Leadership in History Pertaining to the Present
As a bit of an amateur military historian, I have always held the Germans in high regard when it came to the subject of leadership. Erwin Rommel might be the best example of leadership in wartime. In contrast to other fronts during WW II, the North African campaign is often characterized as "the gentleman's war." Rommel's leadership style was forceful--in The Infantry Attacks he threatened to shoot a soldier on the spot when the individual refused to partake in a trench raid. In the desert campaign, Rommel drove his men mercilessly, but he always led from the tip of the spear, enduring the same privations as his men. In Knight's Cross, Rommel recounts three weeks of continuous battle when at the end, even he could not motivate his men to continue the offensive.
When Rommel was recalled to mainland Europe to prepare defensive positions, he was a whirlwind of energy and activity. Upon realizing the war was lost, Rommel helped launch the plot to kill Hitler. For that, he paid with his life. I consider Rommel a role model and example of exemplary leadership. In combat, there was none better. When it came to honor and pragmatism, he was peerless.
So, here's my question: Is there any difference between the office corps of the United States Army as opposed to the Wehrmacht? Was the Prussian tradition of producing military leaders substantially different than the United States? And finally, what was it that made the German officer corps so effective?
I would like to know what we can learn from the WW II German officer leadership that could help the U.S. Army become even better today.
One final thing. Being rather young, I have never known "Mad" Max Thurman other than from stories. I'm sure many who are a part of this forum have served/interacted with the General. Does his style of leadership have merits? I've heard he "jacked people up" as a way of doing business because he understood that enacting change within a large organization is extremely difficult. He assumed (I'm recalling peoples' comments who served under him) that any Army organization had issues and the best way to deal with them was to assume that nothing worked. When, his underlings demonstrated competence, he threw money at them so they could continue to do what they did best. Does any of this sound familiar to SWJ followers? Was he a largely peacetime Rommel?
I did work for GEN Thurman
in SOUTHCOM. I did not like him but I came to have a lot of respect for him. He was intellectually honest and able to admit that he made mistakes. An 06 friend and boss (perhaps the reverse) gave me some good advice on dealing with Thurman - never tap dance. if you don't know something say so, he would not hold it against you. But God help you if you tap danced:rolleyes:!
I saw Thurman take critical comments from subordinates in his stride when the subordinates knew what they were talking about. I saw him gently tell two of us that what we gave him was not what he wanted but he gave us time to get him what he wanted and the guidance to know what it was. I also saw his prejudices, inconsistencies, and total lack of concern for the personal lives of his staff.
On balance, GEN Thurman was a good leader at the unified command level. His record on leading the Army into an effective all volunteer foce is enough to cement his legacy.
Frankly, we could have done a lot worse and have .
Cheers
JohnT
I've learned a lot here. That post, Norfolk,
is probably the single most important point anyone has made on this board since I first came. Gobsmacked by the blindingly obvious, that's me...
Years of puzzlement as to why the potential wasn't being met, why the mediocrity -- swept away in a second.
Thank you.
Seems to me that the Staff system of
Berthier as improved by Scharnhorst and adapted to the US at the direction of Secretary of War Elihu Root had it right. The number One staff agent was the Personnel guy, followed by number Two, the Intel person. Seems logical, own troops and the enemy and their capabilities and intentions were needed by the number Three guy, the Operations Officer to do much of anything -- and the poor number four, the hapless Loggie, had to try to support said doing. That worked. We have now elevated the Three to two steps above primus inter pares and, as a long time Ops guy, I'm not sure we've done ourselves any favors...
The dropping of the human element to a lower priority than organization and functions didn't have time to adversely impact performance to a great extent during WW II but it has slowly done some damage since.
I wonder if the transformation with the 1941 edition of FM 100-5 owed its subordination of people to process to the then creeping bureaucratization in D.C or to the malevolent influence of Frederick Taylor and / or the Deming crowd? Or both? Probably both. McNamara accelerated the destruction for sure.
I don't think that subordination has served the US Army at all well and it probably needs to be undone.
We need to return to our Roots (bad pun intentional).