Diplomatic security after terrorists kill US Ambassador in Benghazi, Libya
CBS News video: WH declares consulate assault "a terrorist attack"
CBS News webpage: Military-style tactics seen in US Consulate siege
According to this report -
Quote:
Arutz Sheva, IsraelNationalNews.com 9/16/2012,
Col. Hunt: Libya Embassy Guards had No Bullets
"The State Department just allowed our guys to get killed," says Fox News military analyst Col. David Hunt.
Colonel Hunt said Thursday that the American mission at Benghazi "was like a cardboard building, there wasn't even bullet proof glass." In addition, Hunt said the security guards inside the mission were private security guards who were not allowed to have bullets n their guns.
"What’s happened in Libya is the final straw of political correctness," he told Breitbart. "We allowed a contractor to hire local nationals as security guards, but said they can't have bullets. This was all part of the point of not having a high profile in Libya."
"The policy of the Obama administration led to this," he said. "It was the policy of the Obama administration to have a low profile in Libya. That's why the rules of engagement were approved by the Secretary of State to have no Marines at Benghazi, and to have an American contractor hire Libyan nationals to provide security there. The rules were they couldn't have ammunition."
"Obama may not have known the details of the State Department Rules of Engagement for Libya, but his Chief of Staff and National Security Advisor would have. The Secretary of State absolutely would have."
"The Department of State Security are the people in charge of diplomatic security. They enforce the rules of engagement, which are set at Clinton’s level at State. The Department of Defense was told we’re not going to have Marines at Benghazi. Whether it goes higher than the Secretary of State to the President, I don't know."
- shockingly, the Benghazi consulate on the night of the attack had -
- No Marine Security Guards.
- No bullets for the guns carried by the hired Libyan "security"
- No fortifications.
This incident confirms my concerns that diplomatic missions in "war-on-terror" countries are not being properly secured by being located in a properly secured and defended military bases.
This reminds me of the storming of a UN base in Mazar-e-Sharif when 7 UN workers were killed in April 2011. The guy responsible at the time for UN security - Gregory B. Starr, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Safety and Security, is an American who used to be employed as the person responsible for the security of US diplomatic bases.
My view is that it's not fair on diplomats to leave them vulnerable in peace-time-designed embassies and consulates when there's war on in countries which are host, however unwillingly, to armed enemy forces and it's not fair to expect them to put their lives in the hands of career State Department officials who are incompetent about security or unable and unwilling to take action to remove their juniors who are incompetent.
I have further concerns that the US & NATO countries' military these days lack the military knowledge and competence even to able to secure our military bases. Bases can't be properly secured in or near an urban area. You need a security zone of cleared and controlled ground of at least 6 miles, but 10 miles is better, around a military base to keep enemy fire from rockets and mortars out of range.
If you don't control the ground around a base this happens - 3 were killed at Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan.
Quote:
Afghanistan Attacks: Insurgents Attack Bagram Air Base
KABUL, Afghanistan -- Afghan insurgents bombarded a U.S. base and destroyed a NATO helicopter, killing three Afghan intelligence employees, officials said Tuesday. There were also NATO personnel aboard and wounded, the coalition said without providing further details.
We've been at war in Afghanistan for nearly 11 years now and still the US and NATO military are operating out of insecure bases! Our supply routes in Afghanistan have never been secured and recently a decision by NATO-ISAF (commanded by a US general) was taken to close bases along the main highways in Afghanistan making the roads even more insecure.
The military and security leaders we are depending on to keep our personnel safe during this war on terror are incompetent and our diplomats would be well advised to have no faith in them. If I was a diplomat in a country with security problems I would quit and come home until we get proper military and security people in charge.
So there is a pattern here of incompetence at the very highest levels of leadership in the United States, NATO and the United Nations.
The people in charge are incompetent and this is very serious folks. We need urgent action to get competent people in post. We need a shake up at the highest levels of government on the military and security side especially. This can't be allowed to go on.
Obama response inadequate
Obama has ordered "heightened security" and the story so far is that means 50 more marines are on the way to Libya. That's an inadequate response.
It's not enough to "order heightened security" if by that you mean ordering the same incompetent fools currently in charge of security to continue in post but to try to do a proper job this time despite still having no idea what to do.
50 Marine Security Guards would have helped had they been there on the night of the attack to defend Ambassador Stevens but from Colonel Hunt's description of the American consulate building at Benghazi - "was like a cardboard building, there wasn't even bullet proof glass" - it was not an appropriate strong building to choose to stand and fight against a terrorist attack with enemies using infantry weapons such as assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades and mortars.
