Iraqi Perceptions of the War
CSIS, 2 May 07: Iraqi Perceptions of the War: Public Opinion by City and Region
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The patterns of conflict in Iraq have grown steadily more complex with time, adding sectarian and ethnic conflicts to what began as a largely Ba’athist dominated resistance in mid-2003. There are now five major patterns of violence:
Sunni Islamist extremist insurgents, where Al Qa’ida plays a major role along with at least two other movements. These are the primary source of suicide attacks, car bombings, and attacks on Iraqi and Coalition forces.
Iraqi Arab Sunni versus Arab Shi’ite conflicts, where Shi’ite militias and death squads play a major role, and where sectarian violence, threats, and pressures are forcing the segregation of many areas, leading to displacements, and creating ethnic “cleansing.”
Iraqi Arab versus Iraqi Kurdish ethnic conflicts center around the “ethnic fault” line, where control of Kirkuk and the oil fields around it have become a major source of tension and potential conflict that extends to the West to the area around Mosul. The future of the Turcomans and other minorities is directly affected by the outcome, as is national unity. This ethnic struggle also interacts with similar Kurdish ethnic tensions and struggles affecting Turkey, Iran, and Syria.
Arab Shi’ite on Arab Shi’ite struggles for political control and power, particularly in Southeastern Iraq. Each of the three major Shi’ite parties is a rival for power along with smaller parties that play a major role in key cities like Basra. Clashes between Shi’ite factions and militias have so far been limited, but the struggle for control of the Shi’ite shrine cites and the oil-rich provinces in the Southeast may have only begun.
Arab Sunni on Arab Sunni violence now concentrated largely in Al Anbar but spreading eastwards into Diyala. This is partly a struggle for tribal control of given areas, but also a struggle between Sunni Islamist extremist elements like Al Qa’ida in Iraq. These struggles ease the pressure on the ISF and Coalition to some degree, but the enemy of an enemy is not necessarily a lasting “friend.”
These divisions, however, tell only part of the story. Many Iraqis have divided or multiple loyalties, and the patterns of violence in one area may well differ from another. This becomes far clearer from the detailed results of a recent public opinion poll by ABC News, USA Today, the BBC, and ARD. This poll provided important insights into the overall trends in Iraqi “hearts and minds,” but it also provided an important window into just how much Iraqis differ by major city and province. It also shows that any successful effort at counterinsurgency and conciliation must carefully consider all of the patterns in Iraqi perceptions and civil conflict.
The rumor mill in action vs political analysis...
From the 12 Jan '10 LA Times IRAQ: Coup rumors paralyze Baghdad
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When Baghdadis awoke this morning to find their streets sealed off and the city under virtual lockdown, the rumors began to fly.
Army officers had staged a coup in the Green Zone, one version said. No, it was Baathists loyal to the former regime who had taken over, according to another.
Mostly, the rumors concerned the Sunni lawmaker Saleh Mutlak, who has been recommended for disbarment from the upcoming March elections by the former De-Baathification Committee, now known as the Accountability and Justice Committee.
Iraqi political analysis at Iraq and Gulf Analysis by Reidar Visser
US perceptions of Iraqi perceptions...
Bolding was added by me and is not in Dr. Lynch's post.
Posted by Marc Lynch on 23 Feb 2010 at FP.com, Iraq contingencies
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The drawdown will probably matter considerably less than people expect. With the new SOFA-defined rules of engagement, U.S. forces have already stopped doing many of the things associated with the "surge." The Iraqi response to American efforts on the de-Baathification circus demonstrate painfully clearly that the nearly 100,000 troops still in Iraq gave very little leverage on an issue which the U.S. at least publicly deemed vital -- a point made very effectively by Ambassador Hill at the Council on Foreign Relations last week. The sharp backlash against even the measured criticisms by U.S. officials offers an important lesson: Doing the sorts of assertive things which may please Obama's critics are highly likely to spark a negative reaction among Iraqis, generating more hostility to the U.S. role without actually accomplishing anything. The U.S. is wise to avoid them.
That doesn't mean that things are rosy. The de-Baathification circus has demonstrated the fragility of Iraqi institutions, and helped to reignite sectarian resentments and fears (many Sunnis feel targeted, while many Shia are being treated to an endless barrage of anti-Ba'athist electoral propaganda). There's very much a risk of long, drawn-out coalition talks after the election. It isn't certain how a transition from power will go, should Maliki's list lose, given the prime minister's efforts to centralize power in his office over the last few years. There may well be a spike in violence by frustrated losers in the elections. If there's massive fraud on election day, things could get ugly. The elections, already marred by the de-Baathification fiasco, may well end up producing a new Parliament and government which doesn't really change much. There are big, long-deferred issues to confront after the elections, such as the Article 140 referendum over Kirkuk.
