Without regard to resource availability
my sense is that there is still very much a SF mission in Iraq. While I was not SF myself, I was Psyop and CA and hung around with a lot of SF guys motly from 7th and 3rd SGG. John Mulholland did his MMAS for me at CGSC, Charlie Cleveland hauled me around the Chapare in Bolivia, and John Waghelstein pinned my silver oak leaves on me. I also had SF teams working for me under OPCON in Panama.
At a minimum, I would think that the advisor/trainers the Army is turning out at Fort Riley ought to be leavened with SF guys. What the regular army advisor/trainers lack is the years of cultural awareness and language skills of the SF guys.
When you have to prioritize, I think you will, in fact, get more bang for the buck in Afghanistan. But I would still have a residual SF force in Iraq as above.
Cheers
JohnT
Right off the top of my head, I think that would take
Quote:
Originally Posted by
MikeF
Regardless, we all concluded that SF should be battlespace owners regardless of the AOR.
That just seemed like common sense to us.
not only a massive cultural shift but also some statutory changes. Not saying it's a bad idea but it (a) needs some thought; and (b) would not be easy to implement for a number of reasons.
An example of this conundrum is Tom Odom's comment above. I get the same sensing he does from the BCT returning folks I hear from; however, my earlier comment was based on the SF returnees I hear from. Rather different perspectives...
Not having been around recently, I don't know for sure
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Eden
...I'm not sure exactly why this was, as I was not privy to the limited circle of folks who were supposedly 'coordniating' activities; nor do I have a firm solution. What I do know is that the current set-up violates both unity of effort and unity of command and makes a coherent approach much more difficult to achieve.
but based on recent anecdotes from some SF acquaintances and grandson-in-law plus some experience at the coordinating level more years ago than I care to recall, I suspect that the problem -- and it is a big problem -- is a combination of minor personality and mission conflicts, tactical preference differences, some turf battles and a propensity on the part of the SOCOM crowd to retreat behind the "that's classified" wall when they hear something they don't like (yep, I've done that, too... ;) ) plus excessive concern for control (or, more correctly, responsibility if there's a screwup) by the conventional force (been there as well...:( ). My bet is that both sides contribute to the disconnects in pretty much equal measures. Shame.
The good news is that based on the same inputs, it appears that if the right people match up and egos are parked, some really good things are happening.