French & US COIN and Galula (merged thread)
RAND has re-issued Galula's 1963 book Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman.
Quote:
When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France, mired in similar wars for independence in its colonial territories, was in a poor position to cope with further upheaval. The Algerian strategy encompassed varying approaches and was more adaptable than that of the French, necessitating a rethinking of traditional counterinsurgency methods. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command in the district of Greater Kabylia, east of Algiers, at the height of the rebellion, and presents his theories on counterinsurgency and pacification. In the process, he confronts the larger political, psychological, and military aspects of the Algerian war, and provides a context for present-day counterinsurgency operations. This groundbreaking work retains its relevancy as a challenge to traditional counterinsurgency tactics and presents approaches to predicting, managing, and resolving insurgent and guerilla conflict. The parallels between the Algerian war and modern warfare are striking, and lessons can be extracted from French successes and failures in its drive to contain and manage the Algerian uprising. A new foreword by counterterrorism expert Bruce Hoffman elucidates the relevance of this historic study in the context of modern times.
The Roots of Galula's Influence on US COIN thinking?
I'm curious if anyone can trace the roots of Galula's influence on American COIN doctrine.
I'm sure that having Pacification in Algeria in the files at RAND provided some accessibility (and ease of distribution given that you can download the .pdf and email it), but the first copy of Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice that I ever saw was an old copy on a friend's bookshelf which had been issued to his father for a class on revolutionary warfare at USMA back in either 1969 or 1970. Based on that, it seems that Galula had some currency back during the time of Vietnam as well for his book to have found its way into the USMA curriculum.
The book was a 'must read' for all us military
intelleckshulls as soon as it came out in 1964. The JFK SWC Center Bookstore at Ft Bragg couldn't keep it in stock. With no Amazon, B&N, Borders and such, people were driving to D.C and Atlanta to buy it. Seriously. Now, those of us with a first edition are all old... :D
Unfortunately, those who read it in those early days didn't rise to high command in Viet Nam for seven years or more... :(
That being said, it was not and is not the be all and end all on the topic, just one of many decent treatises on the subject.
Galula... French or American?
The main reason why Galula never was popular in French Military is because he was unknown... Note that his celebrity started in the US after his resignation from french army!
A second reason is linked with french experience on guerilla, counter-guerilla and many stabilization ops (or even intervention in West and Black Africa between 1960 and today): the lessons learned and (informal) practices we gained in this period was much more than Galula's one during his experience in Greece, China and Algeria. Others have gained more reputation. Bigeard and Massu (though they weren't using the same coin procedures as Galula) are a good example, as well as gen. DELOYEN who fought againt guerilla in Indochina, in Algeria and in Tchad. Trinquier is best known because of its role in the creation of Groupement Commando Aéroportés (anti-vietminh indigenous maquis during the first Indochina War). French experiences in Indochina and in Algeria gave birth to an original way of doing COIN which differs slightly from Galula's Pacification in Algeria. This latter book was written for US public and especially US military concerned by Vietnam. I wonder if Galula would have written it, as well as Counter-insurgency warfare the same way if it was for french readers.
Last: under De Gaulle, COIN formal Doctrine (Guerre révolutionnaire if you want, though it seems that this term refers to much more than precise procedures and principles) was abandonned because it was politically charged. In French military today, COIN does not refer to Algeria, but mainly with African Contingency or past colonial experiences (Gallieni, Lyautey...)
It appears to me that Galula is much more american than french:his principles relies on Mao's one more than on french tradition of "pacification by oil spot". Unlike french, american military establishment in the 60s lacks concrete experience in counter-guerrilla: Galula's fresh one was a good new!
Stéphane Taillat
There were a number of proponents of the oil
spot theory in the US Army in the early sixties and there were units in Viet Nam that used it -- until they got caught and were told to 'search and destroy' -- I happened to be lucky enough to be in one and more lucky to have a commander who told MACV to flake off, he'd fight his own war. He did and did it well.
Search and destroy techniques most on the ground knew intuitively were wrong and unworkable. However the four star commanders from late 1961 until late 1968 believed in them, therefor the staffs and subordinate generals espoused it (which is not the same thing as believing in it). Pity...
Seven long years.
Galula's Influence on US COIN Doctrine
Galula's influence has been far greater in the United States than in France for several reasons. One is that by the time he was writing, France was trying to forget its experience in Algeria; I would draw a parallel with the US after Vietnam. However, Galula's experience in Algeria was highly valued by Steve Hosmer at RAND (who is running an "Airpower in COIN" conference in DC next week--still engaged in intellectual leadership in COIN 45 years after the conference at which he recognized Galula's gifts!)
See http://www.rand.org/publications/ran...6/algeria.html for a brief summary of Galula's thinking, with links to the landmark 1963 study Pacification in Algeria, 1956-1958 (with a great new intro by Bruce Hoffman) that Galula distilled into Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.
Another reason is that Galula did his best writing in English. In fact, Theory and Practice has just been published in French for the first time, with an introduction by General David Petraeus; see http://www.amazon.fr/Contre-insurrec...1344958&sr=8-1
We relied heavily on Galula's insights when writing FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
Your concern is misplaced
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
This is an excellent point and analogous to the thinking that "we have the most firepower so we can win any war." I could see an ambitious general saying to President McCain "we can control the population of Iran" and disaster ensuing.
I think...
You're far more likely to see a General saying "No way we can do that..." Obviously, you've forgotten the Army's reaction to Kosovo (remember the Apaches that could not fly in the mountains).
Not to mention their reaction to Iraq. Both times...
Generals want to protect the institution to defend this nation against attack, they HATE small wars. The myth of the military hawk is leftish foolishness, there are not any Buck Turgidsons out there.