Security Cooperation at the strategic level
I'm in the early stages of working on a paper (about 15 pages) on security cooperation at the strategic level. Right now I'm looking at the "ends" that I want to cover. In other words: What strategic effects can good security cooperation bring to the U.S. Here's what I have so far (terms may change):
1. Force augmentation
2. Enemy Resource Denial- think Brasidas fostering rebellions amongst Athens' colonies
3. Economy of Force denial- think Stillwell tying up Japanese troops in China
4. Strengthen partnered nations
5. Strengthen US/Partnered nation relationship
6. Assist allies without a major US commitment
I'd love some comments if anyone has any ideas or if I'm missing something since I know we have a lot of SC experts on here. I'm only in the rough draft of a vague outline stage and have six months before my deadline, so I'm not emotionally invested in any ideas yet.
Thanks.
Think you're on the right track
Will you limit yourself to SC as currently defined or propose an expansion of authorities?
Strategic Cooperation for a Purpose
Xenophon,
I encourage you to look at the pacom.mil website, and then look over the strategy link to get an idea of the purpose of strategic cooperation according to PACOM. I'm not so sure there is an "endstate", since it is a process that must be sustained to various degrees to maintain the desired relationships and build the cabilities needed to enable us to operate together should the need arise. Relationships garnered from SC can be as important (or more important) as the capabilities generated from these events. The perception that they are our partners and we're their partner has contributed to the prevention of conflict the PACOM AOR in recent years, but of course there is no guaruntee that peace will continue and if we need to go war the relationships we developed through SC will be critical enablers.
I disagree with what I think Wilf implied about the need for a strategy first. The relationships we develop allow us to respond to a host of threats and disasters that we may not be able to predict (thus develop a strategy for). They allow us access to the region and the relationships allow us to reach a consensus quicker should the need arise where we have to respond. We also demonstrate our will to honor our security commitments in the region by participating in various exercises, and with the increasing instability in nK and a rising China that is important. Hard to sum up in a couple of paragraphs, but SC is critical to our overall security.
http://www.pacom.mil/web/PACOM_Resou...Sep%202010.pdf
Strategic Facilities for a Purpose
The title is taken from Bill's post, which acted as a catalyst to return to an issue I've not looked at seriously for a long time.
For a host of reasons, even in this networked world, using the USA as the example there is a requirement for such usually mundane matters as overflight permission (recall the US F-111 strike on Libya) and bases / facilities. I vividly recall now twenty years ago flying to Windhoek from Jo'burg and the on-board announcement look to your right at the US-funded, huge airbase (never used I think).
Not to overlook the role of the heavy airlift available from the commercial sector and former Soviet air forces. Strategic co-operation and often in Africa, where the USAF might not be so welcome to overfly and land.
Professor Robert Harkavy has written on this issue, most recently in 'Strategic basing and the great powers, 1200-2000':http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=s...page&q&f=false
Ensuring both nations gain something is important. I am no expert, others here are on the Phillipines, but I do recall the amazement that the USA lost Clark Field and Subic Bay. What do you when one side says 'go now'? Another example was Libya, with Gadafy's coup. There the UK had more troops than the Libyan Army, plus UK & US airfields.