Revising FM 3-24: What needs to change?
All,
At the organization I work for (COIN Center) there is some discussion of revising and updating FM 3-24/MCWP 33.3.5.
There is certainly a wide body of criticism of FM 3-24, to which most of the regulars here are familiar with. Many units who have employed the FM have found strengths and shortfalls in the manual when put into application.
Here's some starter questions, but don't limit yourself:
1) What was helpful/useful in FM 3-24?
2) What is missing in FM 3-24?
3) What needs amplification?
4) What needs de-emphasis?
5) What is flat wrong or needs removal?
6) Does the manual strike the balance between specific, applicable knowledge and theory of operations?
7) How does the manual hold up in application in Iraq/Afghanistan, and does its principles hold up outside of Iraq/Afghanistan?
Chapter/paragraph would help in the discussion, but is not necessary.
If you need to read the good book, (wink to Gian);), it's here.
We are considering a conference here at Leavenworth early next year to flesh out some of these issues, I thought this would be a good place to start.
Niel
Summary of parallel, earlier discussion?
I don't know whether Steven Metz (link to his June 2007 monograph "Rethinking Insurgency" here) has previously posted it elsewhere on SWJ, but this just crossed my desktop in one of those serendipitous L2I-net "the research gods must be happy" moments. It's a four-page summary of an October 2007 Strategic Studies Institute/Brookings Institute colloquium, a somewhat-tritely titled "COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy." It's available in PDF.
Key insights discussed in this document include:
- Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and how the nation should undertake it.
- The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state, the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach.
- Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics, training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important if not more so.
- Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.
I offer it here in hope of assisting backbenchers like me to frame their own questions/comments/concepts about FM 3-24 version 2.0.
FM 3-24 is Galula Heavy or Trinquier Light
I thought all four reviews were excellent in their own ways and brought out needed criticism of a manual that needs to be debated; heavily and deeply.
I agree with Marc T's notion of grounding the manual in reality on the ground; I would add that the manual's narrow selection of history and theory (population-centric, that is) causes it to be a narrowly applicable doctrine for the many realities of insurgencies that the United States might face. Hence the point I have made previously about the American Army becoming dogmatic in its approach to coin.
John T; what is it about Biddle's review that you thought was "outdated?"
And I believe, contrary to your stark dismissal of Kalyvas's review, that he is actually and absolutely spot-on correct in his assessment of FM 3-24. It is, depending on how you want to look at it, Galula Heavy or Trinquier Light. Go back and read the thing; its premise demands a response of protraction, heavy amounts of American combat boots on the ground to secure the population in order to separate the insurgents from the people and ultimately establish the host government as legitimate. How is this not the protracted people's war approach of the 1960s aka Thompson, Galula, Trinquier, etc?? Point to anwhere in the manual where there are other options for an american counterinsurgent force to pursue other than population-centric? There is one 5 line paragraph in Chapter 5 on "limited options" for coin. But that is it.
The entire FM needs to be deconstructed and rebuilt the same way active defense doctrine was heavily debated between 76 and 82 and in the process fundamentally changed. Unfortunately, most folks in the Army see FM 3-24 at its end point as was FM 3-0 in 1986. Or, in other words, most folks think it just needs some polishing around the edges, I on the other hand, thinks it needs to be rebuilt.
gg
What in your mind would constitute
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Rank amateur
...But if our objective is political reconciliation, these are the issues that could lead to strategic failure in spite of tactical success.
strategic failure with respect to Iraq?
Follow on question; Is our objective political reconciliation? If so or if not, why?
Marc, I had to read your comment 3 times
to grasp its meaning.:o
My reading of the doctrine - 3-24 and its predecessors - does not presume any sort of inevitability. My understanding of insurgency is that it is far more complex and that while it may seek to achieve incorporation into the global economy on favorable terms, it also may have nothing to do with the global economy or even reject it entirely. One could argue that AQ, as a global insurgency, wants to turn the entire global order on its head starting with religious freedom/diversity, moving to a political endstate (or series thereof), and finishing off with adapting modern technology to 7th Century Islamic polities. If I am correct, then Brown really has little to say that is useful - which was my start point based on her inability/unwillingness to determine the facts of what she is wrting about and her lack of understanding of concepts, starting with military doctrine. (She seems to think it is some kind of quasi religious dogma whereas, an old Military Review article captures it best in its title, "Doctrine Not Dogma.")
I guess I really didn't like her piece very much - must be pretty obvious.:p
Cheers
JohnT