No Broadsides, Just Salutes
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Based on my reading of history, I find the analysis compelling. But, some quirks also show up. For example, part of the reason the English became a sea power was due to the effective raiding of the English coasts done by the French during the 100 Years War and the threats of French invasion in support of Scotland during the Wars of the Roses and after. The English use of naval power in the 100 Years War was similar to their ground tactics--they used bowman in ships on the flanks to support an attack by men-at-arms working as boarding parties.
Steve, I admit the idea is not absolute. It is, at least to me, compelling enough that it has tugged at me for years. And I would also say that I am looking at the relationship of seapower thinking to airpower thinking at the critical junction in time when airpower began to emerge. For those reasons, I did not offer anything about the Portuguese, the Spaniards, or for that matter the Phoenicians, Greeks, etc.
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The French had a very powerful navy until the time of Napoleon. Unfortunately for them, the British had much better commanders, like Nelson, who were willing to take risks because of their greater "high seas" seafaring experience. Once their trans-oceanic colonial empire was stripped from them, in their various wars of the 18th Century with England, France only needed a limited, AKA tactical, navy to control access to its colonies across the Mediterranean.
Quite true--gratefully or Cornwallis might never have surrendered. But by the time airpower came on the scene, the French Navy suffered all the same ills as the French Army. To a certain degree the French still have that problem. They have over the years attempted to maintain a place as an international power through their self-declared hegemony over Francophone Africa. They have never developed the airlift to really support it. Shaba II and Kolwezi was a slapped together operation. Operation Turquoise in 94 was even worse as it used former Warsaw Pact gas guzzling aircraft to get 'em there and they really needed the US to get 'em home.
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Japan suffered from having two very separate services in the army and navy (both in terms of doctrine and cultural/social origins), so there was much more conflict between the two services than there was in other nations. Japan never really went for a strategic air force in the sense that the US or Britain did: their military development was influenced by both the Germans and the British (Germans for army and British for navy).
Agreed and that is why I put them in the middle group--because like the US and the Brits and unlike the Germans, the Japanese did exploit the carrier as a strategic arm. Once we crippled their carrier arm at Midway, they never again mounted a strategic threat.
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Hitler's direction wasn't doctrine. I was talking about doctrine. The development of the Luftwaffe prior to 1939 was a direct reflection of what the Germans took from World War I. What he had to work with (and mess up) was in no small measure developed from what the Germans learned in 1917 and 1918...and his obsession with bombing London might come from that time as well, since the Germans tried terror raids then, too (as did the Allies...it was all part of the air power kit back back then, and many thought it would be successful).
Absolutely correct. Hitler never understood the role of a strategic bomber just as he never understood the capabilities or limitations of the U-Boat force. But neither did the General Staff, especially considering the potential role of the strategic bomber on the Eastern Front, ever really get beyond seeing the aircraft as flying artillery. As for naval strategy, the U-boats were Germany's strategic naval force but Hitler started the war short of the necessary numbers. They--like the German air forces--were absolutely brilliant for the early years of the war and largely irrelevant by 1944.
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Seapower is also dependent on geography. It could be argued that the Germans in World War I understood sea power but lacked the freedom (or perceived freedom) of movement (defined as ports with clear lines to the open ocean) to exploit it. There's also developed national "instincts" to consider. Using Germany as an example (although this could also apply to France), most of her immediate enemies shared common land borders. In the cases of Britain, the US, and Japan the main threats would be coming over water. Many of the failed naval powers (Spain and possibly France) ended up stretching their resources too far; fighting major campaigns on land and sea at times when they could only realistically afford one or the other.
Here I believe we are in synch, especially on the issue of national "instincts' because that is where I tie the seapower--airpower effectiveness together.
Best
Tom