Had Ambassador Chris Steven's possible Marine Security Guard detail been blessed with leadership from a good military officer of the quality of Colonel Hunt they ought to have been able to assess that Benghazi building as unsuitable for use as a fort against attackers and would have recommended moving to somewhere more secure.
At least with real marines with real bullets in their guns they could have provided a strong armed escort for the diplomatic team on the move.
However, we need to be honest with ourselves folks and admit that really good military officers are a rare breed these days. Just sending in the soldiers to defend against an enemy does no good if the soldiers you send are not well led, properly deployed, able to do the job.
In the worst cases of military incompetence, more soldiers, even more brave US Marines, setting up in a poorly defended building can just mean more targets for the enemy to attack and to kill.
We need to remember the very painful lesson of -
Quote:
Wikipedia: 1983 Beirut barracks bombing
The Beirut Barracks Bombing (October 23, 1983 in Beirut, Lebanon) occurred during the Lebanese Civil War, when two truck bombs struck separate buildings housing United States and French military forces—members of the Multinational Force in Lebanon—killing 299 American and French servicemen. The organization Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the bombing.
Suicide bombers detonated each of the truck bombs. In the attack on the American Marines barracks, the death toll was 241 American servicemen: 220 Marines, 18 sailors and three soldiers, along with sixty Americans injured, representing the deadliest single-day death toll for the United States Marine Corps since the Battle of Iwo Jima of World War II, the deadliest single-day death toll for the United States military since the first day of the Tet Offensive during the Vietnam War, and the deadliest single attack on Americans overseas since World War II.
So I think we ought to be more demanding than just welcoming any US president sending in some marines. We ought to demand a plan that will deploy the marines well so that they can defend themselves and the embassy or consulate and the ambassador very well indeed.
The US and allied western countries ought to
- Close all vulnerable diplomatic embassies and consulates in host countries with a war-on-terror connection, with an armed jihadi terrorist groups threat. So that would be not only Libya, but it could be a list of 10 or more dangerous countries, such as Egypt, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen - anywhere US embassies have come under fire from jihadi terrorists before.
- Establish new secure embassies and consulates within new or existing military bases where the dangerous host country agrees. If the host country does not agree then withdraw our ambassadors from the country altogether.
My plan for a secure diplomatic military base for Libya
My plan for a secure diplomatic military base for Libya
In my following diagram, the US and allied embassies would be situated in the central base, the green zone.
The features of the diagram are similar for any kind of military base whatever you are defending inside.
http://imageshack.us/a/img690/2116/basedefence768.jpg
Click for LARGER image
This diagram shows my suggested layout for the perimeter defences for a military base.
Explanation of the diagram features.
Base - the green area in the diagram represents the central well-defended area of the military base, where various buildings, vehicles and personnel of the base are normally situated.
Machine-gun emplacements - the red and pink dots which encircle the base at a distance of about 6 miles or 10 kilometres from the edge of the central Base, represent static, armoured fortifications or "pillboxes" for one machine gun and its 3-man team of gunners. The spacing between adjacent pillboxes is about 333 metres or 333 yards.
The plan calls for one team of gunners per pillbox serving on base. The gunners are organised into 3 duty shifts of at least 8 hours and so normally only 1 in 3 of the pillboxes will be manned at any one time. The gunners spend their off-duty time in the central Base where their quarters are situated.
If, when and where the perimeter defences are attacked by the enemy, the off-duty gunners can be called back on emergency duty as required by their officers.
Infantry barriers - barbed wire and anti-personnel mines to stop enemy infantry from advancing into the centre of the base.
Vehicle barriers - obstacles and anti-tank mines which prevent enemy vehicles from advancing into the centre of the base.
Reaction Force Zone - Quick reaction forces deploy in armoured vehicles from the central base into the Reaction Force Zone to fire at enemy attacking forces.
Threat Zone - A circumferential military zone around the perimeter defences where the base defenders may assume a hostile intent on the part of uninvited intruders into the Threat Zone and from where locals are forbidden and variously warned off from intruding upon. This land is occupied or leased to the military base and is closely watched using surveillance technology. Warning shots or sub-lethal rounds may be fired upon suspected innocent intruders and identified enemy forces can be fired upon to kill without warning.
