Could the CAP concept work in Afghanistan?
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This thread was created after the issue started in 2012 on a separate thread reviewing the book 'The Village': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14702 (Mod ends)
As "Combat" Forces pull out by the end of 2014, do we bring the CAP back in support of SOF & ETTs?
If so what would they look like? The Vietnam model was 15 Marines: a 13man Rifle squad w/a Navy Corpsman & a Grenadier.
I would say the 2014 CAP Plt would have to be slightly more robust w/18 to 20 Marines.
I'd start w/the 13man RS + 1 Corpsman. To add to that I'd pull 4 Infantryman fr/the Weapons: 1 to act Squad Designated Marksman in exchange for the old school Grenadier, 1 to act as RTO (0341 FO, LCpl-Cpl), 1 trained to handle basic Intel (C-LIC), 1 I'd send to the 3-6wk Sapper Course.
With so much being done w/vehicles now it would be nice to have at least 1 truck to support patrols as a Fire Support Platform. W/that said it would be nice to have 1 Motor T Lance Cpl knowledgeable in 1st/2nd Echelon Field Expedient Maintenance.
20 could be seen slightly unwieldy but 4 would be mostly post positions, but as Infantryman able to step into patrol or QRF.
What do you think?
Everything that's old is neither new again nor necessarily better than something new.
With regard to Viet Nam, Corson was not alone. Most Officers and NCOs knew it was a doomed effort and many had figured that out by mid-1966 -- some even a earlier. They understood that there was to be no win, that the Government of South Viet Nam did not have the backing of most of the nation (neither did the VC or the North, the bulk of the populace just wanted to be left alone...). Most also knew the Army wasn't doing it right and that US political squabbling wasn't helping... :(
Nor did that knowledge remain confined to griping or bull sessions, those thoughts were officially and in-writing surfaced by many to their Bosses and up the chain until they hit the Party Line when they got buried in smoke and mirrors, can't have the Institution besmirched with dissent. :eek:
Much as is currently the case in Afghanistan and was the case in Iraq. War is an extension of politics, in our case, that's generally US domestic politics which overrule any foreign policy considerations. There are a lot of good, honest people in the Armed Forces and they know a bum hand when they see it, they are not afraid to surface that, they did it in Korea, they did it in Viet Nam as well as in the two more current operations but the services are heirarchial institutions -- when you get to the Bishops and the Cardinals, theology outweighs common sense or concern for the parishioners; survival of the institution means more than a few lives or a bunch of money. That's harsh but it's reality. :mad:
To return to the thread, the CAP program was a good program but it suffered from two significant limitations back in the day and neither of those problems has gone or will go away. It is not possible to routinely, uniformly and reliably aid or extricate (in itself a bad message...) the Squads / Teams or even ODAs in event of overwhelming attack. Far more importantly, there will never be enough people to use the technique in any nation or area of much size. One could, of course, rotate among areas of concern and play Whack a Mole -- we're pretty good at that. :rolleyes:
An added consideration on that last is that not everyone is psychologically equipped to operate in that mode among a local populace that is poorly understood and with wildly different social norms. CAP was a throwback to Haiti, the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. That entailed using Marines whose standard of living back home was not far removed from that of the local people amongst whom they lived in those countries. Those days and that standard of US living for most were long gone by the time the program was instituted in VN -- they're even further behind us today...
I think it comes down to use
I understand all sides of Vietnam being a no-win & there were many reasons for that; Political, Cultural, Tactical, & Strategic. I also understand that many of those issues migrate to A'stan. However the CAPs had many successes in their areas of influence w/little serious support. A lot of the Major short comings came fr/things beyond their control.
Here's the rub.
In 2yrs all Combat Forces will.. be.. out. I hear the Negatives: The Gov't of A'stan is CORRUPT, correct. Small Units operating at Distance are vulnerable, also correct, etc. All reasons would be just as valid for leaving no US troops, But thats not an option. Left behind will be MTT, ETT, some CS, & SOF.
There are many USMC Rifle Squads already acting in a CAP role w/relative independence; owning their own Battle-space, developing their own networks, & training their own local militia. All of this is coordinated at the top but it is the Squads & Sqd Ldrs running the show.
Thanks to Programs like Combat Hunter (teaching Profiling, Networking, Man-Tracking, & Advanced Patrolling & Observation Techniques), Squad Fires (bringing the squad the ability to call up to Level II CAS) & DO/ECO the Rifle Squad has many more tools in his Kit than ever before.
EMPLOYMENT
I wouldn't employ them in major or densely populated areas, those are Main Missions, I'd keep those for the ETTs & the ANSF. The CAPs would operate on the Margins.
I would start in the remote areas, in the villages that would most welcome that type of presence. I'd insert them in rural territory the taliban would need to retake to operate comfortably. The Goal wouldn't be to actively hunt the taliban, leave that for SOF, just disrupt & deny. Deny, Deny, Deny.
We can play the long game on the cheap. Let the ETT continue to build & develop ANSF. Let SOF go Kinetic, picking them off 1 raid at a time. Let the SF coordinate & build. And let the CAP Deny on the margins, denying the ability to set up his remote safe havens.
