Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences That Matter
CTC, 29 Dec 08: Sunni and Shi'a Terrorism: Differences That Matter
Quote:
Key Findings
• Over the twenty‐five year period from 1981‐2006, Sunni terrorism in noncombat zones evolved in four overlapping waves. Conducted by hundreds of ideologically similar groups, Sunni terrorism has featured continuous, mid‐to‐high intensity operations viewing war against infidels and apostates as a perpetual condition.
• Terrorism by Shi’a groups in non‐combat zones over the same period has been conducted in five discrete campaigns and by two main actors: Iranian state agents from special national paramilitary and intelligence services, and Hezbollah operatives. The rationale for terrorism by Shi’a groups over that time frame was tethered tightly to Iranian state and Hezbollah organizational objectives, especially that of state/group survival.
• The six significant differences between Sunni extremist terrorism and Shi’a terrorism over twenty‐five years of practice in non‐combat zones have major policy implications for the United States and its western allies in the event of overt hostilities with Iran over Tehran’s advancing nuclear program.
• The intense correlation between survival aims of Iran and Hezbollah on the one hand, and the instigation of terrorism against western overseas interests on the other, suggests that there is a high likelihood that a mid-to‐high intensity terrorist campaign by Shi’a groups—along the lines of three campaigns carried out by Hezbollah and Iranian agents during the 1980s—would be initiated in response to any U.S. or Israeli strike against Iranian nuclear sites or wider regime targets.
• Any new campaign of terrorism by Shi’a actors of this type could have a profound, unsettling impact on overseas American diplomats, businessmen, educators and commercial agents who would likely become the focused targets of bombings, kidnappings and assassinations.
• Such a terror campaign would likely circumvent much of what the United States is presently doing to combat terrorism overseas, and greatly challenge America’s hostage negotiation and crisis management capability.
• U.S. political leaders should carefully consider the differences in Shi’a terrorism and Sunni terrorism in non‐combat zone as part of a comprehensive assessment of all the costs involved in a crossing of military thresholds that would likely trigger an Iranian‐backed campaign of Shi’a terrorism in the first place.
Complete 75-page paper at the link.
Shiia's, as well as Sunnis, driven by lineage of Abraham argument
Rex:
I am enlightened by you two younger focused experts regarding Sunni and Shiia terrorism comparisons.
Let me suggest a theological/historical simplified fact which does in fact drive both groups from a religious perspective, in my humble view.
Israel.
The core issue is and always will be religions or theological. Who was God's chosen among the two sons of Abraham, Ishmael, first born of Hagar, or Isaac, born 13 years later of Abraham's wife Sarah.
Among my moderate Muslim friends here in the US are of the Agha Khan sect of Shiia Islam. They are more willing to sit down over coffee or tea (or a Coke, my preference) and tell me that the issue, over and over, to the total Muslim world is Jerusalem; Israel's occupation (their view, not mine) of Palestine/Arab home lands, etc.
Look forward to more from you two, Rex, and you guys are the modern front who can stimulate and document very well.
At the risk of interposing myself ...
between two O-6s, are we not moving off the mark of the thesis presented in the OP ?
That is, are there significant differences, which can be used to our (US) advantage, in the approaches taken by Sunni and Shia groups in developing strategy, operations and tactics used in the armed conflicts in which they have been and are now engaged ?
The Executive Summary of the CTC report seems to think so (I reformatted to separate the bullet points):
Quote:
There are significant and little appreciated differences in the trajectory of Sunni extremist terrorism and that of Shi’a extremism. The differences exist across six key areas that impact American policy considerations, especially in light of steadily escalating tensions with Iran.
First and foremost, Sunni radicals and Shi’a extremists differ in the overall approach and main objectives for their use of terror. The former tend to operate in a continuous, mid‐to‐high intensity manner, seeing war against infidels and apostates as a perennial condition featuring overlapping waves. Outside of an ongoing and seemingly open‐ended campaign against Israel, terrorist attacks by Shi’a groups have by and large featured discrete terror campaigns tethered to state and organizational objectives.