Iraq: The Way Forward–U.S. Ambassador's Assessment
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Speaker: Christopher R. Hill, U.S. Ambassador To Iraq
Presider: Karen J. DeYoung, Associate Editor and Senior Diplomatic Correspondent, The Washington Post
February 18, 2010
Council on Foreign Relations
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This election -- it's a very important election. It's an important election, not because if we have a successful election we can pull our troops out. It's an important election, because it will really help define what Iraq is in the future. And in so doing, define a relationship that we're going to be able to have in the future. This is, you know, I do think all problems should start by, you know, look at the map. And when you see what Iraq is, it's where the Shi'a world meets the Sunni world; it's where the Kurdish world meets the Arab world. It's in a very important position in the world. And so we want it to be successful and we want to have a long-term relationship.
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You know, because of the improvement in the security situation, I've been able to get out to almost all the provinces in Iraq, which was -- you know, could not be done by my predecessors due to security. And it was just -- it's been striking, you know, to go to some of these campuses -- I was at the University of Baghdad a couple of weeks ago and, you know, talking to these students. And, you know, they didn't talk to me about the Sunnis and the Shi'a and, you know, Article 140 of the constitution as the solution for Kirkuk.
They want to know, you know, are the oil companies coming in? Are they going to recognize these engineering degrees from Baghdad? You know, what do they need to do to assure that their degrees are going to be acceptable to international firms? You know, know can we improve our English in how can we improve, you know, relationships with American universities? Can we do more on distance learning? You know, this sort of thing.
It's what these kids are all asking. I mean, they're all very much wanting to be part of sort of global climate -- I mean, a global, you know, interaction and education. I was up in Erbil talking to Saladdin students there -- the same reaction. I mean, it's kind of gratifying that they kind of got it. And I must say one of these kids came up to me and said I just want to talk to some native speaker to really work on my English. And I said, well, I think we've got some various programs. And this kid said, well, you know, can't something be done more quickly?
The onion that is Iraq...in a field of onions...
Throwing out the technocrat's who ran things via De-Ba'athification, privatizing SOE's (unemployment rates went through the roof), and disbanding the Army (trained and unemployed soldiers with unlimited access to weapons) had very significant consequences to stability in the region.
It's interesting to think about the why's behind some of those decisions:
- Perhaps sending a noteworthy and long lasting message to the region was part of the decision making process. There are historical examples to consider such as The Morgenthau Plan.
- Perhaps the history of the military and the Ba'ath Party in Iraq was part of the decision making process.
Chronology of Iraqi Coup's
1941
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The 1941 Iraqi coup d'état, also known as the Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani coup or the Golden Square coup was a military coup in Iraq on April 1, 1941[1] that overthrew the regime of Regent 'Abd al-Ilah and installed Rashid Ali as Prime Minister. It was led by four Iraqi nationalist army generals, known as "the Golden Square." The Golden Square intended to use the war to press for full Iraqi independence following the limited independence granted in 1932. To that end, they worked with German intelligence and accepted military assistance from Germany. The change in government led to a British invasion of Iraq and subsequent occupation until 1947.
1958
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Inspired by Nasser, officers from the Nineteenth Brigade known as "The Four Colonials", under the leadership of Brigadier Abd al-Karīm Qāsim (known as "az-Za`īm", 'the leader') and Colonel Abdul Salam Arif overthrew the Hashimite monarchy on 14 July 1958. The new government proclaimed Iraq to be a republic and rejected the idea of a union with Jordan. Iraq's activity in the Baghdad Pact ceased.
February 1963
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The February 1963 Iraqi coup d'état was a February 8, 1963 armed military coup which overthrew the regime of the Prime Minister in Iraq, Brigadier General Abdul-Karim Qassem. Revolutionary leaders and supporters of the coup referred to it as a movement, rather than a coup. Some time after the Homeland Officers' Organization, or "Al-Ahrar" ("The Free") succeeded in toppling the monarchy and transforming the Iraqi regime into a republic in 1958, signs of differences between political parties and forces and the Homeland Officers' Organization began when Pan-Arab nationalist forces led by Abdul Salam Arif and the Baath Party called for immediate unification with the United Arab Republic.
Another view of the February 1963 coup
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Qasim’s removal took place on February 8 1963, the 14th day of Ramadan and therefore called the 14 Ramadan Coup. The coup had been in its planning stages since 1962, and several attempts had been planned, only to be abandoned for fear of discovery. The coup had been initially planned for January 18, but was moved to January 25, then February 8, after Qasim gained knowledge of the proposed attempt and arrested some of the plotters.
The coup began in the early morning of February 8 1963, when the Communist air force chief, Jalal al-Awqati was assassinated and tank units occupied the Abu Ghrayb radio station. A bitter two day struggle unfolded with heavy fighting between the Ba’athist conspirators and pro-Qasim forces. Qasim took refuge in the Ministry of Defence, where fighting became particularly heavy. Communist sympathisers took to the streets to resist the coup adding to the high casualties. On February 9, Qasim eventually offered his surrender in return for safe passage out of the country. His request was refused, and on the afternoon of the 9th, Qasim was executed on the orders of the newly formed National Council of the Revolutionary Command (NCRC)[73]. His successor was his fellow July 14 conspirator, Arif.
1968
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In 1968, Abdul Rahman Arif was overthrown by the Arab Socialist Baath Party.
Back to De-Ba'athification:
Joel Wing at Musings on Iraq, Timeline of Iraq’s De-Baathification Campaign