Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare
Fraud or Fuzziness? Dissecting William Owen’s Critique of Maneuver Warfare
By Eric Walters, Small Wars Journal blog
Quote:
See William Owen, "
The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud," in
Small Wars Journal. Also published in August 2008, Vol 153, Vol 4.
Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) Journal.
As a very minor contributor to a couple of the Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication “White Books” outlining Maneuver Warfare and having once been a professor teaching Maneuver Warfare for American Military University, my attention was caught by William F. Owen’s piece, “The Manoeuvre Warfare Fraud," if nothing else than for its catchy title. One might expect it to get a fair amount of visibility due to its controversial thesis. Owen is rightly frustrated with the maneuver warfare concept, especially since he appears to rely on the U.S. Marine Corps publications FMFM-1 and its successor, MCDP-1 Warfighting as the best contemporary articulation. But to characterize the concept as a fraud? A perversion of the truth perpetrated on the U.S. military in order to deceive it? There are indeed difficulties with the maneuver warfare concept, but to label it a fraud seems a bit much. Owen argues that the “the community it was intended to serve” embraced maneuver warfare uncritically. So who is to blame—the advocates who maliciously perpetrated the concept or the U.S. Marine Corps that accepted it so naively and so readily? ...
Fuller has a great deal to recommend him, not least
his ideas on staffs and age of Generals...
I think the Tank led us to Maneuver Warfare simply because it existed and offered a combination of offensive power and mobility that begged to be exploited, a combination that nothing previous could provide. Fuller's swarms were not outrageously impossible but they were and are beyond the state of technology, training and human capability available to large Armies -- and by definition, swarms take numbers...
Unattended Vehicles, air or ground, OTOH... :cool:
I think the natural tendency of combat between individuals or Armies and most conglomerations in between is to stasis which leads to pure attritional warfare. Instinctively, most realize this is not good and thus a desire to avoid it yet such opportunities to preclude having to "...fight it out on this line if it takes all Summer..." are offered only by a relatively rare combinations of synergistic events, a significant mistake on the part of one side or the other -- or by a truly exceptional and innovative Commander literally making an opportunity.
Lengthy way to say maneuver warfare is important and desirable but rarely able to be practiced much above Battalion level however any decent Army must have the capability of employing the techniques when that chance or stroke allows.
Cavalry was never unstoppable
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Originally Posted by
Render
Ken - I would think the tank returned us to the maneuver warfare of the past. In that the tank provided the cavalry with a way to get past those horse killing machine guns.
Tanks under many circumstances are.
Cavalry offered mobility, not maneuver warfare. Other than the Mongols, most Cavalry supplemented but did not replace Infantry and combat was at Infantry speed, maneuver at an Infantry pace. The Tank changed that.
What is maneuver warfare exactly?
This is the real issue here, and we can see it in the various posts on this discussion thread. I'm not even sure I understand what William Owen thinks it is. I agree that the MCDP 1 definition as articulated is not much help. Robert Leonhard's definition works much better for me, but that isn't exactly the way Bill Lind, John Boyd, and others would see it. For them, it's either German School Maneuver Warfare (Auftragstaktik) or nothing.
A lot of worthwhile points to discuss and I'm going to wade into this since Mr. Owen seems willing. But I need to get through a bit of truth in advertising before diving into this so everybody understands my particular bents and biases.
When I came into the U.S. Marine Corps in 1980, I was pretty dismayed at what I found. I'd been a military history buff and wargamer since I was 14, and what I was seeing in the Marine Corps (I was a tank officer) wasn't squaring with what I was reading and experiencing on the historical board wargame maps. Of course, the USMC had a rich tradition of storming fortified areas and throwing bodies/ordnance/ammo against it. But I noted that we all too often went for the "thickest part of the hedge" instead of going around when that chance was offered. I still see this today, believe it or not. More on that in a bit.
Met Bill Lind in 1988 and we became fast friends. It was then I first got exposed to MW and got the terminology I needed to explain things that just didn't seem quite right. Through him I met John Schmitt, the author of FMFM 1 who was working on a "white book" on campaigning. We seemed to see things in much the same way. In 1993 as an AMU masters student, I met Colonel Mike Wyly (who figures so prominently in the Marine Corps adoption of MW) and Bruce Gudmundsson, author of STORM TROOP TACTICS, a seminal work on German tactical innovation in WWI that busted a lot of myths about storm troop tactics in that era. Bill and Bruce ran a TV show called "Modern War" in 1994 that I was fortunate enough to have participated in. I'm still in contact with all of them. I will admit all these men affected my thinking a great deal. In 1994 I was part of "The Great Synchronization Debate" in the pages of the MARINE CORPS GAZETTE and carried on a lengthy correspondence with Robert Leonhard who was writing PRINCIPLES OF WAR FOR THE INFORMATION AGE--that's me as a Major in the acknowledgements. We didn't agree on a number of things, but I think I can articulate his views relatively well after all that. His work affected me greatly, particularly his book FIGHTING BY MINUTES as I quote it extensively in my chapter on Soviet decentralization in Stalingrad, 1942 in John Antal's and Brad Gericke's anthology, CITY FIGHTS.