W/a CAP Platoon in many of these remote areas the SF can disperse in much smaller numbers, spread influence, & coordinate across a larger AO. Let SF MSGTs handle the Strategic nature of these relationships. Let the CAP run the day-to-day Local/Tactical end.
They don't need to be nor do I think they should be in the same chain of command. SF's mission is Strategic, the CAPs is Local/Tactical. However operating together (having 2-3man SF tm in the same village) will allow SF to remain fluid & centered on their Strat Goals, leaving village security to CAP, also allowing CAP Ldrs access to Sr. guidance.
Deployment
In 2008 2nd BN, &th Marines deployed to Farah Prov. as a Training BN, under basically the same "Non-Combat" authority as units will have in 2014. It eventually became a Combat/Training BN b/c for the most part(except for SOF) they were alone. They were successful but took a lot of casualties TF-2/7 was stretched over 10,000sq miles & at 1 pt over 16,000sqmi.
In 2014 the USMC can Deploy a 2-3 BN CAP based Special Purpose MAGTF.
Rough Draft: TF-2/7 deployed 70man Reinforced Rifle Platoons most at 70-100mi of dispersion. Each Squad separated to train, advise, & lead its own Police Station in the IDR FDD Programs.
Take 2-3 Infantry BNs & develop a 5-6mth CAP based PTP, similar to the ETT (culture, language, isolation) training-cycle, fr/the squad up start with:
- A 18-20man CAP Plt, pulling fr/Weapons Plt to fill SDM, RTO, CLIC, & Sapper slots
- Similar to TF 2/7 reinforce the Rifle Plt HQ (Plt Cmdr, Plt Sgt, Plt Guide, RTO, Corpsman) w/support Marines & a PSD fr/Weapons Plt & or Company. Rifle Plt HQ operates freely across 3 CAPs & coordinates objectives
- Company HQ operating on the Tenets of Distributed Ops & the BN as well. Weapons Coy is BN QRF. SPMAGTF HQ coordinates w/HHQ
Will CAP be welcome to the locals in Afg.?
If the CAP concept is suitable today or after 2013-2014 for Afghanistan, surely the areas for deployment are the non-Pashtun areas, where at least there maybe more of a welcome? Notably in the north, centre and west.
In the Pashtun-majority areas the time for CAP has evaporated. It is easy to speculate that a CAP in a "platoon house" will become a target for the Taliban and allies. The first "house" and CAP that is overwhelmed will lead to a political re-appraisal, since the CAP is only likely to American, I simply cannot see it being sustainable politically at home.
Could the CAP concept work in Afghanistan?
Moderator at work
This thread was created after the issue started in 2012 on a separate thread reviewing the book 'The Village': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=14702
The 2012 posts have been moved here and so will come before this explanation.
A "Transistional Concept"
As I "perceive" COMMAR's concept, it's intended as being transitional, since a 100% immediate withdrawal is not feasible (and in any event, is not intended as a universal prescription throughout Afghanistan). Nor, does it seem to be intended to provide for "pacification" (if that is even possible, except in the abstract) - or a "How to Win in Afghanistan" theory.
As such, it appears to focus more on the major strength of the VN CAPs as seen by Col. (then Maj.) Phil Ridderhof, COMBINED ACTION AND U.S. MARINE EXPERIENCES IN VIETNAM 1965-71:
Quote:
The Marines originally meant for Combined Action to provide them with rear area security. The idea of using CAPs for pacification did not really take hold until 1967.[293] CAPs were placed so as to fulfill a security mission. They only took hold in areas that had already been under U.S. military control. They were not placed out in areas that didn't have large units operating.[294] Most of the CAPs were placed on lines of communication in the I CTZ. This included such locations as Route 1, the main north-south artery in Vietnam, also known as the Street without Joy. This placement allowed for easier access and resupply to the CAP's. It also meant that the CAPs were providing security for these important supply routes.[295] Col. Solak, commenting on Combined Action, felt that they provided good rear area security and credible intelligence for Marine units. They did not, however, succeed as pacification. Their main success with the people was to provide a grassroots link with the Marines.[296] Security was the main benefit of Combined Action.
...
What Combined Action seemed to be best at was providing area control and security. Much of this accomplishment came about because of the aggressive military operations run by the CAPs. Body counts aren't a good indicator of pacification, but a favorable count can point to successful military operations.[303] In 1966 the kill ratio for CAP's was 14 VC KIA, confirmed, for every CAP Marine or Pr killed.[304] This even looked good to the military men favoring the big unit attrition strategy. One of the main arguments against Combined Action was the fact that the US didn't have enough troops to cover the area needed. To counter that, combined Action proponents gave statistics such as the fact that in 1968, CAP Marines comprised 1.5% of total Marine strength in Vietnam, yet they accounted for 7.6% of VC kills.[305]
The rest of the Ridderhof thesis is also a realistic ex post hoc look at VN CAP.
Maybe my perception is wrong; but that's how I take COMMAR's proposal.
Regards
Mike