The diagram represents a Threat Zone which extends to 10 miles / 16 kilometres from the edge of the central Base. The plan therefore recommends that it is inappropriate to site a well-defended base within 10 miles of an urban area or a public highway which would cause local people and local traffic to enter into the defined Threat Zone routinely making the early detection of real threats difficult to distinguish.
A large Threat Zone is desirable for security purposes because it makes for a safer perimeter defence but does add significantly to the land requirements of the base therefore the availability of a wide area of undeveloped land is ideal when choosing a location for the construction of a new military base.
Some existing military bases are located close to urban areas where a large Threat Zone cannot be defined and this is likely to make such bases much less secure.
Access road Road to access the base from the surrounding road network.
STOP police control barrier Military police stop traffic wishing to enter the base and perform final checks that visitors and loads are authorised to proceed. The control barriers prevent terrorists driving off the road and prevent vehicles proceeding without permission.
The control barrier fortifications need to be very robust so as to survive an enemy truck bomb.
Trust Zone People, vehicles or buildings in the Trust Zone which is everywhere outside of the Threat Zone are assumed to be trustworthy and non-threatening in so far as the base defenders are concerned.
People in the Trust Zone are assumed to be respecting the base's security and the base defenders treat people in the Trust Zone with the same mutual respect for their own security.
Protestors
Protestors who wish to demonstrate for whatever reason their political viewpoints are allowed to approach the base as far as the Warning Line which surrounds the Threat Zone but it is the responsibility of the local authorities to ensure that protestors do not intrude into the Threat Zone without invitation otherwise a hostile intent may be assumed and defensive actions taken.
Defence force For the smallest bases, this plan calls for a defence force of three serving companies of gunners - one company for each of the 3 shifts.
One company needs at least 200 gunners and their officers so 3 companies total at least 600 gunners and their officers. In addition, military and support personnel are needed for other duties such as policing visitors, cooking, vehicle and plant maintenance engineers, medical, supplies storage & management, camp tidying up, latrine digging, reserves etc.
The defence force required would be of an infantry battalion size of perhaps of about 800 soldiers / marines and support personnel in total and so the base defence force commander would likely be ranked at Lieutenant Colonel or higher.
For larger bases with central Base areas that could be miles wide, such as military air bases that require aircraft runways, the lines of perimeter defences would need to be longer and so more gunners etc would be required.
Low profile
A military base like the one I describe can still be reasonably low profile if it is situated somewhere out of sight and out of mind, such as in the Libyan desert somewhere south of the coastal road between Tripoli and Benghazi.
Low profile, welcome, interacting, our troops
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
Such a base for diplomats would not be 'low profile',
Sure it would be. The Libyan desert has a very low population density. This would not be like the Green Zone in Baghdad situated in the middle of the capital city but rather out in the middle of nowhere.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
but a gross affront to local people
What? Like the "gross affront" of the US military bases in UK, Germany, Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Bulgaria, Turkey, Greenland, Kosovo, Israel, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti, Qatar, Kyrgyzstan, Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Guam, Brazil and Cuba? ;)
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
and challenges the very need for diplomats to be in country.
No it doesn't. It is needed to challenge the anti-American terrorists who want to challenge our diplomats' welcome in the country.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
US diplomats in risky places already are known to have minimal interaction outside embassies - this would end it.
Actually it would provide more possibilities for interaction because the diplomats would be able to leave the secluded embassy by helicopter at times unknown to the terrorists. Thus diplomats could arrive at events anywhere in country for surprise visits leaving the terrorists flat-footed.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
davidbfpo
Oh yes, who provides the guard force (battalion equivalent), the host nation or the foreign nations?
The foreign nations.
Most of the battalion equivalent would comprise of 3 companies operating in 3 shifts.
I would suggest -
- If it was a US-only embassy military base, all 3 companies would be American.
- If it was a diplomatic base for the US embassy and embassies of only a few close allies of the US, such as the UK, Canada, perhaps one or two others, 2 companies would be American, the other would be from one of the other countries and would rotate deployments.
- If many or all of the US's NATO allies were joining in to locate their embassies there then 1 company would always be American, the 2 others would rotate around the NATO countries.
Rural, troublesome, in bases, forget high-rise, let's do our best
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
I second that.
U.S. embassies re already rather unpopular because of their often outrageous security demand affecting local traffic and their fortress-like appearance.
