The American Approach to Counterinsurgency
Here are a couple of little brain farts that I had during my presentation to the Army War College Distance Education class yesterday (and now has been integrated into my "Rethinking Insurgency" presentation):
1. What's the ultimate strategic objective--government control of "ungoverned spaces" or stability? This is a crucial decision. If, as I argue, it is stability (based on the idea that protracted conflict rather than insurgent "victory" generates threats like terrorism and organized crime), the U.S. role should involve things like mediation between insurgents and government, and aiding a sectarian militia which can protect a repressed or excluded group rather than simply assistance to the government (which is our current approach). The idea of a “legitimate resistance forces” in Iraq—Sunni Arab militias--is interesting. IF the core of the conflict is fear of repression and distrust of the government by Sunni Arabs, it might make sense to give them something to protect their community other than AQ.
2. Counterinsurgency is extremely difficult. It conflicts with the American strategic culture which thrives on quick, clean, decisive outcomes. As a result, we do it half way, embroiling ourselves without demanding the reengineering of the political, economic, cultural, and social system which gave rise to the conflict in the first place.
I believe we should either do it right or not do it all. If a state facing an insuring is not willing to undertake deep changes (to include things like the empowerment of women), I believe we should opt out. Other nations should be able to choose between sustaining their "culture" or undertaking reforms which lead to prosperity and stability, but we should not bear the costs for the decision.
Think about it--what if we opt out? But, you might say, If we do, insurgents may win and take over a country! And, I reply, So what? Think of insurgent victories of Cold War--Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Nicaragua, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe. How much of a real threat did any of them become? Even what may be the worst of the lot for us--Cuba-- was no real threat, but only an imagined one sustained by Florida politics. If, in fact, insurgents seize power somewhere and become state sponsors of terrorism, we can stop them more effectively and cheaply than we could try and stop them from coming to power by propping up incompetent governments. Ultimately, insurgent victories may be less of a threat to U.S. national interests than involvement in a protracted, perhaps failed counterinsurgency campaign.
So, again I say, let's either do it right or not do it at all.
Couldn't agree more. I'd also suggest that we
Quote:
Originally Posted by
SteveMetz
Check. In a way, that follows the ideas I'm trying to make--that we think more in terms of stability ops/peacekeeping than in terms of warfighting. What I'm struggling with is that our current conceptualization of counterinsurgency sees it as a variant of warfighting, meaning that the strategic objective is "victory." What I'm trying to say is that victory requires reengineering a flawed society, and we're not willing to pay the cost to do that. So we've put ourselves in a situation where we can't attain our own strategic objectives.
Stability ops are different because the strategic objectives are not necessarily "victory." Stability I think we can attain.
toss words around that feed perceptions that are inimical to what we want to do.
Leaving aside the 'heroes,' 'warfighter' and such cinematic or media excesses, I'll also reluctantly forebear commenting on the current fad for naming operations in grandiose and vastly overstated terms (OEF, OIF) which themselves send a bad message subject to manipulation.
Instead, let me just suggest that the very term 'war' applied to a counterinsurgency sends bad messages and the use of words like victory, defeat and such in the context of such an effort where the best outcome can only be an acceptable conclusion sends a terrible message that can and will be used, domestically (regardless of which party is where) and internationally to our detriment.
You are correct IMO in that we in the US are not prepared to pay the price -- or be patient enough, some of both I think -- to wage a successful counterinsurgency in the classic mode. Stability ops are possible and we should head that way.
I have never subscribed to the "American's don't want casualties" routine. While it's certainly true in a relative sense, it has been used as a propaganda tool by many and is vastly misunderstood. There is no question that some Americans do not want any casualties and that some relatives of those hurt or killed will be angry but they are a small minority, most Americans will accept high casualties as long as the goals are clear and the operation(s) are successful. Failure, bungling and sloppy work turn off more Americans than do body bags. As we have seen...
A military capability is required, no question but it needs to be focussed and far better trained to be effective and quick. We have the capability, the potential is there but Congress is a big part of the problem.
Simply put, big hardware items that bring benefit to multiple States and Districts are a better sell in Congress then are a few small high end pieces of materiel from small suppliers and in small quantities for smash and grab raids or the cost of training to get the 'conventional' forces to a level of capability required to perform the operations that can be effective. This tends, unfortunately, to drive the Army in a quest for a bigger budget to go where the money is.
Put most but not all of the heavy and medium stuff in the ArNG, congress will buy that and you can have the best of both worlds.
Removing SF and CA from SOCom and putting them to work on their primary designed missions while leaving, even expanding, JSOC would be helpful. However, a well trained Infantry Battalion can ride helicopters, fast rope and kick doors as well as those guys can. The MEU-SOC effort worked but can be improved and the Army is equally capable of doing it. We are going to be confronted with a high number of second and third term enlisted guys who are Grunts and they'll have some good experience. The key is in the training; it is good now -- it can be better.
Whoops. Inadvertent lie, there. The Key is in getting the 'senior leadership' to adapt. ALL of them...
Just a couple of quick observations...
Steve, I think that you are fixating on the wrong level of analysis. Supporting government operations in states that are undergoing an insurgency is not necessarily about "winning a war" or securing strategic resources. A lot of it comes back to a really simple point: is the US' word any good?
Diplomacy, as someone once put it, relies on credit established on the battlefield. Nobody would trust a country who said "we are your friend, so give us free trade, but we won't help you defeat those people who are trying to destroy you". This is reminiscent of Achilles grumping around in his tent :cool:.
Having said that, I would also like to point out that your two categories, COIN and Stability Ops, are also problematic :D. First, they are not discrete, they are a continuum. Second, by casting them solely in kinetic terms you are leaving out other possible solutions.
It strikes me that a far better way of casting the entire problem set would be to recognize that "stability operations" are multi-faceted from natural disaster recovery through refugee issues and economic displacement to outright insurgencies. These types of operations should be, especially towards the natural disaster end, should be an automatic action rather than a diplomatic action (it's a case of is your word good when you [the US] says that X, Y, and Z are your values). The issue of supporting your allies should not be a question, although the issue of making some one or some faction your allies should be.
On the issue of an insurgency in Canada - not only would you loose your supplies of comedians and natural gas, but you also might want to check out how much petroleum, hydro electric power and fresh water you get from us as well :D. Believe me when I tell you that the Canadian public would be quite happy to stop exporting gasoline to the US if we could get it ourselves at even a 100% markup over the oil sands production cost of $15.85 (CDN) per barrel :eek:!
Marc