Second, Sunni terrorists and Shi’a extremists manifest different patterns for recruiting terrorist operatives and developing terrorist missions. Shi’a terrorists, unlike their Sunni counterparts, enjoy direct state support and for that reason are far more likely to originate from Iranian embassies, consulates and state‐run businesses.
Third, despite holding a minority viewpoint within the wider Sunni Islamic community, Sunni extremists, especially Salafi‐Jihadis, rely more extensively on the support of their coreligionist expatriate communities in facilitating terrorist activities.
Fourth, while employing similar tactics and methods, Shi’a terrorist groups have shown a much greater propensity to kidnap innocents to barter, while Sunni extremists more frequently abduct to kill.
Fifth, Shi’a terror groups exhibit a much higher incidence of targeted assassinations for specific political gain, rather than the high‐casualty killings featured in Sunni terrorism, and particularly of the Salafi‐Jihadist variant.
Finally, each sect’s extremists manage publicity and propaganda differently. The Sunni approach to information management tends to feature doctrine and resources geared to take immediate credit and widely amplify a terrorist event. Shi’a terrorists, while not averse to normal media publicity and amplification, by and large take a much lower‐key approach.
Importantly, this study does not argue or imply that violence perpetrated by Sunni or Shi’a extremist groups is carried out for reasons that are inherent to one or the other tradition of Islam. There is no evidence sought or identified in this work contending that historical patterns of terrorist attacks by organizations identifying themselves as Shi’a, for example, are pre‐determined by Shi’a theology or philosophy. What this study does suggest, however, is that those Shi’a organizations that have conducted terrorism in non‐combat zones display several preferred operational patterns that contrast markedly from their Sunni counterparts.
The general thesis of this report is similar to the arguments advanced by Bob Baer in The Devil We Know - several dozen reviews at the Amazon page.
PS - George: Your six points are something you and I could spend much time into the wee hours of the morning; but, for the life of me, I have a hard time seeing how they are directly material to the thesis of the CTC report. :)
Sunni vs. Shia, some sideline thoughts
Rex, your opinion is noted.
My meaning is that "all Muslims" are taught, as an integral part of their lives from childhood, that Islam is the final and correct religion, that others (guys like me, to keep it focused on just me) are ignorant, wrong, and in league with a "false" religion.
On the topic of how to use or drive wedges between Sunnis and Shias, I wouldn't go there in the context of either Pakistan nor Afghanistan.
REASON: The Shia minority in Northern Paksitan and in Afghanistan are routinely attacked, murdered, blow up, whatever, these days just because "they are Shia." They don't have a share in the power structure effectively speaking in Pakistan (Northern parts is my focus) nor in Afghanistan, despite artificial quotes NATO/US are using in training up officers, police, civilian civil service native to Afghanistan.
My "George know it all" opinion is you would do well to be focusing and studying tribal vendettas among and between the Sunni Pukhtuns, pure and simple.
Taking my wife out for an early dinner to then attend our local SOUTHERN VOICES authors conference which starts tonight and runs through this weekend here.
I would encourage some of you to go on and join to have full access, including posting rights on Global Hujra Online, which is a part of KhyberWatch.com, similiar to the structure of SWJ and it's various parts. The you can have direct dialogue and conversations very candidly.
One observation: KhyberWatch.com and Global Hujra Online are Pukthun nationalist sites, focused on promoting ethnic pride, identity, and pehaps future efforts at a nation of Pukhtuns, in violation of the current Durland Line structure that separates Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I'm sure you can get on (I am tired of being the only non-Muslim member of Global Hujra Online) with all the brain and word power and real world younger men and women's experience evident here on SWJ.
Yes, "all" of anybody of anything is a glittering generality, but with Islam is comes closer to the truth than with any other grouping I have ever known. My views again here.
BW, this statement seems questionable factually....
Quote:
from BW
The majority of Shia populaces are not in states that have governments formed during the Cold War by western governments that shaped the politics of the region to deny this critical Cold War battlefield to the Soviets. The majority of Sunni populaces are in states that are.