You are describing embassies in capital cities. That's not what I am proposing. There's no traffic in the middle of the Libyan desert. Appearance doesn't matter when no-one is there to see it.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
I suggest to
(1) Stick with the existing, already quite fortified embassies and consulates in calm countries.
Agreed. My proposal is only for countries with a history of jihadi terrorist attacks against embassies and diplomats. So that might be only something like 10 countries.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
(2) Have embassies in troublesome countries only in places very close to police stations, army bases or buildings that can be expected to be well-secured (such as ruling party's headquarter, presidential palace etc); piggyback on existing security arrangements in order to boost the own security.
Next to a military base etc would be no safer from a suicide bomber driving a truck bomb. Only placing an embassy within a military base, taking advantage of the perimeter defences of the military base would be much safer.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
(3) Build consulates in troublesome countries only high in high-rise buildings (8+ floors). This does largely neutralise car bombs and makes it rather easy to stop even an armed mob (assuming elevators can be stopped). Preferably have a roof that's suitable for an evacuation by helicopter. Use a separated and CCTV-secured part of the garage.
No it doesn't. :mad:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...rutembassy.jpg
Quote:
Wikipedia: 1983 United States embassy bombing
The 1983 U.S. embassy bombing was a suicide bombing against the United States embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, on April 18, 1983, that killed 63 people, mostly embassy and CIA staff members, several soldiers and one Marine. 17 of the dead were Americans.
The car bomb was detonated by a suicide bomber driving a delivery van packed with about 2,000 pounds (910 kg) of explosives
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...estruction.jpg
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...T-98-01356.jpg
Quote:
Wikipedia: Oklahoma City bombing
The Oklahoma City bombing was a terrorist bomb attack on the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Downtown Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995. It would remain the most destructive act of terrorism on American soil until the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Oklahoma blast claimed 168 lives, including 19 children under the age of 6[1] and injured more than 680 people.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
(4) Demand public safety guarantees from host governments, local police chiefs/governors whenever the risk of riots or assaults is high.
Such safety guarantees are easier given than delivered. What if the embassy gets bombed despite the guarantees? No doubt such safety guarantees have been sought and given in every case where an embassy has been bombed.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
(5) Live with the fact that there is no 100% security anywhere or for anyone.
Live with the fact that during a war on terror, diplomats do require competent military defences for embassies and consulates. Don't live with incompetent diplomatic security measures. Let's put 100% effort into making our diplomats as secure as they can be. We can only do our best but we should do at least that.
Nice embassy, share costs, smart land-mines OK
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Actually,
the embassy fortress in Berlin was an affront to the German people and got bad press for years.
It fell much short of a battalion battlegroup fort right next to our capital, it is an embassy of an ally and it was/is still quite an insult.
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...n_westside.JPG
The US Embassy in Berlin looks impressive to me. I'd be very pleased if Scotland had an impressive US embassy building like that.
We've just got a wee US Consulate in Edinburgh. :(
http://photos.state.gov/libraries/un...ate300x234.jpg
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Btw, you seem to have lost all sense for the cost/benefit ratio. Three companies of guards for an embassy is insane.
Well bear in mind the plan is easily adapted to station many allied countries' embassies in the one secure diplomatic base. That would enable the costs to be shared among many countries as well.
Three companies gives you enough guards to man the perimeter defences at 6 miles radius from the central base. If you use less guards then you need to space the pillboxes out too much or shrink the perimeter diameter which starts to bring enemy mortars into range of the central base from outside the barrier defences.
There are rational military reasons for using that many guards to defend against typical infantry-style attacks of the sort that we saw against the Benghazi consulate.
The thing which would be, so to speak, "insane" would be terrorists attacking and failing to make any impression on a secure embassy designed according to my plan. The martyrdom video of that failed attack is not one the terrorists would want to show on YouTube. :D
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Fuchs
Besides, laying AP and AT mines in a foreign country is insane as well, and will be outright illegal in all those countries which ratified the ban on AP mines.
Land-mines are an efficient way to defend a perimeter. Granted there are huge problems with conventional mines left over from old wars but the way to go with land-mines is smart, self-deactivating or self-destructing mines which can be designed to be set to become inert and safe when the lease for the land on which the base was sited was up. Those are the land-mines that the US is using now.
Quote:
U.S. Landmine Policy
On Friday, February 27, 2004, the new United States policy on landmines was announced. This policy is a significant departure from past approaches to landmines. It ensures protection for both military forces and civilians alike, and continues U.S. leadership in humanitarian mine action -- those activities that contribute most directly toward eliminating the landmine problem and mitigating its effects on landmine survivors. Under the new policy, the United States will:
- eliminate all persistent landmines from its arsenal;
- continue to develop non-persistent (self-destructing/self-deactivating) landmines that will not pose a humanitarian threat after use in battle;
- continue to research and develop enhancements to the current self-destructing/self-deactivating landmine technology in order to develop and preserve military capabilities that address the United States transformational goals;
- seek a worldwide ban on the sale or export of all persistent landmines;
- get rid of its non-detectable mines within one year;
- only employ persistent anti-vehicle mines outside of Korea between now and 2010, if needed, when authorized by the President;
- not use any persistent landmines -- neither anti-personnel nor anti-vehicle -- anywhere after 2010;
- begin the destruction within two years of those persistent landmines not needed for the protection of Korea;
- seek a 50 percent increase in the U.S. Department of State's portion of the U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action Program over Fiscal Year 2003 baseline levels to $70 million a year.
One thing which is, so to speak, "insane", with regard to land-mines is the reckless way NATO-ISAF forces are driving about on Afghanistan's roads not cleared of enemy mines or road-side bombs and getting our soldiers killed.
For a better way to secure supply routes in Afghanistan see my post "4. Secure supply routes for Afghanistan. Land routes." in my thread "How to beat the Taliban in Afghanistan / Pakistan (and win the war on terror)" in the "OEF - Afghanistan" forum of SWC forums.
Gun turrets for 25mm canons!
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Peter Dow
Machine-gun emplacements - the red and pink dots which encircle the base at a distance of about 6 miles or 10 kilometres from the edge of the central Base, represent static, armoured fortifications or "pillboxes" for one machine gun and its 3-man team of gunners. The spacing between adjacent pillboxes is about 333 metres or 333 yards.
The plan calls for one team of gunners per pillbox serving on base. The gunners are organised into 3 duty shifts of at least 8 hours and so normally only 1 in 3 of the pillboxes will be manned at any one time. The gunners spend their off-duty time in the central Base where their quarters are situated.
If, when and where the perimeter defences are attacked by the enemy, the off-duty gunners can be called back on emergency duty as required by their officers.
More on what I have in mind for the machine gun emplacements.
The plan calls for something much better than WW2 style pillboxes. We can do much better in this day and age.
There would be a minimum of 180 machine gun emplacements required by my plan.
I would hope that the budget for such an important high-value facility would stretch to maybe, for each,
- a 25mm canon, which typically have a range out to 2.5 km / 1.5 miles with
- a 12.7mm (0.5") or 7.62mm machine gun back-up.
Also I'd want the guns mounted into some kind of swivelling gun turret, with working parts like the gun turret on top of an infantry fighting vehicle maybe. In fact the cheapest option might be to buy off-the-shelf turrets which are already in mass production for vehicles like the Bradley IFV with some additional armour capped on top of it because it doesn't need to be light, just very strong against incoming mortar or artillery fire.
http://pdxtac.com/wp-content/uploads...t-1024x527.jpg
http://www.armyrecognition.com/image...nology_640.jpg
The one issue there might be with IVF turrets is that it really needs lower gun elevation than is standard for an IFV turret. IFV guns often don't dip below -10 degrees below the horizontal. That's not ideal because the gun turrets are going to be much higher off the ground than they would be in an IVF and ideally the gunners ought to be able to target the ground beneath them as well as the ground hundreds of metres away.
Naval ship mounted cannons tend to dip lower, down to -20 degrees and that would be better, but naval cannons are not usually well armoured for the gunner's protection.
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_25mm_mk38_pic.jpg
They do come in remotely operated versions which is an interesting option to consider.
http://www.seaforces.org/wpnsys/SURF...n/image037.jpg
Gun turrets in towers = Gun towers!
The gun turrets would be mounted in I am thinking probably some kind of massive high-security armoured & reinforced concrete sloping at a pyramid-type-of-angle type bunkers / towers.
Maybe something like this, only not with a sharp top but a gun turret on top.
http://www.artonfile.com/images/OLDROME-12-2.jpg
The idea of gun towers is to give the gunner a good view of the desert terrain which is unlikely to be completely flat and dips in the ground could otherwise provide cover for attacking mortar teams. Gun towers also enable the gunners easily to see over and beyond any obstacles in the vehicle barrier into the Threat Zone. The gun towers should be robust enough so that they could take a number of artillery shells without collapsing.