So here is the "Apostles of Mobility" creed--yes, I am a maneuverist. I need to say that up front. Hopefully I can make points better than what we have often seen in the advocacy rhetoric. That said, I am not one to claim MW is the end all be all warfighting philosophy. I happen to particularly like it, but that's because I grew up in a Marine Corps that was unable to think beyond the beachhead and/or fortified line, that had been seared by its institutional experience against the Japanese, Koreans, and Vietnamese that seemed inured to any other approach than "kill them all and let God sort them out." There is certainly a time and place for that, but what I noticed was that we were seemingly incapable of doing anything else, even when the situation seemed to call for it.
I'll just make two points before I address the specific items brought up here in future postings.
1) MW was a medicine designed to address a particular warfighting "disease," borne out of Vietnam war experience. Like any medicine, it loses a great deal of its relevance when the disease goes away. I have a hard time talking and thinking about maneuver warfare in any instance other than when seeing attritionist approaches applied to situations that aren't suited for such a style of warfare--but the attritionist approach is applied nevertheless.
2) I am not sure MW has really been embraced by the USMC. I'd say there are those who have--and they are about 10-20% of the total. That may be enough. Sure, many can parrot the manuals and the buzzwords, but they show little practical understanding in the cases, TDGs, field exercises, and combat situations handed to them. For those who point to the doctrine, I will simply say that doctrine has no force if it is not followed. Additionally, many of the doctrinal tenets in the USMC "White Books" are not carried through to the detailed Marine Corps Warfighting Publications that contained more of the "how to" guidance. In fact, in some situations they are actually contradictory.
Some will point to Grenada, the Persian Gulf War, and OIF I to prove that I am wrong--that the Marine Corps had leaders who understood and applied MW. I can't disagree with that--we were lucky to have had them. And perhaps one should not expect more than this, that our senior leadership understands and can apply the concept. It's far from clear that our juniors can. It's very much a mixed bag. And much depends on how you define the term "maneuver warfare," which brings this particular reply back full circle to where I open.
In short, I want to make sure I understand what flavor of MW we are talking about. Are we talking the USMC definition? Lind/German School definition? Or Leonhard definition?
Can't speak for others but for me,
it's an amalgamation of all three plus Fuller, et.al. and others even including De Saxe and Gustavus Adolphus; probably best summarized as the Lind/German school for most purposes. It is IMO a valuable form of warfare but it is not a panacea that will fit all situations; it's a tool in the toolbox for use if possible by the substitution of innovation, surprise and agility for mass...
Framing the MW Discussion--Definitions
Please bear with me on this, but in my experience in grappling with the issues surrounding MW, we have to agree on what we are talking about. Otherwise, we'll talk past each other.
William Owen has already well described the problem with the MCDP-1 statement on MW, but there's much more to this definition that we need to pull out. The USMC says one thing but really means another; to understand this, I've got to walk everyone through a few things. Once I do this, some of the implications of Lind and Leonhard will become much more clear.
On pages 37 and 38 of MCDP 1 we get what I consider to be the best "definition" of MW in the publication, and you'll see I say that because I tend to agree with Leonhard's characterization in The Art of Maneuver. The below paragraph follows a brief charaterization of Attrition Style of warfare:
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On the opposite end of the spectrum is warfare my maneuver which stems from a desire to circumvent a problem and attack it from a psotion of advantage rather than meet it straight on. Rather than pursuing the cumulative destruction of every component in the enemy arsenal, the goal is to attack the enemy "system"--to incapacitate the enemy systematically. Enemy components may remain untouched but cannot function as a cohesive whole." Rather than being viewed as desirable targets, enemy concentrations are generally avoided as enemy strengths. Instead of attacking enemy strength, the goal is the application of our strength against selected enemy weaknesses in order to maximize advantage....Maneuver relies on speed and surprise for without either we cannot concentrate strength against enemy weakness. Tempo itself is a weapon--often the most important. Success by maneuver--unlike attrition--is often disproportionate to the effort made. However, for exactly the same reasons, maneuver incompetently applied carries with it a greater chance for catastrophic failure. With attrition, potential losses tend to be proportionate to risks incurred.
There is no discussion on command and control here, but the two statements regarding the reliance on speed and surprise and the idea that tempo itself is a weapon are key ideas that are intended to justify decentralized C2, with attendant improvisation, initiative, adaptation and cooperation between elements, particularly laterally. We don't really get to that until nearly the end of the publication, at the top of page 78, when MCDP-1 "drops the hammer" in a section called "Philosophy of Command:"
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It is essential that our philosophy of command support the way we fight. First and foremost, in order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command and control must be decentralized. [emphasis in the original--EMW]
This is practically unchanged from the version orginally published in FMFM-1 Warfighting. Not can, not should, not possibly or probably--C2 must be decentralized to "support the way we fight," which is a maneuver style. If MW requires decentralized C2, then it's easy to conclude that if there is no decentralized C2, you cannot then do the MW style.
