IW and Stability Operations - in your own words - what is the difference?
Lots of terms moving about these days. Two of them that have some weight are "Irregular Warfare" and "Stability Operations". At the SWC we have a pretty good group that is confident, well read, inter-active and interested to expend grey matter in pursuit of getting it right. So lets open up a discussion on the matter. I suspect that if this thread does take off, it will go in some unexpected directions. No need to limit yourself to IW and SO - there seem to be many other terms out there that conflict, parallel or intersect at points. I'd also say it is worthwhile to consider what the implications are for favoring one term over another.
Another good reason to do it here is our diversity - as definitions build, they may use other terms or contain ideas which seem out of context to particular disciplines or cultures - this is one of those cases where the discussion is probably worth more then the definition itself.
Not to avoid initiating the discussion while avoiding any “published” doctrinal definitions in order to consider the nature of the words:
For myself, I'm suffering from the component of the terms themselves - IW contains the term "warfare", which to me means a "way" or manner of waging war. E.G. – “irregular” could mean something out of character to the norm - which could mean everything from the type of means used to wage the war that then drive irregular tactics, operations and strategy, or just an "irregular" use of the "regular" means to wage war.
Stability Operations sort of hits me the same way - the key word being "operations" which to me indicate a type of undertaking to achieve an objective - in this case "stability" of something - a state, an area, a group, a problem, etc.
I recently read a definition of a "term" that because it used other like terms in its definition limited the utility of the term it was defining to a point that put the original term at odds where it has been used elsewhere in the greater lexicon.
While there is goodness in defining things, I think the real value in this case is probably the discussion about how they are perceived. Its not too hard to find out discussions or speeches where the multiple terms are used to describe the same things, and others where the same terms are used in ways that put them outside the context of an accepted definition.
Best, Rob
I waited. Crickets. So I'll step up with a simplistic stab,
noting that all my stabs are simplistic... :wry:
I think when the 1 MarDiv was tracing down the remnants of the fleeing North Korean Army north of Wonsan in 1950, we were engaged in IW. We were again in early '51 when we and the 5th RCT [1] hunted down the remnants of the same Army left behind in far south near Pusan due to the US / ROK push northward in the fall of '50. They had reverted to using guerrilla TTP [2] and were not attempting to move north [3].
When I went to Laos in 1960, I was engaged in a Stability Operation (which entailed a very minimal amount of IW). In Viet Nam in early '66, prior to the bulk of the buildup, same situation. Later in that year, it morphed for several reasons into more IW and less SO. When I returned in 1968, we had CW (generally less Tanks), pure and simple and little concern in units for SO. That, after Tet, pulled down rapidly to IW as opposed to CW -- and SO was ramped up [4].
To me, the 'classic' definitions are appropriate, simple and not ambiguous. CW is major military force using current technology in moderately to highly intensive combat. IW is characterized by one or both opposing sides using what are conventionally called guerrilla TTP. Stability Operations are as you described and may also involve a spectrum of force through none to simple Police or constabulary effort through Paramilitary Constabulary effort to IW in varying intensity and, rarely, up to CW. That said, it must be acknowledged that variances in that are, IMO, of small concern. Most words in the English dictionaries have multiple definitions and that seems to be acceptable [5].
NOTES:
[1] The 5th RCT in 1950-51 contained then CPT Hank Emerson, who from that experience probably developed his Checkerboard Theory of COIN Warfare. IIRC, he refined that theory and published it while at Leavenworth in 1963-64. It should be in the Archives there.
[2] I use the phrase 'guerrilla TTP' as shorthand for any combat effort by a force (organized, uniformed or not) that uses stealth, evasion, clandestine operations and short sharp actions while avoiding decisive commitment against superior force as a combat norm. Their actions may include infrastructure destruction (human and machine), attacks solely on opposing military forces, attacks on any opponents to include civilians, terror, intimidation and other tactics short of fully engaging major forces in combat.
[3] Sort of an aside to your question but somewhat appropos, I think. With 1 MarDiv and with the US Army in Korea, note the changes in a short period from full bore conventional warfare involving defense against Armored attack to a major offensive operation entailing full bore urban warfare to IW to CW against a different enemy with very different TTP to IW and back to CW. This is why I contend that the Armed Forces of the US are completely capable of conducting full spectrum warfare. If a marginally trained crowd could do it reasonably well in 1950, with todays training we should be able to do it very well at a high performance level.
[4] Again, note the sliding between categories of combat. US units translated between the various forms of combat and other operations relatively painlessly and generally fairly effectively. Most failures I observed were not at the unit level but were command failures at Division and above. Something to ponder is that most Bdes did well; most Divisions did not.
[5] Reasonable people could disagree with me on some of that transitioning between forms of warfare -- and warfare itself is constant evolution. For those two reasons, I think that a quest for excessive accuracy in terminology is probably not possible. That does not mean we should not try to be more precise, simply that accord may be difficult.
Random thoughts before earning my paycheck
Interesting topic, though dangerous to deal with without sufficient caffeine in the system.
To my mind, there is a fundamental divide in ways of applying organized violence - though actually it's not so much a divide as a fuzzy grey area.
Conventional (or regular) war is an artificial construct in which force is directed at the avatar of an opposing body politic. In its purest form, 'civilians' and their works are not affected except incidentally, mostly among those unfortunate enough to be located on or near the battlefield. Both sides have essentially abandoned rationality and entrusted the issue to brute strength. The two avatars contend until one side is either completely destroyed or concludes that it can no longer shield the body politic. Since this construct is completely artificial (and in many ways counter-intuitive), it has to be hedged about by the many laws and rules of war to ensure that it remains a non-rational contest of intellectual, spiritual, and material strength, unrelated to the actual issues at stake.
Unconventional (or irregular) war, on the other hand, is the application of organized violence directly to the body politic - or attempts to shield the body politic from such violence. In other words, at least one side is purposefully evading the opponent's avatar to starve, kill, rob, persuade, energize, terrorize, liberate, etc, the 'civilian' sector. Attacks on the opposing avatar are limited to what is necessary to allow access to the body politic.
No war is an unalloyed example of one or the other, of course.
Victor Davis Hanson alert: I will now use questionable and simplistic historical examples to illustrate.
The Hundred Year's War was largely irregular. It consisted mostly of raids, pillaging expeditions, massacres, and the like, designed to enrich one side directly at the expense of the other. On the flip side, each side was also trying to prevent the enemy from inflicting such harm. The key was that any fighting was directly aimed at gaining access to the body politic. Both sides were manned, trained, and equipped for this type of war - the medieval army was a supremely fit tool for irregular warfare in every sense. From time to time, conventional war was resorted to in the form of pitched battles (Agincourt et al), but this was the rare exception.
The American Civil War was originally purely and consciously conventional, but it was won by the north when they began to employ irregular warfare directly against the body politic of the south - and it was the vulnerability of the south to direct attacks on its body politic that in the end ensured there would be an actual surrender rather than a resort to a continuing guerilla campaign.
World War II had aspects of irregular war in ways obvious (partisans, saboteurs) and less obvious (terror bombing) I say less obvious because terror bombing employed the same tools used in regular warfare (bombers, fighters) in very similar ways as those used to attack the opponents avatar. The difference is that it was aimed directly at the body politic, rather than the material strength of the enemy.