The action is in the reaction
Peter, has it occurred to you that such a siege mentality and withdrawal into fortress embassies is exactly the response the terrorists want to provoke?
How we can use a fortress embassy to defeat terrorism
Quote:
Originally Posted by
bourbon
Peter, has it occurred to you that such a siege mentality and withdrawal into fortress embassies is exactly the response the terrorists want to provoke?
The terrorists want to kill the US Ambassador or other embassy staff whenever they like so they prefer weak embassy security or perhaps no embassy at all.
The terrorists also want to prevent the establishment of new foreign military bases and to close any existing bases and drive out all foreign military forces.
So a new super-secure military fortress embassy is exactly the response the terrorists don't want to provoke. They want us to surrender and withdraw from the countries concerned altogether, not to secure our defences so our diplomats can stand up and speak out for the friendship and alliance we offer to the people of those countries.
I also wish to take issue with your suggestion that the establishment of a new fortress embassy represents some kind of mentality of "siege" or "withdrawal" or disengagement from diplomacy with the local people of the host country.
To explain that the converse is the case, that such a fortress embassy base could be ideal for a renewed and more intensive engagement with the local people of the host country, (which on the face of it, I admit, may seem to be a strange statement to make) I do need to reveal much about the nature of the war on terror which may be obscure. It's a long explanation so please bear with me. If any of this requires further clarification or explanation please do ask.
People almost everywhere, and Libya is no exception, view their country, the world, via the media - TV, radio and the internet. The person-to-person diplomatic meetings that matter for local people are the meetings which are reported in the media.
What's most important for diplomacy with the people is getting our ambassadors and other diplomats on TV watched by the people, seen in a favourable light, having friendly meetings with popular local people etc. That's how you connect with local people these days.
Now let's take a look at what is going wrong with our diplomatic "connecting with local people" attempts.
The terrorists who killed the US ambassador in Benghazi were able to do so because they had the distraction, cover and support of an angry mob.
It was the fuss and incitement to violence which was broadcast on Egyptian satellite TV which is watched in Libya (and across North Africa and the Middle East) which stirred up the Benghazi mob.
The incitement to violence was on the pretext of a supposedly "offensive" video which had been uploaded on YouTube for a while and could have sat there for years and never come to public attention. It was the Egyptian satellite TV coverage that suddenly blew the whole issue up.
The Egyptian satellite TV channel chose to bring that particular video to the attention of their TV viewers. They had no intention of ever bringing to the attention of their viewers any of the very friendly and diplomatic videos made by US Embassy staff in the region attempting to connect with the local people.
That TV channel was not trying to be diplomatic or make friends with Americans or westerners but trying (and succeeding) in prosecuting their jihadi terrorist war against us "infidels". That was an enemy propaganda broadcast.
Egypt's NileSat was used to incite the mob which besieged the US Consulate in Benghazi and gave cover for the jihadi terrorist group which killed US Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens and three other Americans.
It seems on this occasion the mob was incited to violence by a Saudi-funded Egyptian satellite TV channel called "Al Nas" -
Quote:
Originally Posted by BBC Monitoring
Radical religious Al-Nas TV gains influence in Egypt
Analysis by Muhammad Shukri of BBC Monitoring on 26 June
Al-Nas (The People) TV, an Arabic-language religious satellite TV channel which broadcasts 24 hours a day from the Media Production City in 6 October City in Egypt, has mesmerized Egyptian and Arab viewers generally.
A few months after its launch in January 2006 as a station focusing on social and entertainment content, the channel's administration decided to turn it into a Sunni religious TV, a move that has attracted millions of viewers to the channel in Egypt and across the Arab world.
The channel is owned by Saudi businessman Mansur Bin Kadasah and is managed by Atif Abd-al-Rashid.
- by someone called "Sheikh Khalad Abdalla".
Atlantic Wire: The Egyptian Outrage Peddler Who Sent an Anti-Islam YouTube Clip Viral
http://cdn.theatlanticwire.com/img/u...la_1/large.jpg
Quote:
Originally Posted by Atlantic Wire
But it did gain the attention of a Glenn Beck-style TV pundit in Egypt: Sheikh Khalad Abdalla, a host on the Islamist satellite-TV station al-Nas. On Sept. 8, Abdullah lit the match that set this entire international incident in motion and broadcast an offensive clip of the trailer
