Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006
Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006 - LTC Gian Gentile, International Herald Tribune.
Quote:
During the year I commanded a combat battalion in West Baghdad in 2006, some of the soldiers in our outfit were wounded and some were killed, but we did not fail. In my opinion we succeeded.
We cleaned up garbage, started to establish neighborhood security forces, rebuilt schools and killed or captured hostile insurgents, both Shiite and Sunni. Our fundamental mission was to protect the people. Other combat outfits we served alongside did the same.
In this sense there is little difference between what American combat soldiers did in 2006 and what they are now doing as part of the "surge." The only significant change is that, as part of the surge strategy, nearly 100,000 Sunnis, many of them former insurgents, were induced to stop attacking Americans and were put on the U.S. government payroll as allies against Al Qaeda...
Our troops did not fail; our strategy did
The troops did not fail in 2006, but the strategy did. Gian Gentile is wrong when he writes about 2006, "Our fundamental mission was to protect the people." In fact, the fundamental mission in 2006 was to transition the mission to Iraqi forces. And there were not just "fewer Combat Outposts" in Iraqi neighborhoods in 2006; in fact, there were almost none.
Gentile's troops were forced to try to protect the Iraqi people by commuting from Camp Victory and other large bases on the periphery of the city. I contend that this is the reason why the local Iraqis did not side with his battalion, or others in the city, and why were willing to side with U.S. forces in the same neighborhoods a year later. The fact is that a year after his battalion left, our troops were living among the local inhabitants, not driving by on periodic patrols. Gian Gentile and his troops may have tried to do the right things, but they could not replicate the successes of 2007 because they did not live in the neighborhoods they professed to protect. Those successes required more than a surge in forces; they required a change in our doctrine and strategy.
Different Visions of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Our strategy failed in 2006, just as it failed in 2003-2004 when my brigade was stationed in Rusafa and Adhamiya (not Sadr City). I have admitted as much in a book I have written on that experience, "Baghdad at Sunrise," which will be published this fall. This statement has nothing to do with units being "goofed up." Rather, it has everything to do with strategy and doctrine. In the spring of 2004, we withdrew from our forward operating bases inside Baghdad to the super-bases on the city's periphery. The fear was that our continued presence inside Iraq's cities would cause the Iraqi people to view us as occupiers. News Flash - they already did. But by withdrawing to the large bases on the outskirts, we ceded the streets to the insurgents and militias. And I disagree with you that patrols conducted from Camp Victory are as effective as combat outposts positioned 24/7 amidst the neighborhoods of Baghdad.
The 2006 Campaign Plan stated, "Our actions during liberation, occupation and partnership have enabled the Coalition and successive Iraqi governments to set the conditions for the stabilization of Iraq and for the transition to Iraqi self-reliance. Completing this transition during the tenure of this Consitutionally-elected government is the focus of the Campaign Plan."
Not "a focus," Gian, but "the focus." This statement is the reason why the commander of Multi-National Force-West in Al Anbar could state publicly that he did not have enough troops to protect the people of the province, but he did have enough to accomplish his mission.
Compare the above with what is written in the 2007 version of the same plan, "In the near term, the downward spiral of sectarian violence will be halted by further developing existing security lines of operation to protect the population and render irreconcilable groups less effective, while concurrently developing and employing political, economic and diplomatic policies and initiatives that will move reconciliable groups and the political establishment of Iraq towards political accommodation."
Perhaps the difference in these two vastly different visions of the campaign plan for Iraq is not apparent to you, but the maturation of our thinking on Counterinsurgency is evident to me.
By the way, none of what is written above came from the so-called "neo con spin machine." And "my surge" and "my purported new doctrine" actually belong to the nation and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, respectively. We are all in this together.
We are going to have to agree to disagree on this issue, Gian.
Presence, Patience, Persistence
I think that some people fail to realize that there is no quick win in a COIN environment and the perceived success of the surge is also a result in part of seeds planted and actions taken long before the surge was devised or implemented. Although this article is defensive in nature I think it also illustrates a potential problem that could arise within the ranks – a “we-they” among those whose units served at different times. But in the end, as we all know, the only ones who can achieve success are the Iraqis themselves. The real success of the surge is not due just to the increased presence of US forces, but because of actions of Iraqi security forces, actions of the (though still troubled) Iraqi government, and most importantly actions of the Iraqi people and the choices they are making (and the choice is not to side with terrorists/insurgents or Americans; the real choices are side with terrorists/insurgents, be indifferent or apathetic, or side with the Iraqi government – in the end it is always a fight for legitimacy – the insurgents or the indigenous government – and we can only be the external support to that indigenous government – we cannot win the COIN fight for it)
And of course COIN takes presence, patience, and persistence. You have to have security forces present in sufficient forces engaged with the population and providing the necessary secure environment. You must have patience because change does not happen over night, the enemy has a vote and most importantly the essence of COIN (as in all warfare) is about dealing with human behavior. And finally you must be persistent because not all strategies and tactics work in every situation. You must adapt strategies and tactics to suit the specific conditions and most importantly the changing conditions.
Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy
In this morning's Wall Street Journal - Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy by Yochi Dreazen.
Quote:
... Lt. Col. Gian Gentile, a history professor here who served two tours in Iraq, begs to differ. He argues that Gen. Petraeus's counterinsurgency tactics are getting too much credit for the improved situation in Iraq. Moreover, he argues, concentrating on such an approach is eroding the military's ability to wage large-scale conventional wars...
Col. Gentile is giving voice to an idea that previously few in the military dared mention: Perhaps the Petraeus doctrine isn't all it's cracked up to be. That's a big controversy within a military that has embraced counterinsurgency tactics as a path to victory in Iraq. The debate, sparked by a short essay written by Col. Gentile titled "Misreading the Surge," has been raging in military circles for months. One close aide to Gen. Petraeus recently took up a spirited defense of his boss...
Col. Steve Boylan, a spokesman for Gen. Petraeus, said the surge deserved credit for enabling the other dynamics contributing to Iraq's security gains. "The surge was definitely a factor," he said. "It wasn't the only factor, but it was a key component."
Col. Boylan said that he was familiar with Col. Gentile's arguments but disagreed with them. "I certainly respect the good lieutenant colonel," he said. "But he hasn't been in Iraq for a while, and when you're not on the ground your views can quickly get dated."...
Col. Gentile's arguments have drawn fierce criticism from counterinsurgency advocates, in particular from Gen. Petraeus's chief of staff, Col. Pete Mansoor, who is retiring from the military to teach at Ohio State.
In a posting to Small Wars Journal, a blog devoted to counterinsurgency issues, Col. Mansoor wrote that Col. Gentile "misreads not just what is happening today in Iraq, but the entire history of the war."...
Additional links at SWJ.