We have from COL Lynch's report this snip (p.47 - see also Table 3, p.49):
Quote:
Only five countries (Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain and Azerbaijan) have more self-identified Shi’a than Sunnis. Another ten states have Shi’a populations or diasporas numbering more than half a million and that hold
a politically important minority position. [81]
[81] In addition to the five Shi’a majority countries, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Turkey, India, Pakistan and Albania have Shi’a minority populations with significant numbers and political import. One should note that despite control by an Alawite, secular Shi’a leadership, Syria is a country with more Sunni than Shi’a.
Iran, Iraq and Lebanon were very much Cold War political battlegrounds, from the time of Kim Roosevelt on. Azerbaijan is independent because of the Cold War. I also fail to see the direct materiality of the Cold War to Lynch's thesis.
PS - COL Lynch, wherever you are. Please come on and explain your take to these other O-6s. :D
Those "cold war battlegrounds" cited actually precede
the cold war by many years. Go back to 1919 (in some cases thousands of years earlier...). The Ottomans were on the losing side and all their former Arab lands gained some form or other of independence. the British and French chopped up the area by drawing lines on a map -- diligently ignoring anyone who knew that Middle East -- and created a series of fault lines.
The USSR moved in smartly with Agitprop during the 1920s and proceeded for the next 70 or so years to foment hate and discontent (I suspect their successors are still at it...) all along those fault lines and they were successful beyond their wildest dreams. They played all the Arab psyche buttons; colonialism, neo-colonialism, sectarian differences; western disdain, all those and more. Today, there are a lot of little old guys watching BBC World News in St. Petersburg and chuckling while they sip their vodka.
They were far more successful in shaping the attitudes of the populace than the west was in shaping governments. We may have 'won' the cold war on an overall basis -- but they definitely won in the ME. It is perhaps noteworthy that, hard as they tried, they failed in the nation with the second largest Muslim population.
The Sunni / Shia divide is generally dormant unless agitators provoke one side or the other. Iran is Shia but its problems and attitudes stem more from dreams of Darius and Cyrus than they do from a desire for religious domination. Shia populations in the other nations all get along with each other barring deliberate provocation. The Iraqi problem is one of payback, most of the other nations are trying to adapt and defuse confrontations.
However, there are still agitators working zealously. Religion is not their motive power -- that would be political power with religious issues as cover.
I think Bob's world is correct on this score:
Quote:
"...Certainly Islam is central to the lives of most of the people of the Middle East; but it is not Islam that drives young men to violence.
True, it is not -- but some are using Islam to justify and endorse violence and too many in Islam are tolerant of this perversion not least because the USSR was successful for many years in planting anti-western attitudes that will be around for many more years. Islam is not the driver but is accepting and even, in too many cases, approving of that violence.
In fairness, the west has not done a very good job of refuting those attitudes.
Picking up the SovCom themes
Quote:
from Ken
They played all the Arab psyche buttons; colonialism, neo-colonialism, sectarian differences; western disdain, all those and more. ....
They were far more successful in shaping the attitudes of the populace than the west was in shaping governments....
Strikes me that these Cold War themes were picked up by both Shia and Sunni as their geo-political arguments - to which, extreme religious positions were added, starting with Maududi.
I think a case could be made that
both sides learned from each other and, other than a very few, the west did not catch on to much of anything. The USSR; the Cheka / NKVD / MGB / MVD / KGB; were probably the best intel crew around. They were flexible and shrewd, adapted well to their environments -- something the Brits do fairly well and we do not do well.
I also strongly suspect that the extreme religious arguments are mostly -- not all -- in reality more cover for political maneuvering than deep faith. A detailed study of the life, politcal ploys and shenanigans of the Imam Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini can be illuminating in this regard. He was for the Shah before he was against him. He knew Kermit, Jr for instance...
Suggestion for some off line chat
From the Saturday, Feb. 21, 2009 NEW YORK TIMES, of interest on this thread:
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/21/wa..._r=1&th&emc=th
If any of you guys want to chat off line, I have one private suggestion/observation regarding a tribe in NWFP of Pakistan/and in Afghanistan, same tribe by name, which "might" address my reply to Sunni vs. Shia exploitable differences...my reply being you might rather consider trying to exploit among and between Sunnis tribal fueds.