Given the influence of John Boyd and Bill Lind on the development of MW in the Marine Corps, it's understandable that, to the USMC, decentralized C2 is quite possibly the defining characteristic of MW, but you have to get to page 78 to get there. Interestingly, we don't see this explicit linkage in the earlier description of the "maneuver style."
And that is where Robert Leonhard lives in his first book. Mr. Owen brings up Leonhard's misgivings in later works (and I'll get to that eventually, and it's a very worthwhile discussion, but I won't right now). Leonhard sticks very closely to the description of the "maneuver style" without characterizing the C2 philosophy that achieves it. To Leonhard, defining the C2 characteristic is too narrow. He appears to agree with Colonel Mike Wyly who is reputed to have said that the two defining principles of MW are "speed and focus." That accords well with the USMC description we have. So all agree that this is what discriminates MW. Where the differences emerge is whether or not you can do MW without decentralized C2. Leonhard in his book The Art of Maneuver will say you can, and we call that Soviet School MW.
Speaking from an academic standpoint and as a former analyst of Soviet military theory (my first masters was a Soviet concentration), I agree with Leonhard. The Russians perfected by 1944 a system where they could mount maneuver warfare style in very much the way our MCDP 1 page 37-38 description would conform, only they had a much more hierarchical and centrally controlled method, one that persisted for decades afterwards.
But as a frustrated Marine junior officer who bridled under what I perceived to be as an oppressive training regime where intiative was routinely stifled and compliance to orders was prized above all (even if it compromised success), I am far more sympathetic to the German School and am ready to concede that--for the Marine Corps--I've signed up to the USMC/Boyd/Lind definition that you can't do MW without decentralized C2. What's extremely interesting to me is that Bob Leonhard grumbles about much the same thing in The Art of Maneuver--the Army may preach initiative and mission tactics, but it practices something else in AirLand Battle, despite the doctrine.
The Soviets had no choice but to do things the way they did, especially after The Great Patriotic War when they had short conscriptions and still had a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic force. They did not exhibit a lot of characteristics for independent thinking (at least successfully) and individuality that we see in the American military. German school fit more with American talents and capabilities, although I kept seeing U.S. military doctrine begin to look more and more like their Soviet enemies, particularly with regard to command and control. I first wrote about this in 1993 and 1994 and haven't seen much--at least regarding conventional U.S. warfare--that makes me change my mind. The Soviet model, while achieving speed and focus, meant more stifling of initiative, more rigid compliance to orders regardless of success at a particular level, and so on. The U.S. is wedded to synchronization, an impossible goal given the original definition for it, and I'd argue Soviet Troop Control methods did a better job of it in the 1970s (at least from a doctrinal standpoint) that does our most recent official articulation of the concept. But that's a whole seperate discussion.
So where does this leave us?
Regarding the MCDP-1 quote that William Owen gives us, it contains the gist of the MW style, but doesn't really get at what the USMC thinks is the necessary component--decentralized C2. Even Owen's restatement of the quote doesn't treat this, but that's because he is going elsewhere with his argument:
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The US Marine Corps seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions, which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope.
He goes on to say that:
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However, the usefulness of this aspiration is in the precise nature of those unexpected actions. Identifying what these actions should be and how to perform them is a necessary step in defining the concept.
He's absolutely right, of course, but it's at this point where he and I part ways. I focus on the C2 issue as being the problem, whereas he attacks the issue of the dichotomy that MW set up, a contrast between "the attrition style" (or Attrition Warfare) and "the maneuver style." He's got good reason to do this and we'll get into that, but it fails to scratch the itch of those of us who are watching our superiors, peers, and subordinates oftentimes pit strength against strength, fail to be discriminating in what, where, and how we attack, and innumerable other things that the "maneuverists" associate with the attrition style.
So I'll propose this before going forward. If we are talking about MW as a "style" (speed and focus) compared to something else, we'll keep calling it MW. If we're talking about "German School" MW (as Leonhard would call it) which is what the USMC, Boyd, and Lind would term MW, then I suggest we call that "mission tactics" which is really all about decentralized C2. Just so we can keep the ideas straight. "Maneuver Warfare" without all this qualification is just too slippery a term, meaning too many things to too many people.
Any problems with that?
I don't agree at all with your assertion that the
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"..."German School" MW (as Leonhard would call it) which is what the USMC, Boyd, and Lind would term MW, then I suggest we call that "mission tactics" which is really all about decentralized C2.
is anywhere near that simplistic but I'll certainly accept the stipulation for now to further the discussion. :cool: